A failure of will, and a Euro dream that sank beneath the waves

‘ IS THIS for real?’ my German friends asked about Tony Blair’s strongly pro-European rhetoric following his election victory in May 1997.‘Or is this a re-run of John Major’s failed ambition to be at the heart of Europe?’ There was a profound wish across the German establishment that it should be for real. The litmus test would be the new government’s intentions towards the euro. Would it honour its commitment to hold a referendum on giving up the pound and, if so, when? In my brief seven months as ambassador to Bonn, successive visits by Robin Cook, the new Foreign Secretary, Peter Mandelson, an ardent pro-European who had become Minister without Portfolio, and Tony Blair himself, encouraged the Germans to think that this time it really would be different. It was not, of course, though at the time that was not obvious. Sitting in Bonn, I even detected a vibration from London that Blair might be considering a quick euro-referendum in the autumn of 1997, to cash in on the new government’s soaring popularity. But it was not to be. Instead, the Government constructed an elaborate argument around the need for the British and eurozone economies to converge more closely before our membership could be contemplated. There was much talk about the economic cycles being out of sync. It was quite convincing for a while. In reality, it masked a failure of political will.

In his early years as premier, Blair hoped

Britain could join Germany and France in a

triple alliance leading the EU — while also

acting as a ‘ bridge’ to America. But Meyer

picked up warning signs in Washington that

this dream was fatally unrealistic. At a

dinner in 2001, attended by leading

Republicans and media tycoon Rupert

Murdoch, Meyer was berated for

Blair’s decision to step up military

co-operation with France, which the

Americans saw as a threat to Nato. I withstood a full-frontal assault from all concerned against our alleged sell-out to the French. A low rumbling sound issued from Murdoch in which the word ‘ appeasement’ could be identified. There was a serious point. How could even Tony Blair, the most gifted performer of his generation in the circus of British politics, ride the American and European horses at the same time without falling between two saddles? The real answer was: with difficulty. I fell back on the holy mantra of British foreign policy. There was no choice to be made between Britain’s European and Atlantic vocations. If we were strong and influential in Europe, this would strengthen our hand in the U.S. If we were close to the U.S., this would rebound to our benefit in Europe. ‘ No, no!’ the cry went up around the table.‘Britain must choose.’

But Blair stuck to his dream. When he

visited America in September 2001, after

9/11, Meyer says he was ‘ on a high’ after

successful meetings with Chancellor

Schroeder of Germany and President

Chirac of France. Meyer goes on: This was a moment when Blair must have thought that a Franco-German-British directorate of Europe, with Britain in the lead, was a real possibility. Robin Cook, as Foreign Secretary, had been the first back in 1997 to articulate the notion of a three-power European directorate. In late 2002 Jack Straw began to talk about Britain as Europe’s leader in the fight against terrorism. Hubris was in the air. Nemesis would in due course follow.

This nemesis took the form of France

and Germany’s implacable opposition

to Bush and Blair’s strategy on Iraq.

Before long, says Meyer, ‘ Blair’s famous

bridge between Europe and America

was sinking beneath the waves.’