Iran stand-off shows Royal Navy is now in choppy waters

BRITISH foreign policy and diplomacy seem all at sea as the stand-off with Iran deepens. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard shows no sign of releasing the Stena Impero and its crew.

At the heart of the crisis are mistakes in strategic analysis, diplomacy, foreign policy, and operational planning. When Royal Marines seized the Panamaregistered Grace 1 in Gilbraltar, allegedly carrying nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude to the Syrian refinery at Banias, the Tehran regime swore that it would react. And it did.

The May government seemed completely ill-prepared. Analysis must have been carried out about likely strategic consequences of the Grace 1 incident, and precautions taken. It should have been discussed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the National Security Council (NSC) — not just the “Cobra emergency meetings” so beloved of the media. Cobra meetings happen generally when the unforeseen has happened — in other words, a cock-up.

Any analysis by the JIC and NSC, and at the military operational headquarters at Northwood, must have looked at the likely consequences of seizing the Grace 1. Iran’s foreign affairs spokesman, Abbas Mousavi, warned that Iran would seize a British ship if the Grace 1 wasn’t released.

“We will strike at British shipping in the Gulf. And it may not just be in the Gulf. It could be elsewhere in the region,” he told me just a week ago on Al Mayadeen, a pro-Iran Lebanese TV station. The Government responded by dispatching the destroyer HMS Duncan but only to relieve the Montrose, which is to go into refit. HMS Duncan, too, is due for refit within weeks.

Why is Britain so unprepared? Who asked the UK to seize the Grace 1? It was nominally in support of EU sanctions against Syria, yet the EU has offered precious little support for this. Was it at the behest of the White House hawks led by National Security Advisor John Bolton? Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt still has questions to answer.

There now simply isn’t enough of a Royal Navy to protect British ships and trade. HMS Montrose is a capable ship but the Type 23 class is old. HMS Duncan is ultra-modern, with a world-beating radar, but a design fault means it cannot stand high heat — and the whole class has to go for refit. The replacement, HMS Kent, has the new Sea Ceptor missile system, UK-designed, and is ideally suited for the Gulf confrontation. But if all 19 destroyers and frigates of the Royal Navy were up and running, there aren’t the crews to man them. Any new government will have to address this, and it cannot be a quick fix.

Recruiting, training, pay and conditions will need a major overhaul — it can’t be fudged any more. Meanwhile, in t h e G u l f , u rge n t me a s u re s a re needed. It is likely to mean the costly and cumbersome tactic of tanker convoys. That means our deployment and policy for Iran will now come under the command of President Trump.