ELECTIONS AND LOGGING TRENDS
● A cynic might be forgiven for suspecting that a logging company might speed up activity if it suspected that a forthcoming election might result in a stricter regime. Activity might also increase if a candidate thinks that supporting logging will secure key votes.
And indeed, emerging evidence suggests that elections can play an important role in shaping deforestation rates. In a 2022 paper, ‘ The role of elections as drivers of tropical deforestation’, published in Biological Conservation, researchers from the Universities of Amsterdam and Nairobi, and others noted how the rate of deforestation increased when a forthcoming election was expected to be close-run; and that uncompetitive elections were associated with lower deforestation rates than non-election years. They compiled a pantropical analysis – an annual database from 2001 to 2018 – on political elections and forest loss for 55 tropical nations and modelled the effect of elections on deforestation. In total, 1.5 million square kilometres of forest were lost during this time period, especially in the Amazon, the Congo Basin and Southeast Asia. Deforestation was significantly lower in years with uncompetitive lower chamber elections compared to competitive elections. A study in the Brazilian Amazon found that municipallevel deforestation was 8–10 per cent higher in years when there was a municipal election. Moreover, a similar increase in deforestation was also found during the national elections in Brazil’s Atlantic forest biome. ‘Election theory suggests that politicians should utilise all avenues possible to win support and favour in the lead up to an election, which includes giving away or promising forested land for development, or turning a blind eye to forest exploitation,’ the authors write. Equally, a process of ‘make hay while the sun shines’ (or ‘cut trees while you can’) may apply when a pro-logging incumbent is under pressure.
This phenomenon isn’t limited to Brazil. During gubernatorial elections in the USA, governors are more likely to advance or retract environmental policy based on the preferences of their voters.
The authors urge electoral-management bodies and conservation groups to be vigilant during competitive elections, ‘because forests and other natural resources could be traded for votes.’