TELE POSTBAG ‘Transparency needed from IEM on emergency response’

REGARDING the recent article in the Telegraph on the ‘tyre storage ticking time bomb’ at Devol Farm, I have not been actively involved in Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) for the last six years, however, my following observations are based on 30 years previous experience in the subject.

All the organisations mentioned in the Tele article have legally defined responsibilities under said Civil Contingencies Act (2004).

The underlying aim of IEM is to develop flexible and adaptable arrangements that will enable effective joint response to any crisis whether foreseen or unforeseen.

That’s where the Multi-Agency Incident Response Guide (MAIRG) document mentioned in the article can play a vital part in those arrangements.

The purpose of IEM is to ensure organisations and agencies that may be involved with the local emergency response should work to the following common objectives: protecting human life; property and the environment; minimising the harmful effects of the emergency; promoting a swift return to a normal life; maintaining normal services at an appropriate level; supporting mutual support and co-operation between local responders; supporting the local community and its part in recovery; ensuring an effective and co-ordinated joint response.

There are five key elements to IEM — assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery.

Not having had sight of the MAIRG it would appear from the article that the agencies involved have indeed addressed or are in the process of addressing them all as they are required to do under the legislation.

The key issue that I have taken away from the article and presents the greatest concern is the reluctance of the IEM responders, to share the content of the document in full.

A MAIRG is a short document outlining key information on a site and the responsibilities of responding agencies to any incident occurring. This is intended as a quick guide to assist responding agencies during the operational response phase.

It is therefore not intended for ‘general’ consumption.

The other issue is that MAIRG documents can contain details of organisations’ operational response plans which should not or cannot be shared outwith the organisation.

The issue that needs to be considered is that a high proportion of MAIRG documents are ‘protectively marked’ under the government’s ‘Protective Marking Scheme’.

Security classifications indicate the sensitivity of information and there are three levels of classification: ‘Official’, ‘Secret’, ‘Top Secret’.

From the information gleaned from the article, I am not suggesting that the MAIRG document in question has been protectively marked as not all such documents require this level of protection. But it may explain the reluctance to share the document in full.

In conclusion, to ensure the agencies involved are seen to be working to the IEM common objective of ‘supporting the local community and its part in recovery’, it would seem prudent for them to be more open as the reasons why they are reluctant to share the full content of the MAIRG, and to engage with the councillors openly and answer questions on exclusion zones and the impact they may have on the local residents and indeed the wider community, as if the smoke plume in particular spreads over a wide area, it may affect infrastructure and businesses wider afield.

RICHARD DUNCAN, Group COMMANDER (retired), Scottish Fire & Rescue Service