THE MILITARY PHILOSOPHER
The figure of Epaminondas is shrouded in mystery despite his importance and a rich anecdotal tradition regarding his outlook on life. His death heralded the end of Theban dominance and very little evidence of his life survives. Alexander the Great would raze Thebes to the ground 30 years later, which probably destroyed yet more evidence. Several important literary sources also do not survive, which hampers us yet further, and no description is available. We do know, however, that Epaminondas was impoverished, despite being from an old aristocratic family. He embraced his straitened circumstances and made them a part of his philosophy. Indeed he was regarded as a military philosopher who studied the lyre, singing and dance – all skills in which he saw a military application. He remained unmarried so that he could better concentrate on studying those things that brought protection and glory to Thebes.
“EPAMINONDAS WAS IMPOVERISHED, DESPITE BEING FROM AN OLD ARISTOCRATIC FAMILY. HE EMBRACED HIS STRAITENED CIRCUMSTANCES AND MADE THEM A PART OF HIS PHILOSOPHY”
from Polyaenus of him encouraging the Theban hoplites to train in wrestling. Nepos lists his qualities: prudent, serious, a lover of the truth, self-controlled, kindly. His listed qualities are so many that we must suspect the tradition that survives in Nepos is panegyric or an encomium. Epaminondas also studied philosophy and is rated by several authors as a military philosopher with only one rival – Socrates.
Perhaps the earliest event for which we have an account of Epaminondas is him saving the life of his colleague and friend Pelopidas at Mantinea in 385 BCE. This parallels Socrates saving Alcibiades’s life at the battle of
Potidaea. Plutarch tells us that Epaminondas defended his friend’s body even though he thought Pelopidas was already dead.
This bonded the two together for life. Pelopidas was not only prominent in the overthrowing of Spartan power but was also the first commander of the elite Theban hoplite force, the or Sacred Band. This force comprised of 300 Theban hoplites paid by the state to dedicate themselves to war, just as their Spartan adversaries were. They were probably established in the aftermath of the liberation. One tradition names Epaminondas as the founder of this unit, although another names Gorgidas, one of the other conspirators against Spartan power. We should be wary that Epaminondas’s later importance may mean that he was given credit for all manner of events to which his connection may have been small.
The Sacred Band is itself obscured by conflicting sources, since several writers name it as comprising 150 pairs of homosexual lovers who would fight furiously for each other. Other writers do not mention this recruitment requirement, and Xenophon refuses to name the unit altogether. Nonetheless, the Sacred Band was prominent in several of Thebes’s most important battles – including Tegyra in 375 BCE, Leuctra in 371 BCE and Mantinea in 362 BCE. They died to the last man facing the forces of Philip II of Macedon at Chaeronea in 338 BCE.
Heiros Lochos “EPAMINONDAS ALSO STUDIED PHILOSOPHY AND IS RATED BY SEVERAL AUTHORS AS A MILITARY PHILOSOPHER WITH ONLY ONE RIVAL – SOCRATES”
Leuctra
The Battle of Leuctra is one of the most discussed in the ancient sources. There are four lengthy accounts of the battle – more than for any other important ancient battle – by Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Xenophon and Pausanias. Unfortunately, among these four accounts there is confusion and disagreement, and working out what actually happened – and why the sources disagree – is complicated. There is also a plethora of minor and anecdotal accounts, which can add to the overall picture of the battle.
The differences in the accounts are such that they cannot be reconciled without disregarding one or another of them. Xenophon paints a reasonable picture of the battle but gives no credit to the Thebans or Epaminondas, and he contradicts the picture from our other sources. Disregarding Xenophon, all the other surviving sources preserve a cohesive picture of the battle and Epaminondas’s role in it.
Epaminondas had been elected Boeotarch for the campaign – these were the elected leaders of the Boeotian League. There were 11 Boeotarchs: four came from Thebes itself and the others from the other cities in the league. Pausanias’s and Diodorus’s accounts
make it clear that Epaminondas was regarded as the senior Theban leader and overall commander, and the tradition that attached itself to Epaminondas, which credits him with responsibility for the victory, should be trusted. What is more, it is clear that Epaminondas’s plan of battle was deliberate and premeditated, not some accident of happenstance. His reputation as a military genius should never be in doubt.
On the field at Leuctra, Epaminondas drew up the Boeotian line with the Thebans themselves on the left facing the Spartan King Cleombrotus who was, as was traditional, stationed on the Spartan right. Numbers at the battle differ in all the accounts, but the consensus has come to 7,000 Boeotian hoplites (because seven Boeotarchs were present) and 700 cavalry, versus 10,000 Peloponnesians (including 700 Spartans) and 1,000 cavalry. Plutarch has 2,000 Spartans present (two-thirds of the total Spartan manpower available at the time). Other sources give a ratio of six to one in favour of Sparta to increase the impressive nature of the Theban victory.
The 300 members of the Theban Sacred Band with their commander (lochagos)
Pelopidas were also stationed on the left, possibly as a front line, although their exact deployment has evaded scholars. Pelopidas led the charge and won great glory in the battle, even though he was not a Boeotarch. The remainder of the Boeotian line was drawn up obliquely or in echelon, meaning they were facing diagonally away from the massed Theban phalanx on the left. As the Theban left advanced towards Cleombrotus, therefore, the remainder of the Boeotian line would not be required to fully engage with the corresponding part of the enemy phalanx. Diodorus tells us they actually withdrew as the Spartan army advanced. The battle would be decided by the densely packed Theban phalanx’s clash with the Spartan right; elite versus elite.
This is indeed what happened. The Theban phalanx, led by the Sacred Band, smashed into the Spartan right and, after a time, felled Cleombrotus and much of his Spartiate bodyguard. After this the Peloponnesian line broke and fled from the field. Plutarch and Xenophon tell us that 1,000 Spartans fell in the battle – a huge blow to Spartan manpower and one from which they could not recover: Spartan boys trained in warfare from childhood, and losing that many men in a single engagement crippled the city as a military force. Other accounts have larger numbers – as high as 4,000 Peloponnesian dead. Losses on the Theban side range from 47 to 300.
Summaries of the battle suggest that such an event and its significance had never before been seen. While it is true that Sparta had been defeated in battle before, it had never lost such a significant proportion of her manpower in one battle. What is more, the Spartans had broken and fled, something that had never been recorded before and showed that the Spartans were just as fallible as ordinary men. The damage to the Spartan reputation was perhaps more harmful than that to its manpower.
“IT IS CLEAR THAT EPAMINONDAS’S PLAN OF BATTLE WAS DELIBERATE AND PREMEDITATED, NOT SOME ACCIDENT OF HAPPENSTANCE. HIS REPUTATION AS A MILITARY GENIUS SHOULD NEVER BE IN DOUBT”
Sparta was not destroyed, however, and still represented a tyrannical presence (according to ‘freedom-loving’ Thebans) in Greece. Epaminondas’s next actions showed how farreaching his plan was: he aimed to bring about the complete overthrow of Spartan power.
The Theban hegemony
There has always been criticism that when Thebes defeated Sparta at the Battle of
Leuctra it had no real plan to replace the Spartan domination of Greece with its own. Hence the Theban hegemony of Greece was short-lived and lasted barely a decade. One consideration is that Thebes only sought to end Spartan domination, not replace it. By achieving that it actually created a power vacuum, which would eventually be filled by Macedon under Philip II.
But Thebes, and more importantly Epaminondas himself, did have a plan to utterly destroy Spartan domination of Greek politics, which can be seen in his next actions. In 370 BCE Epaminondas led an invasion of the Peloponnese itself, taking advantage of grievances against the Spartans in the Peloponnese. The states of Elis and Arcadia in particular chafed at Spartan dominance and they formed a league opposing Sparta in 370. They were soon joined by Argos.
Envoys came to Thebes and both Epaminondas and Pelopidas (both Boeotarchs for 370) persuaded the Theban government to support an alliance. The members ringed Sparta and could force Sparta to defend its homeland rather than venture further afield in Greece and therefore ensure the autonomous identity of other Greek city-states.
Epaminondas was the figure to whom the alliance looked as their leader, even though there was no official position for him to be considered as such. He and Pelopidas were keen to invade the Peloponnese itself, and so late in the year they sent 6,000 troops to oppose a punitive Spartan expedition against Arcadia. When they arrived, the Spartans had already departed Arcadia, and the opportunity to invade the Spartan homeland of Laconia presented itself.
Winter campaigns were a rarity in Greek warfare and an invasion of Sparta’s homeland was even rarer. The other Theban commanders, however, realised that their commands were due to expire at the end of the year and were in favour of returning home. Only Pelopidas and Epaminondas wanted to remain. Epaminondas persuaded the others to follow him and invaded Laconia via a four-pronged attack, advancing along all four access routes, as they could not all be defended adequately.
As the armies descended towards Sparta, they came across the Eurotas River, swollen by winter rains. This proved an obstacle, but Epaminondas’s army burnt and destroyed as it went along the eastern bank, inflicting pain and suffering that the Spartans were more used to dealing out than experiencing themselves.
The failure of Sparta to muster an army against Epaminondas demonstrates the catastrophic manpower shortage it was suffering. The Spartans were forced to enrol their slave class, the Helots, as hoplites. 6,000 Helots joined up and Sparta soon realised it had armed its own slaves, who could easily turn against them.
Eventually Epaminondas was able to cross the Eurotas, and he did so unopposed. He marched his army into the outskirts of Sparta itself, but the Spartan policy pursued by King Agesilaus II was not to meet him in open battle. Such a tactic was entirely un-spartan and attests to the fear Epaminondas instilled.
Instead, Agesilaus kept his forces in garrisons and defending passes that were difficult to attack. Such a tactic left Epaminondas unable to take advantage of his huge army, which numbered 40,000. Unable to come to battle, Epaminondas decided to ravage all of Laconia and to free Messenia, the Helot homeland held under Spartan domination since the 8th century BCE. Most of the towns of Laconia were unwalled, as defence had never been necessary, and Epaminondas burned them as he went, taking ample plunder with him. Helots and other disaffected Peloponnesians flocked to his side.
“EPAMINONDAS WAS THE FIGURE TO WHOM THE ALLIANCE LOOKED AS THEIR LEADER EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL POSITION FOR HIM TO BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH”
A new Messenia
In 369 BCE Epaminondas founded a new city of Messenia on the slopes of Mount Ithome to take advantage of those who opposed Spartan domination and had found not only a voice for the first time but also support – not just from Thebes but from Elis, Arcadia and Argos too. This city would be a permanent thorn in Sparta’s side, deplete her manpower even further and close the ring of states opposed to Sparta. There can be little doubt that Epaminondas conceived the policy, foundation and even the location of Messenia. He sent invitations far and wide for any exiles to come to the city as a new home. It would become the focal point of resistance to Sparta. Epaminondas made sure the town was built and, when spring came in 369 BCE and the men of Elis, Argos and Arcadia departed for home, he left a garrison before departing himself for Thebes. There he was prosecuted for breaching the legality of his year-long office and continuing it into a new year. The jury dismissed the charge.
Sparta was forced to look for help from its old enemy, Athens, which sent men under Iphicrates, but when he learned of Epaminondas’s approach he withdrew.
Epaminondas’s campaign had been a huge success, achieving things never before done or even attempted. The establishment of Messenia all but doomed Sparta to a slow death. Still, he had not met and destroyed the Spartans in open battle once and for all.
Sparta looked to cement its alliance with Athens who, probably fearful of the growth of Theban power, gladly assented. The Peloponnesians appealed to Thebes to invade again and Epaminondas obliged. Pelopidas did not go with him, turning towards the Thessalians in the north instead. The Spartans sent their army to Corinth, who remained a Spartan ally (as did Athens) to oppose the Theban invasion.
Epaminondas, at the head of his forces, was again unable to draw the Spartan alliance out to face him in open battle – they stayed behind hastily constructed defences that barred Epaminondas’s path into the Peloponnese. He attacked the Spartan camp at the changing of the watch and forced the defenders to retreat.
Rather than attack the outnumbered defenders, Epaminondas next chose to conclude a truce with the Spartan commander, allowing him to withdraw and give the Thebans free passage. This action actually enabled those enemies of Epaminondas’s power at Thebes later to accuse him of treason for not inflicting casualties on the Spartans when he had the chance. This charge perhaps shows an overall Theban policy to harm Sparta rather than replace it as the pre-eminent Greek power.
Epaminondas went on to detach other Spartan allies by force or, if he could not do that, ravage and plunder their lands and crops. He took Sicyon, which gave him access to a port in the Peloponnese, and Pellene. The Spartans and Athenians once again refused to come out and face Epaminondas in the open field. Epaminondas’s second invasion seems
much less impressive than the first, but it did further harm Sparta and render it unable to impose its will on other Greek states.
There may have been dissatisfaction at Thebes with Epaminondas’s policies concentrating only on the Peloponnese, since he was not re-elected Boeotarch for 368 BCE. Alternatively, this may have been a result of the prosecution by his enemies. Without Theban or Epaminondas’s leadership, the Arcadians and Eleians squabbled, eventually declaring war on each other in 365 BCE.
Epaminondas rejoined the Theban army as a regular hoplite for the year of 368 BCE. When the army was serving against Alexander of Pherae in Thessaly and were led astray by their Boeotarchs, the men of the phalanx called on Epaminondas to lead them to safety. He stepped out of the line and did so, saving them from defeat, according to Diodorus. This reveals the high regard that he was held in by the rank-and-file, and also his own humility by returning to the ranks when not elected for office. Epaminondas may also have been a member of the Sacred Band and recognised as an elite hoplite in his own right. Pelopidas died in 364 BCE and Epaminondas seems to have taken over as of the Sacred Band.
In 366 BCE Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese for a third time. This time he invaded Achaea in the north and sought to deprive Sparta of yet another ally. He also sought to build a fleet to rival Athens in the Aegean. This was a miscalculation.
Death at Mantinea
In 362 BCE peace was concluded between
Elis and Arcadia but this soon embroiled Thebes and Epaminondas as leader of the Boeotian-peloponnesian alliance. The protheban members of the alliance requested that Epaminondas lead an expedition to the Peloponnese. This was approved, but the Theban government put a caveat on the expedition requiring it to be concluded within four months.
Epaminondas marched, and the opposing forces met him at Mantinea. These included men from Elis, Arcadia, Athens and part of the forces from Sparta. Epaminondas planned a bold night march on an undefended Sparta.
The Spartan King Agesilaus II (who had only advanced a short way from Sparta with the rest of the Spartan force) had time to fall back and prepare defences. Epaminondas’s men swept into the city – the first force ever to do so, but the city was desperately defended and fighting in the narrow streets favoured the defenders. Epaminondas was forced back. He decided to return north and sent his cavalry ahead to try and seize Mantinea. Both of these gambits were bold and sound but neither came out in Epaminondas’s favour.
Epaminondas marched his infantry north towards Mantinea in battle formation. He encountered the enemy forces drawn up at the narrowest point of the plain and ordered his men to ground arms. This gave the impression that he was camping for the night and some of the enemy forces likewise made camp. Sending his cavalry forward to create a dust cloud, Epaminondas ordered his units to mass on the left wing where he was positioned.
This formation mirrored that at Leuctra. His force numbered probably 25-30,000 and the opposing forces some 20,000. His dense left flank probably included all of the Boeotian hoplites, some 6-7,000 men. The plan, as at Leuctra, was to break through on the enemy right and then roll up the line, preventing any group escaping to Mantinea.
As before, the rest of the line was drawn up obliquely. Epaminondas advanced, which threw the enemy into a panic when they realised. The Boeotian cavalry saw off the paltry Spartan horse, and their retreat disrupted the Spartan phalanx. Epaminondas’s massed phalanx smashed into the Spartan right wing and, just as at Leuctra, they broke and ran. As the pursuit of the Spartans began, Epaminondas himself fell. When he fell the Boeotian phalanx halted and, although victory was already secure, they sensed that they could do nothing without him. With Epaminondas’s death the Theban hegemony of Greece also died, although Theban power persisted until it was destroyed by Philip and Alexander in 338 BCE.
Epaminondas’s career was a remarkable one of amazing success and innovation, as well as tactical and strategic foresight. His fellow Boeotians knew what a prize they had in Epaminondas, and with his death they knew what they had lost.
lochagos “WHEN HE FELL THE BOEOTIAN PHALANX HALTED AND, ALTHOUGH VICTORY WAS ALREADY SECURE, THEY SENSED THAT THEY COULD DO NOTHING WITHOUT HIM” (lochoi)