Defence in Disarray
With the royal navy and RFC acting almost independently, Britain’s defences Were in dire need of Coordination and restructuring
Some of the delays experienced during the air raids of WWI were the result of the wasteful and chaotic state of Britain’s aircraft (and perhaps more importantly engine) procurement system. The RFC had been established in 1912 with a military wing, a naval wing, the Central Flying School, and the civilian Royal Aircraft Factory. All orders for new aircraft, as well as the testing and evaluation of new types, were supposed to go through the Factory. However, the Royal Navy rapidly went its own way, working directly with Britain’s tiny aircraft industry to develop their own machines. By 1914 the navy had attained complete independence, and the naval wing of the RFC had become the RNAS.
Although the Factory would produce some excellent aircraft, it also worked slowly, and many felt it was stifling innovation. This became a serious issue as the Germans began to win air superiority in 1915 during the ‘Fokker Scourge’ and the RFC was left behind in technological terms. It would happen again in the spring of 1917, and while this time German superiority was also due to their own tactics and poor British training, the fact that large parts of the RFC were still flying essentially the same aircraft they had since 1914 was nothing short of scandalous.
The Royal Aircraft Factory tended to be the scapegoat for these failings but, while true to an extent, other factors are also to be blamed. Britain’s aircraft and engine industries were small and struggled to expand to keep up with demand. The Factory and the RNAS were often in direct competition to secure the limited output of the factories. Particularly for engines, the British often had to look abroad to make up their shortfalls, and in France representatives of the RFC and the RNAS were in direct bidding wars against each other and the French air services for the output of manufacturers there.
Several attempts had been made to bring coordination and efficiency to the system with a series of advisory committees, but they had no executive powers. These failed to have any effect, with the Admiralty in particular refusing to co-operate. By the end of 1916 the two services had 9,400 aircraft of 76 different types on order, plus 20,000 engines of nearly 60 types. Even as the issue continued to have serious operational repercussions, it took a judicial inquiry and firm action by the prime minister to rectify the situation. In December 1916 a new Air Board was created with the official weight of a ministry, and the president of the Air Board (Lord Cowdray from January until November 1917) was given the status of a minister.
The Air Board was given control over the design of aeroplanes, the numbers and types ordered, and the allocation of aircraft to each service.
The Ministry of Munitions had control of actual manufacturing and the inspection of finished aircraft, and so they took over management of the Royal Aircraft Factory. Although the Air Board controlled allocation, this was only in broad terms. They had no influence over how those aircraft were used within each service, and Cowdray’s desire to build a strategic bombing force was simply ignored by both the RFC and the RNAS.
The new organisation would have a very real affect on the war in the air as it entered a critical phase. The first four months of 1917 saw the RFC taking increasingly high casualties on the Western Front, culminating in ‘Bloody April’ when over 250 aircraft were lost. The RFC was attempting to expand and modernise but could not do so while facing such loses. In April 1917 new aircraft types like the SE5A and the Bristol F.2B Fighter began entering frontline service, and from May losses dropped and strength increased. By taking a firm grasp of the production and supply systems, deliveries of aircraft more than doubled from
6,633 in 1916 to 14,832 in 1917, and again in 1918 to 30,782. In June 1917 the War Cabinet approved an expansion of the RFC from 108 to
200 squadrons, and an increase in the RNAS, with confidence that this target could be met. This total was to include a strategic force of ten long-range bomber squadrons, a number which was increased to 50 squadrons in August as calls began for reprisal raids against Germany.
“THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1917 SAW THE RFC TAKING INCREASINGLY HIGH CASUALTIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT, CULMINATING IN ‘BLOODY APRIL’ WHEN OVER 250 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST”
technology. AA guns, for example, were initially simply field pieces pointed upwards, but were gradually improved with special ammunition, better range-finders, improved sights that allowed for deflection, and faster rates of fire.
It took until the end of 1916, but the Zeppelin threat was eventually defeated. After this, operational realities came into play. The Royal Navy desperately needed small, quickfiring guns to arm the merchant ships that were suffering serious losses from German submarines. Indeed, the Germans were very close to winning this First Battle of the Atlantic, and in the winter of 1916 many guns were withdrawn from the air defences for this use. This reduced the number of personnel needed to man the AA cordon. These trained artillerymen were sent to France, where they were badly needed. Pilots were also desperately needed on the Western Front, and while the Home Defence squadrons were already committed to sending nine experienced pilots per month to France (to be replaced by newly qualified men), in March the transfer of an additional 36 men was approved. As it was, the 11 Home Defence squadrons (four dedicated specifically to London) only mustered just over 50 serviceable machines against their authorised strength of 96 aircraft. However, with the Zeppelins gone, the Western Front was the priority.
Then, in May 1917, this relieved sense of security was abruptly and dramatically shattered. The Zeppelins had previously operated alone or in tiny groups, striking almost blind at night, scattering handfuls of bombs across wide areas, but on 25 May 1917 a formation of 23 German aeroplanes from Kampfgeschwader 3 appeared in close formation and in broad daylight approaching London. Although poor weather forced them away from the capital, the raid diverted south and dropped bombs, causing heavy civilian losses in Kent, especially Folkestone. The shock, so soon after the relief of the victory
“ON 13 JUNE THE FIRST DAYLIGHT RAID ON LONDON WAS MADE. SOME 162 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, INCLUDING 18 CHILDREN FROM THE UPPER NORTH STREET PRIMARY SCHOOL IN POPLAR, AND 432 WERE WOUNDED”
over the Zeppelins, forced the government to act. As the raids, carried out mostly by Gotha G.IV twin engine heavy bombers and supported by a few massive four-engine Zeppelin-staaken Riesenflugzeuge ‘Giants’ continued, the military once again seemed powerless to stop them.
Two more Gotha raids and a Zeppelin raid followed in June. On 13 June the first daylight raid on London was made. Some 162 people were killed, including 18 children from the Upper North Street Primary School in Poplar, and 432 were wounded. The British were unable to bring down a single enemy aircraft.
After a long pause (apart from a raid on Harwich) the Gothas returned on 7 July, and 21 aircraft dropped 81 bombs in central London. Some 79 aircraft (of 20 different types) were scrambled by the RFC, and another 22 by the RNAS. Two British aircraft were lost, although one Gotha was bought down over the sea. Another four crashed, due to various reasons, near their bases. A total of 54 people were killed in the raid and 190 wounded.
The apparent inability to stop these raids had several immediate effects, including that King George V changed the Royal family’s surname from ‘Saxe-coburg-gotha’ to ‘Windsor’. More importantly, on 11 July 1917 Prime Minister David Lloyd George appointed the South African General Jan Smuts to establish the Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence Against Air Raids. The Committee presented two reports, on 19 July and 17 August 1917. The
“IN MAY 1917, THIS RELIEVED SENSE OF SECURITY WAS ABRUPTLY AND DRAMATICALLY SHATTERED”
first of these recommended a range of reforms to improve Britain’s air defences. Primarily, Smuts called for better co-ordination of the home defences.
While the air defences may have been advanced and sophisticated, they were sadly disjointed. The RNAS aircraft around the coast worked in conjunction with HQ Home Defence, but they were still under independent, Admiralty control. The observer networks and the AA guns separately came under Lord French, the field marshal commanding Home Defence, as did the RFC’S Home Defence Brigade. Therefore, three of the four key elements reported to Lord French, but there was no formal connection between them anywhere lower than this highest of levels.
Any attempts to co-ordinate actions had to go all the way up through the different levels of command to the top, and then back down again, costing time.
Smuts recommended that a joint headquarters immediately be set up at a lower level, to afford quicker communications and “the unity of command which is essential to any warlike operation”. Within weeks, the London Air Defence Area (LADA) was formed to co-ordinate all of the city’s defences. Smuts also recommended that the RFC’S Home Defence squadrons be properly constituted as permanent units and equipped with modern aircraft, rather than their current use as de facto reserve units only able to launch smaller numbers of obsolete aircraft. As he saw it, the answer to the bomber threat was properly co-ordinated attacks by formations of fighters. AA defences were also to be strengthened. For both the aircraft and the guns, reinforcement would take time as new equipment was manufactured and personnel trained.
The Gothas made three more raids in August 1917, all aimed at east Kent ports. Although one was abandoned because of poor weather, 18 Gothas were lost, four to British aircraft, one to AA guns, and the rest to accidents or Dutch air defences. Britain’s defences were stiffening, and the Germans switched to night raids in September. The Gothas now suffered the problems of flying and navigating by night, although of course it also hindered attempts to intercept them. However, the balloon barrages that were strung across the approaches to London were more effective at night, while the reinforced AA batteries were adopting barrage techniques, putting up walls of fire at certain points to discourage the enemy and force them to turn back, rather than engaging single aircraft. The areas around London were divided into strict zones for AA guns, balloons, and aircraft, creating a layered defence and reducing the risks of British fighters falling foul of the ground-based defences.
Further Gotha and Giant raids continued until the last, and largest on the night of 19-20 May 1918, known as the ‘Whitsun Raid’. This involved 38 Gothas and three Giants. Only
18 of them managed to penetrate the LADA, dropping 72 bombs. Most were discouraged by the barrage of AA fire – some 30,000 shells were fired – while the (by then) Royal Air Force launched 88 sorties to intercept the bombers. Two enemy aircraft were shot down by AA fire and three by night fighters.
In all, the German aeroplane raids caused 837 deaths (486 in London) and 1,991 injuries
“THE DAY MAY NOT BE FAR OFF WHEN AERIAL OPERATIONS WITH THEIR DEVASTATION OF ENEMY LANDS AND DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL AND POPULOUS CENTRES ON A VAST SCALE MAY BECOME THE PRINCIPLE OPERATIONS OF WAR” – General Jan Smuts
(1,432 in London) during their 12-month campaign. 16 British aircraft were lost, while 24 Gothas were shot down by British defences, and 36 more (plus two Giants) were lost because of accidents.
While Smut’s first report was successfully overhauling the Home Defence organisation, on 17 August 1917 he presented his second report. This examined the use of and co-ordination between the flying services and, doubtless encouraged by the success of the new Air Board, he concluded that they should be merged into an independent air arm, supported by an Air Ministry. Heavily influenced by the Gotha raids, Smuts enthused that “the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principle operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinated”. He wanted to develop a strategic bombing force to this end – a call that was also being echoed across the country as the public clamoured for retaliatory raids on German towns.
The report was quickly, but secretly, acted on, and the many administrative and practical issues surrounding the creation of a new fighting service began to be tackled. Even so, the Cabinet continued to debate the issue. Many of the senior figures brought into the discussion, including Lord Cowdray and General Sir Hugh Trenchard, commander of the RFC in France, thought any such move should wait until after the war, while Smuts and General Sir David Henderson, general officer commanding the
RFC and director general of military aeronautics, wanted it done as soon as possible. In the end,
“AA BATTERIES WERE ADOPTING BARRAGE TECHNIQUES, PUTTING UP WALLS OF FIRE AT CERTAIN POINTS TO DISCOURAGE THE ENEMY AND FORCE THEM TO TURN BACK”
the latter party won, and on 6 November 1917 Cabinet passed the draft Air Force Act, which was duly passed by Parliament and signed by the king by the end of the month. On 1 April 1918 the Royal Air Force would come into existence. In the meantime, an Aerial Operations Committee was established to look at the logistics behind building a strategic bomber fleet. In early October it was renamed the War Priorities Committee, with wide-ranging authority over munitions production, such was the perceived importance of developing a strategic bombing force.
There was now much to do. At a senior level, new staff and a ministry had to be properly established, although this proved highly problematic. Lord Cowdray resigned in umbrage at being very publicly passed over to be the first secretary of state for air, a job that went to Lord Rothermere instead. Rothermere was a press baron who did not transition well into politics. He hated having his actions debated or questioned, and often acted without consulting his senior staff. Trenchard had been brought back from France to be the first chief of the Air Staff (CAS), but on 13 April 1918 he resigned due to incompatibility with Rothermere. Henderson also resigned from the Air Council, and by the end of April Rothermere himself had resigned. It was an uninspiring start. Rothermere was replaced by Sir William Weir, who made a success of the job, while
Sir Frederick Sykes, who had been the original commander of the military wing of the RFC in 1912, became the new CAS. Trenchard would eventually return to France to command the Independent Force of strategic bombers.
There were many administrative questions to answer over rank structures, uniforms and organisation. For these, the new RAF took a very pragmatic approach. Beyond bringing the old RNAS units more in line with the former RFC, most of these questions were given a lower priority, and the focus remained on the operational performance of the new service.
“THE RAF SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ITS TRANSITION WITH THE MINIMUM OF IMPACT ON THE FIGHTING FRONTS. INDEED, THE NEW, BETTER CO-ORDINATED SYSTEM SOON SHOWED ITS ADVANTAGES”
With 137 squadrons (plus some flights) spread across the world from the UK to India, and even North America if you included training units, the RAF successfully completed its transition with the minimum of impact on the fighting fronts. Indeed, the new, better coordinated system soon showed its advantages.
Within ten weeks, the RAF was able to activate the Independent Force to start a bombing campaign over Germany. A dividend of both the better procurement system and the ability of the new service to expand away from the tactical focus of the army, the force would inflict small but serious damage on German production, as well as strike a blow against enemy morale. Across all of the fighting fronts, the RAF continued to expand with newer and better aircraft, and the number of active squadrons increased by 30 per cent in just eight months.
In some areas the RAF found new freedom to offer ideas and innovations without being shackled to the army’s preconceptions. In Palestine, for example, the RAF was able to offer an air plan for the final British offensive in September 1918 that would have a shattering effect on the Ottoman forces opposing them. In a few short months, the RAF was able to demonstrate the formidable potential of air power in war.