The battle for Hougoumont
Was the defence of this farmhouse as crucial as claimed? A fresh look at French and Allied sources provides new perspectives
Dr Bernard and René Wilkin explore the tough defence of Wellington’s flank
On 18 June 1815, Napoleon’s cannon opened fire at the Allied army at around 11.35am (the exact time is a source of disagreement among witnesses and historians). The Battle of Waterloo had just begun. The French wanted to destroy Wellington’s army as well as the Belgian-dutch military, convinced that the British would sign a peace treaty if Brussels were taken and the enemy general driven out of Belgium.
On the other side, the duke of Wellington was determined to counter the French offensive in Belgium before stopping the troublesome French emperor once and for all. Both commanders had plenty of experience on the battlefield but displayed very different military styles. Napoleon, who had been fighting since the Wars of the French Revolution, nearly always adopted aggressive doctrines in battle, trying to crush the enemy swiftly and decisively. His military might was indisputable, but historians and witnesses have noted that he was not at his best during the Hundred
Days. Tired, depressed and overweight, he was probably not fit to lead an army as effectively as previously. Wellington, a cautious commander, preferred defensive positions in order to preserve his men. His careful approach to battle, combined with British discipline in the heat of the action, was key to his many victories during the Peninsular War.
Caution was precisely the reason Wellington picked Mont-saint-jean to fight the French army. The British commander knew the place already, having noticed its favourable topography the year before. The gentle slopes and the hills around the small hamlet would protect his men from the French cannon. Moreover, four key positions could potentially stop the enemy: the castle of Fichermont (also spelled Frischermont) and the farms of Papelotte, Haye Sainte and Hougoumont (in fact a farm-castle).
On 17 June General Cooke was ordered to reinforce Hougoumont with the light companies of his four battalions of the Guards (First Division). Colonel Macdonnell was made commander of the castle and the farm. One witness, a man named Maaskamp, saw the British at Hougoumont the day before the battle: “During the night, they prepared for the castle’s defence. They dug a pit next to the outside hedge, and there was a reinforced wall behind the hedge around the garden and the orchard. They dug loopholes in the wall and placed an elevation platform to fire above it.” Companies of the Second Brigade occupied the garden as well as the farm, while men of the First Brigade, commanded by Lord Saltoun, were positioned in the orchard and the wood.
Early on 18 June 1815, the duke of Wellington, the prince of Orange, Generals Hill and Uxbridge, as well as Müffling, a Prussian officer, inspected the Allied lines before going down to Hougoumont. The prince of Orange, having had a close look at the farm-castle, sent 300 men to reinforce it. Wellington also positioned the light company of the Coldstream Guards and men of the Third Guards to the west of Hougoumont. Soldiers from Nassau and Hanover were placed in the wood. At 10.00am, Captain Bügsen and six companies of the Second Nassau Regiment arrived, totalling 800 soldiers. 400 men were positioned in the orchard while the others occupied the farm-castle. As a result, most of the men in the garrison on the day were German. Light companies of the Third Guards were moved to the western lane area, and men of the light company of the Coldstream Guards were ordered to defend the north gate and the buildings of the lower courtyard.
“AFTER A SHORT INSPECTION, THE GENERAL FAILED TO REPORT THE DANGEROUS STRONGHOLD. HAXO’S SLOPPINESS WAS UNFORGIVABLE, EVEN IF HOUGOUMONT WAS HIDDEN NOT ONLY BY THE WOOD BUT ALSO BY THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE REGION”
Confusion and visibility
The farm-castle of Hougoumont was hidden from the French line by a small wooded area. The map used by Napoleon and his generals, made by Ferraris between 1770-1778, showed Hougoumont itself, but the walls around the structure were not clearly drawn and the wood looked far more accessible than in reality.
Before the battle, the emperor had ordered General Haxo, commanding the génie (military engineering), to reconnoitre the enemy lines. After a short inspection, the general failed to report the dangerous stronghold. Haxo’s sloppiness was unforgivable, even if Hougoumont was hidden not only by the wood but also by the topography of the region. The fortified farm-castle was equally invisible from Rossomme farm, where Napoleon stood during the first part of the battle. This important point was highlighted early: in 1817 a British man named John Booth wrote that, “It is said the enemy were ignorant of the strength of the position, the garden wall being concealed by the wood and hedge.”
At 11.00am General Reille, commander of the French II Corps, was asked to take the wood of Hougoumont. It should be noted
that Napoleon’s order did not mention the farm-castle. This objective was explained by Napoleon in his book: the attack was supposed to be a diversion, a way to draw Wellington’s men away from the centre, the point of the main French assault. From Wellington’s perspective, the loss of Hougoumont was unthinkable. The capture of the farm-castle would have threatened his right wing and the whole Allied position. A vigorous defence was therefore required.
Reille sent Napoleon’s brother, Prince Jérôme, and four regiments on the left. To protect the soldiers moving towards Hougoumont, a division battery belonging to II Corps opened fire. The horse battery of Piré’s cavalry division was also sent to support the assault. The artillery, however, was unable to fire directly at the farmcastle. Three British batteries, east of the road to Nivelles, riposted. The battle for the British right wing had just begun.
The first regiment of light infantry launched a bayonet assault to take the wood, an action that saw the death of General Bauduin. Despite their resilience, the First Battalion of Nassau and a company of the King’s German Legion (KGL) were forced to retreat but were soon assisted by British soldiers. To take the 300 remaining metres (330 yards) separating the French from the farm, the Third line infantry regiment followed the First Léger. Allied defenders, vastly outnumbered, took cover behind the trees to fire back at the enemy. After an hour of heavy fighting, the French managed to repel the soldiers of Nassau as well as the British who had come forward to help them. However, upon exiting the wood, Jérôme’s men found themselves in a killing field – an empty space of 30 metres (33 yards) between the trees and the farm.
Reille’s orders, given to him at 11.00am, did not ask for the capture of the farm-castle.
The initial assault on Hougoumont was in fact unnecessary. It was either a misunderstanding or Jérôme Bonaparte’s responsibility. It is also possible that the French, having pushed the
Allies from the wood, spontaneously attacked the farm. However, Hougoumont was far from easy to capture. Firing through improvised loopholes, soldiers of the Second Company, Second Nassau took aim calmly at the nearby targets.
At such short distance, the French were hard to miss. Jérôme’s men returned fire but wasted their shots on the protective wall. The British sent more artillery until the ridge above the farm-castle was lined with guns.