Kills & losses
The debate and research concerning this topic continues to exercise the minds of historians. No single source can really claim to be definitive as both sides had their own reasons for overstating their ‘kill’ count. The Soviets inflated their numbers, particularly of Tigers, to justify their own severe losses. The Germans did so for the simple reason that they lost. Equally problematic is the definition of a ‘kill’: does it mean a track blown off, the turret blown off, or the vehicle sinking into the mud up to the track tops and being abandoned? Furthermore, some Russian researchers in the post-soviet world have reflected their anti-communist stance to inflate Red Army losses. Here is not the place to enter this complex discussion.
There was something in the region of 95 Tigers operable with AGS on 4 July, and by 15 July, when AGS halted and the last blow of Operation Citadel had been struck, there were 63 available. However, the Soviets did not consider the fighting in the Kursk Bulge (as the Russians call it) on the southern face over until 23 July and so continued to count kills.
AGC’S Tiger losses, from the 31 tanks committed on 5 July, are awkward to assess as the records of Ninth Army are difficult to access. However, on 10 July there were 26 still operational. By 12 July AGC had shot its bolt and the Soviets had unleashed Operation Kutuzov that aimed to destroy AGC. Judging by those figures, 37 Tigers were irretrievably lost by both AGS and AGC.
Keeping score for the T-34 was less problematic as it was a familiar and easily identified vehicle.
The three fronts involved, including armour from Steppe Front, committed 2,730, of which 854 were lost by Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, but only 175 by Central Front. This simply reflects the different commitment levels of armour on the northern and southern faces of the salient. It must also be remembered that at the end of operations the Red Army was in a position to pick over the remains of its tanks and restore what was worth saving, whereas the Germans were not. Soviet tank crews were paid a bonus of 1,000 roubles for every confirmed kill. Interestingly Stalin, not generally fussed over casualties, almost put General Rotmistrov, commander of Fifth GTA, on trial for his command’s losses at Prokhorovka.
“STALIN, NOT GENERALLY FUSSED OVER CASUALTIES, ALMOST PUT GENERAL ROTMISTROV (COMMANDER OF FIFTH GTA) ON TRIAL FOR HIS COMMAND’S LOSSES AT PROKHOROVKA”