THE BATTLE FOR GORAŽDE 28 May 1995

“WITH NO HEAVY ORDNANCE, THEY COULD CALL ON ONLY EIGHT LIGHT MACHINE GUNS AND A FEW SAXON ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS”

HOW TO SAVE A TOWN

Westley’s plan for the defence of the east bank was to withdraw the outer OPS and checkpoints as and when they became vulnerable in order to maintain a tightly controlled circle, from which B Company could deny the Bosnian Serbs the high ground at OP3 and keep the fight from Goražde proper.

“I’m just trying to control the movement so that we don’t give [the Bosnian Serbs] momentum, because once they get that it’s very difficult to stop, plus at the same time the Bosnian army is pouring out of the town and getting up alongside us. So if we can hold the smaller circle for longer, they can come up and bolster us, and then they can then expand out so that the Serb forward observation officers can’t get on the high ground to see and adjust the artillery fire.” If OP3 had fallen, Westley admits that, though the outlook would have been grim and Bosnian Serb artillery spotters would have direct eyes on the town, the only option was to keep fighting.

“I would have reduced to the bridges and fought on the bridges. I couldn’t let them into the main part of the town where the bulk of the population were in. We would have had to just sit there and fight until such a time as somebody decided enough is enough and brought some airstrikes in. There was going to be no ground reinforcement.”

QUICK reaction Force

Westley and the Quick Reaction Force are at the base of Cemetery Valley, coordinating the defence and offering fire support from the Saxon. At 2.30pm the Saxon’s machine gun turret becomes jammed on a strap from one of the bergens slung around it. Lieutenant Glyn Llewellyn valiantly ignores the incoming fire and scrambles up the Saxon to work it free.

checkpoint 1

Sometime after 3.00pm Sergeant Adrian Kent reports in from Checkpoint 1 that a convoy of Bosnian Serb vehicles, including armour, is advancing slowly down the road. Westley orders them back a couple of hundred metres to a bend in the road.

“Checkpoint 1 is on the road that parallels the river. They didn’t just pull back, they actually pulled back to a blocking position. Now there was a problem with one of the Saxons rolling off the road into the river, but they got everyone into the other Saxon and they produced a blocking position,” Westley explains.

op3

The most strategically vital of the three, commanded by Captain Tom Murphy, OP3 holds out for four and a half hours with supporting fire from the Saxon in Cemetery Valley, before B Company is relieved by ARBIH.

Corporal Dave Vaastra, on his tripod-mounted GPMG, is the first man to fire and the last man to withdraw, and they scramble down the hillside towards Westley and the QRF.

801 BRIGADE op2

At 3.44pm, Corporal Dave Parry admits that they’re unable to hold as the Bosnian Serbs have brought up anti-tank weapons. The men defending OP2 are taken hostage, and the main thrust of the attack on OP3 now comes from the direction of the captured OP2.

Parry conceals his radio in his smock, and later that evening reports in to Westley, staying in contact until the prisoners are finally taken out of range. Like B Company, ARBIH’S 801 Brigade is responsible for the defence of the east bank. As soon as OP1 comes under fire, Westley urges them into action from their base in town. Commanded by JNA veteran Salko Osmanspahic, they begin a slow advance up the slopes towards OP2 and OP3, coming under heavy fire from the advancing Bosnian Serbs.

“No doubting their commitment, their families were in the town so they’re going to fight, but they just didn’t have the weaponry that the Serbs had and that was always going to be a deciding factor. They realised they had to survive any bombardment and to be able to come out and fight, and we had talked with them about how they might do that, but even in the early stage one had to be quite careful that one wasn’t seen to be siding with one team or another. They were good enough, and on the day when we were running out of ammunition and had done our bit, they were ready to take over and they took over and did very well. So I suppose the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and when it came down to it they stepped up,” Westley says.

op1

At 1.05pm OP1, commanded by Colour Sergeant Pete Humphreys, reports a build-up of Bosnian Serbs and comes under fire soon after. OP1 is the most exposed of the east bank OPS, but offers views over the approaches to Goražde that give first warning of the offensive.

At 3.00pm Humphreys reports that they’re unable to hold. Westley orders them out and then everything goes ominously quiet. Amazingly Humphreys and his men re-appear after OP3 is relieved, all completely unharmed, having crept through Bosnian

Serb lines and back into town.