Breaking up the UK
Unorthodox fighting methods used by the severely outnumbered IRA forced the British Empire to permanently divide its home country
The Anglo-irish Treaty of 1921 was a previously unthinkable victory for irregular rebel forces over the might of the British Empire
The British Empire was at its zenith in 1921. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Britain had acquired huge parts of the Middle East and Africa, but it was at this moment of its territorial peak that the world’s largest empire began to disintegrate. Although it was not obvious at the time, the direct cause of imperial decline was within the United Kingdom itself.
Ireland had been an integral part of the UK since 1801 with a British presence that dated back to the 12th century. Nevertheless, despite centuries of unsuccessful rebellions, it was the Irish War of Independence that dealt a severe blow to Britain during a remarkable military campaign.
Intelligence and Flying Columns
On paper the IRA had little hope of defeating British forces. Two army divisions were based in Ireland during the war and troop numbers rose to 50,000 soldiers by July 1921. The army was extensively supported by the RIC and its paramilitary police forces who also numbered in their thousands. By contrast the IRA claimed to have a total strength of 70,000 but in reality only approximately 3,000 volunteers actively fought against the Crown.
Nevertheless the IRA were eventually called to the negotiating table and this achievement was largely due to military pragmatism. Unlike previous Republican uprisings, the IRA were led by realists who achieved results that were disproportionate to their resources.
Intelligence was the most crucial factor of the conflict and Michael Collins organised the
IRA war on business lines by prioritising the targeting of policemen, government agents and informers. He knew that the conflict was unequal and so eliminating spies was an effective way of grinding down the British war machine. By denying them proper intelligence, the British could not form a clear strategy against the
IRA, which resulted in a frustrating, ambiguous campaign. Events such as Bloody Sunday were also of great propaganda value to Collins who could use British heavy-handedness as a weapon to swing public opinion.
Nevertheless the IRA also had a surprisingly effective fighting wing that was suited to the unique circumstances of the conflict. Because
Ireland was one of the home countries of the UK, the British could not use military methods that would have been acceptable in imperial colonies. This made the country an ideal ground for highly organised guerrilla fighting. The IRA managed to develop an army out of scattered rebels and fostered the development of ‘Flying Columns’. Numbering 20-100 men per unit, these mobile, armed volunteers characterised the military campaign against the British. Field commanders were encouraged to think for themselves and learn from each encounter with the enemy. This independence bore fruit in several successful ambushes, particularly at Kilmichael in November 1920 when a patrol of RIC Auxiliaries was destroyed. Although this event was militarily a small affair, the Kilmichael Ambush was a shock to the British. Occurring only a week after Bloody Sunday, the government became increasingly convinced that they were dealing with a rebel army as opposed to a gang of murderers who committed political crimes. The Flying Columns’ activities, particularly in counties such as Cork, prevented British authority from fully functioning and they were often aided by the public who provided safe houses and supplies. Even worse for a proud imperial power, the British were suffering small but symbolic military humiliations that often drove them to vengeful reprisals. This further angered public opinion, both at home and abroad.
“THE GOVERNMENT BECAME INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT THEY WERE DEALING WITH A REBEL ARMY AS OPPOSED TO A GANG OF MURDERERS”
Struggling to forget
The truce and Anglo-irish Treaty that followed in 1921 was perceived as something of a diplomatic success for the British. David Lloyd George believed that he had solved the ‘Irish Question’ by partitioning the island while keeping the Free State under the Crown and within the Empire. Negotiations were called on his terms and he had threatened “instant and terrible war” if the treaty was not accepted.
The reality was that the IRA had enabled a limited amount of independence in 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties. Covert guerrilla warfare had broken up the UK for the first time and the partitioned border continues to plague Irish politics. The success of the IRA also inspired other insurgencies against the British Empire during the 20th century, which partially led to its irrevocable decline. It is consequently perhaps no surprise that the historian Richard Bennett labelled the Irish War of Independence as one that “the English have struggled to forget and the Irish cannot help but remember”.