A controversial policy
During the 19th century, paranoia of Russian expansion in Asia led to the introduction of a defensive policy that sought to control external states and led to bloodshed
Paranoia over Russian expansion caused Britain to seek control over a number of other states
Throughout the so-called Great Game, Britain’s principal fear was a Russian invasion of India, the jewel in the crown of empire. Concern over Russian expansion in Asia became so acute during the 19th century that successive governments in London were engulfed in paranoia of the Tsar’s troops pouring over India’s northern border. In retrospect, this obsession was perhaps misplaced, but at the time it felt real enough for Britain to adopt an aggressive forward policy to ensure the security of their most valued colonial possession. Many argued for a defensive line to be pushed forward of India’s border in order to meet a potential invading force long before it could threaten India itself.
In 1846, 2,000 miles lay between the southern borders of the Russian Empire and
territory held by the British in India. By 1885, this distance had shrunk to a mere 500 miles as the two empires slowly edged ever closer to each other. The British believed they needed a strong line of defence – but the question was where? To answer this military strategists of the period began to fall into one of two camps. Firstly, there were those who proposed a forward policy, the more extreme of which called for a defensive line to be established far beyond India’s borders, where it would engage and defeat an advancing Russian army many miles from India. The more moderate exponents of this view also believed in this basic idea, but they wanted a specific line of defence closer to the border.
The second prominent view was a stationary policy, which argued for a static defensive line to be established along the mighty Indus River. Others who subscribed to this idea believed that, if circumstances dictated it prudent, the defensive line could be pushed out from the Indus to face the Russian advance. The policy adopted varied over time, but the forward school eventually prevailed due to Russia’s continued encroachment in Asia.
An example of a consequence of the forward doctrine can be seen in the Second Angloafghan War of 1878-80. To stem Russian influence in the country, following the arrival of a Russian delegation at Kabul in July 1878, the British demanded the Afghan Amir surrender control of his foreign policy to authorities in India. When the Amir refused to accept a
British diplomatic mission several months later, the British issued an ultimatum they knew the Amir would not accept and declared war. The first phase of the war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, forcing the Amir to cede several of his frontier districts to the British. However, when the bulk of British forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the war flared up again, ending in 1880 only after considerable military effort by the British. In 1888, Lord Lansdowne became Viceroy of India. He proposed a boundary be established along
‘scientific’ lines through territory sandwiched between British-india and Afghanistan. The route of the line was worked out by Sir Henry Durand, the foreign secretary of India, and the Afghan Amir, and was designed to take into consideration the defence of India. This new border, which became known as the Durand Line, arbitrarily cut through Pashtun tribal areas and set out spheres of influence for British-india and Afghanistan. Most importantly for the British, it reinforced the notion of Afghanistan acting as a buffer state between India and Russia.
The Durand Line, however, failed to take into consideration the feelings of the Pashtun tribes that inhabited the North West Frontier. These tribesmen, quite rightly, saw the border as both unnecessary and unwelcome. They paid little attention to it and even destroyed markers placed to demarcate the line.
To make matters worse, the British built roads and established forts, to protect important routes to places such as Chitral, in Pashtun territory, which greatly alienated the fiercely independent tribesmen. It would become a major contributing factor to the frontier risings of 1897, perhaps the greatest challenge to British authority in Asia since the Indian Mutiny four decades earlier.
In the wake of the risings, which were unprecedented in scale, Lord Curzon, who had been appointed Viceroy of India in 1899, introduced major political and organisational changes, including the establishment of the North West Frontier Province. He ordered the withdrawal of British forces from Pashtun territory, recruiting local tribesmen to police the frontier instead. Nevertheless, the controversial forward policy did not finally come to an end until 1907, following the Anglo-russian Convention of the same year, which defined borders and spheres of influence between the two powers. Today, the route of the Durand
Line still demarcates Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province), Balochistan and Gilgit-baltistan from the southern districts of Afghanistan, although the Afghan Government refuses to officially recognise this relic of British imperialism.
“IN 1846, 2,000 MILES LAY BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN BORDERS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TERRITORY HELD BY THE BRITISH IN INDIA. BY 1885, THIS DISTANCE HAD SHRUNK TO A MERE 500 MILES AS THE TWO EMPIRES SLOWLY EDGED EVER CLOSER TO EACH OTHER”