History of War

DESERT RATS IN NORMANDY

Discover how the veteran 7th Armoured Division met its toughest challenge during the Battle for Caen

- WORDS ANTHONY TUCKER-JONES

General Bernard Law Montgomery made an emotional farewell to the officers and men of his beloved 8th Army in late 1943 at Vasto Opera House, Italy. His place in the history books was firmly secured thanks to his victories in North Africa and Sicily, now he was going on to bigger and better things. He was to command the 21st Army Group tasked with liberating Nazi occupied Europe.

Monty’s chief of staff, Major General Francis de Guingand who was to accompany him recalled, “My chief was very quiet and I could see that this was going to be the most difficult operation he had yet attempted. We arrived inside [the opera house] and he said ‘Freddie, show me where to go’. I led him to the stairs leading up to the stage. He mounted at once, and to a hushed audience commenced his address to the officers of the army which he loved so well.”

However, Monty took with him Major-general “Bobby” Erskine’s veteran 7th Armoured Division, the famed Desert Rats. He also took the 50th (Northumbri­an) and 51st (Highland) Divisions; along with 7th Armoured they had formed the backbone of the 8th Army. In the days following D-day on 6 June 1944 Montgomery was like a prize-fighter before Caen. First he launched a series of right jabs to the west of the city. These were followed by a head blow with a direct assault and then a very heavy left hook. For the latter, 7th Armoured was ordered to deliver the coup de grâce. Such was its reputation that some thought it was unstoppabl­e.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel always knew that the battle for Normandy hung on the defence of the city of Caen – more specifical­ly the strategic high ground just to the south and southeast formed by the Bourgébous Ridge. Beyond this was good tank country that would offer the Allies an easy ride to the Seine and Paris. While D-day had gone remarkably well the American breakout in the west had been slowed by the need to clear the Cotentin Peninsula and secure Cherbourg. To the east, Montgomery with the British and Canadian forces had struggled to evict the Germans from Caen. Frontal attacks and the push to the west had achieved very little. Monty

now decided to try and break through Rommel’s thick defences to the east of the city, then head for Falaise 20 miles due south.

To achieve this, he massed three armoured divisions, the Guards, 7th and 11th. While the Guards and 11th Armoured were newly arrived, 7th Armoured had been in Normandy since just after D-day. The tough Desert Rats were long-term combat veterans, as a result great things was expected of them. “The 7th Armoured Division were very experience­d fighting men,” said Sergeant Harry Ellis with pride, “and we felt we had been selected to take part in the coming invasion in Europe because of our experience­s in battle.” Instead its first major engagement in Normandy at Villers-bocage proved a severe embarrassm­ent when its spearhead was mauled unexpected­ly by German Tiger tanks.

Goodbye Shermans

The Desert Rats’ morale had been dented when they left Italy without their heavy equipment.

“In early November [1944], word got round that were going home,” recalled Sergeant Ellis. “We handed all our guns and vehicles over to the

5th Canadian Armoured Division and made for the Sorrento Peninsula to await a convoy to take us to Blighty.” Many of the veterans had been at war for three years and for them, unlike a fresh unit, there was no sense of adventure.

Furthermor­e, despite its veteran status

North Africa and Italy had not prepared the division for what was to come in France.

“Three years in the desert was not the best preparatio­n for the bocage [Normandy hedgerows],” grumbled Sergeant Bobby Bramall of the 4th County London Yeomanry, “we’d had no training for this jungle country … it was that close and not tank country at all.”

Crucially the 22nd Armoured Brigade had surrendere­d all its Sherman tanks in Italy.

When the crews got home they were equipped with the new British-built Cromwell tank. Although faster than the Sherman, it had

“MANY OF THE VETERANS HAD BEEN AT WAR FOR THREE YEARS AND FOR THEM, UNLIKE A FRESH UNIT, THERE WAS NO SENSE OF ADVENTURE”

the same inadequate 75mm gun and similar armour. This meant it was inferior to German panzers such as the Mark IV, the Panther and the Tiger. Each troop of three Cromwells was beefed up with a Sherman Firefly armed with a 17-pounder anti-tank gun. Some Cromwells were produced as a close support variant armed with a 95mm howitzer, but this was intended to fire high explosives.

Trooper Duce with the 8th Hussars, while not blind to their new tank’s shortcomin­gs, was still impressed. “The Cromwell’s strongpoin­ts were its speed and reliabilit­y,” he said, “and once these factors could be taken advantage of, the slow, ponderous enemy would be taken care of in other ways.” In contrast Sergeant Bramall was of a completely different opinion: “they were atrocious tanks, fast enough but thin skinned and somewhat undergunne­d”. He commanded a Firefly which he thought was a good tank. However he was alarmed that prior to D-day, apart from firing their guns, they had no tactical training.

During May 1944 while the division was undergoing its Operation Overlord training the rumour mill circulated that their destinatio­n was the Dutch coast. The 22nd Armoured Brigade moved from Norfolk to Ipswich while the others

headed for Tilbury docks in east London. General Erskine gathered his officers in a cinema in Brentwood, Essex to give them a final briefing. The division embarked on 6 June and crossed that night for Normandy in fairly rough seas.

First casualties

The advance elements of the division came ashore on Gold Beach on 7 June. “We crossed in daylight and hit the beach about mid-afternoon,” recalled Sergeant Bertram Vowden with the 8th Hussars. There was no opposition but disturbing­ly they saw the bodies of dead British soldiers bobbing up and down with the tide. “Once on the hard-packed, wet, shiny sand, the beachmaste­r directed us to the white taped lanes,” recalled

Trooper Duce, “which had been swept by the Mineflaile­r Shermans.

What a Godsend they were, and what high calibre men crewed them.”

The Rats suffered their first casualties on 9 June after running into German anti-tank guns. The following day those units that had landed were sent

toward Tilly-sur-seulles. Five miles south of Bayeux they destroyed a Panzer IV. The division was finally in the fight. On 12 June General Erskine was ordered to secure the town of Villers-bocage and the high ground to the east. Here the division soon became embroiled in heavy fighting with elements of two German armoured divisions, 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr plus two companies of powerful Tiger tanks.

The advance guard from 4th County of London Yeomanry pushed through Villers-bocage at 9.00am on 13 June and reached Point 213 to the northeast. Unknown to them part of 2nd Company from the 101st Heavy Ss-panzer Battalion was in the area under panzer ace Sslieutena­nt Michael Wittmann. The 1st Company under Ss-captain Mobius was on their right. What followed was a disaster for the Desert Rats. Wittmann and a handful of Tigers made short work of 7th Armoured’s advance guard.

Sergeant Bramall said, “A Tiger came into the village. First it wiped out the Artillery observer tanks … poor devils. Then it got to the Recce Troop.” This was Wittmann who got between A and B Squadrons deployed either side of the town. When he reached the western outskirts he was driven off by Sergeant Stan Lockwood’s Firefly, which achieved at least one hit but did no damage. On the hill A Squadron were trapped on the road by Wittmann and the other Tigers and systematic­ally knocked out. Once the Fireflies were destroyed the Cromwells were helpless.

J. L. Cloudsey-thompson watched as A Squadron were just leaving the town when the rear tanks were hit and burst into flames. “Then an armour-piercing shell whizzed between my wireless-operator’s head and mine, he said. “It passed so close that although I was wearing headphones, it made me slightly deaf for 24 hours afterwards.” His tank was suddenly confronted by a Tiger and alarmingly his 75mm rounds just bounced off it. “Wham! We were hit.” Cloudsley-thompson and his crew baled out taking shelter under a currant bush. He noted that, “The Tiger drove off undamaged, its commander waving his hat and laughing. Its armour was so thick that none of our Cromwell tanks had been able to knock it out.”

At 1.00pm Mobius with eight more Tigers supported by infantry arrived to mop up

British survivors between Point 210 and 213. Wittmann likewise reappeared to cause more mayhem. Eventually he was ambushed by B Squadron and two Tigers and a Panzer IV were lost in the town centre. Lieutenant Bill Cotton’s Cromwell was only armed with a 95mm howitzer so let Wittmann pass unmolested. His Tiger was then successful­ly hit and disabled by a British six-pounder anti-tank gun. Sergeant Bramall’s Firefly knocked out the second Tiger. The Panzer IV was hit in the rear at close range. However, Wittmann and most of the crews managed to escape on foot to fight another day.

In total this opening battle cost the Desert Rats 20 Cromwells, four Fireflies, three light tanks, 14 half-tracks and 14 Bren carriers. The Germans lost about 15 tanks. A very shaken

7th Armoured was forced to abandoned Villersboc­age. “We felt bad about getting out,” said Sergeant Lockwood. “It made it seem as if it had been such a waste.” What was worse was the way they had blundered into the Germans.

“THE TIGER DROVE OFF UNDAMAGED, ITS COMMANDER WAVING HIS HAT AND LAUGHING. ITS ARMOUR WAS SO THICK THAT NONE OF OUR CROMWELL TANKS HAD BEEN ABLE TO KNOCK IT OUT.”

The debacle at Villers-bocage was a blow to the division’s morale and General Erskine knew it was likely to cost him his job. Afterwards the division was deployed east of Caumont. Living in trenches next to their tanks the Rats stayed there until the end of June. In the face of roving Tiger tanks and panzerfaus­t teams their casualties mounted. The division’s first three weeks in Normandy cost it 1,100 casualties. During this time the division made the most of the opportunit­y to resupply. Jack Geddes, a Sherman Firefly gunner, noted with some irritation, “You would be surprised at the amount of wood, wire and canisters the factory bods used to wrap a shell or two.”

Too wary, too canny

The 7th Armoured was not closely involved with Monty’s next attempt to breakthrou­gh German defences west of Caen. This time the honour fell to three fresh divisions under 8th Corps that included 11th Armoured. Operation Epsom ran from 26 June to 1 July with the loss of over 4,000 men. The Desert Rats next went into action as part of Monty’s controvers­ial Operation Goodwood. Publicly at least the intention was to help the Americans ready for their breakout to the west by tying the panzers in the Caen area and cutting through to Falaise.

Having walked the ground before D-day, Rommel had made sure that the Bourgébous Ridge was heavily defended and to a great depth. Monty’s intelligen­ce assessed Rommel’s defences to be three miles deep, in reality they were three times this, consisting of five defensive zones. The first was made up of infantry, then tanks from the 21st Panzer Division, behind these were fortified villages and farm houses, then a gun line honed on the Garcelless­ecqueville woods and the Bourguèbus ridge backed by panzergren­adiers and Panthers from the 1st SS. The last zone held two battle groups from the 12th SS. The gun line on the ridge included 88mm guns, field guns, heavy flak guns and rocket launchers. German tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles totalled around 400.

To convince the Germans that Monty would attack to the west again, on 15 July operations were conducted by the 12th and 30th Corps. To the east the problem Monty faced was that he first had to get his armoured divisions, 11th, Guards and 7th last over the Orne. Although the country to the east was suitable for tanks there were not enough bridges over the river and Caen canal. As a result, the divisions could only advance in columns of brigades one after another. Although General O’connor’s

8th Corps could pitch 870 tanks against 230 panzers he simply could not bring them all to bear at once. In addition, there was a shortage of infantry support. The infantry divisions were deployed on either flank.

Lieutenant-colonel Rankin with 7th Armoured and other officers who attended the 8th Corps planning conference came away with a deep sense of gloom. “No-one felt that passing three Armoured Divisions over one bridge could lead to anything except chaos,” he said, “and we knew the bulk of the German armour had been concentrat­ed in the area S and SE of Caen.” Afterwards Corporal Norman Habetin, serving with 11th Armoured, recalled, “We were briefed for Operation Goodwood, which was going to be the attack to end all attacks.”

Notably General “Pip” Roberts, commanding 11th Armoured, had every confidence in his division and the Guards. “They had a view on the battle very much the same as ours,” he said, “they were raring to go and show what they could do.” In contrast he characteri­sed 7th Armoured as “a little too wary … and a little too canny”. This did not bode well for the coming operation.

The Germans were stunned by a massive artillery and aerial bombardmen­t before the British tanks surged forward on 18 July. At 7.45am, 11th Armoured, with the British 3rd Division on their far left heading for Troarn, and the Canadian 2nd Division on the immediate right pushing on Colombelle­s, charged the German defences. Their target was the village of Le Mesnil-fremental followed by Verrières and Rocquancou­rt. The Guards on the left met stiff resistance at Cagny. When the lead elements of 11th Armoured cleared the enemy minefields they found themselves exposed. “The Germans knew the exact yardages and they could knock you out quite easily,” observed Corporal Bill Scott, “and they did – from both flanks.”

“HAVING WALKED THE GROUND BEFORE D-DAY, ROMMEL HAD MADE SURE THAT THE BOURGÉBOUS RIDGE WAS HEAVILY DEFENDED AND TO A GREAT DEPTH”

Late to the fight

In the meantime the 7th Armoured found itself snarled up in the bottleneck caused by congestion on the bridges and was unable to join the battle until the afternoon. “All I remember of Goodwood is sitting for most of one night in a traffic jam waiting to cross a bridge,” recalled Private Robert Boulton, “and the non-existent Luftwaffe being very existent.” The delay in the Desert Rats’ 22nd Armoured Brigade joining the battle did not go unnoticed by General Roberts. He wanted them to take over the space between his 11th Armoured and the Guards. Roberts grumbled that “7th Armoured did not put in an appearance before 5.00pm”. Six hours earlier Roberts had met Brigadier “Looney” Hinde commanding 22nd Armoured Brigade. Hinde had not been happy about the battlefiel­d saying, “There are too many bloody tanks here already.” Roberts was about to point out that many of these were wrecks but Hinde had gone.

Once across the Orne the Desert Rats came into contact with the enemy at Cuverville. The

5th Royal Tank Regiment destroyed two Panzer IVS but this cost them six tanks and 12 men. In contrast 11th Armoured lost over 100 tanks. The casualties for the day showed that Roberts’ division had borne the brunt of the battle having suffered 336 casualties – the Guards lost 137 and 7th Armoured 48.

Roberts was not impressed with the Rats noting rather causticall­y, “They certainly did not have the same enthusiasm for this battle as ourselves and Guards Armoured Division.” This perhaps was a little harsh in light of them being late to the fight, but they did seem to lack drive and aggressive­ness.

On the morning of 19 July 5RTR took Grenthevil­le along with 80 prisoners. The 7th Armoured fought its way through Panther and Tiger tanks and their supporting infantry. For the tank crews it came as a shock to see the battlefiel­d littered with so many knocked out tanks. Major Bill Apsey who was wounded by German mortar rounds recalled, “In the ambulance were two tank boys horrendous­ly burnt, both died on the way back.” At 5.00pm 5RTR commenced clearing the Germans from Soliers while 1RTR took Fours. Their objective was the heavily defended Bourguébus ridge.

The following day Captain Bill Bellamy recorded, “On 20 July Ifs, Bras and Hubertfoli­e were occupied and patrols pushed on as far as Verrières, held by up to 100 tanks of 1 SS PZ Div, a battle Group of 2 Panzer and 272 Infantry Division.” At 6.00pm on 20 July 5RTR took the village of Bourguèbus. Remarkably for the loss of just one Cromwell they claimed two Tigers and a Panther. All three panzers were destroyed by a Firefly commanded by Sergeant “Pluto” Ellis. One of them he knocked out by shooting it through a haystack. The following day they captured two Panthers, set another on fire and destroyed a Tiger without loss. Also on the 20 July the 4CLY got to the Caen-falaise road near Bras.

On the 21 July the weather broke and there was torrential rain that turned the battlefiel­d into a quagmire. Although Monty had taken Caen and 30 square miles, Goodwood had run out of momentum. The Germans remained entrenched on part of the Bourguébus ridge. In three days of fighting he lost in excess of 400 tanks. The Allies were easily able to replace these, but the tank crews and supporting infantry were irreplacea­ble. The 7th Armoured alone suffered 200 casualties. “After Goodwood,” recalled Private Bill Hinde, “Jerry made a couple of counter-attacks but Div and Army Arty [artillery] made short work of them. He got no where near our positions.”

There was to be little respite for the Desert Rats. On 25 July they came under the Canadian 2nd Corps for Operation Spring. This was a continuati­on of Goodwood that saw another attack toward Falaise. At the end of the month 7th Armoured was committed to Operation Bluecoat which pushed toward Mont Pincon. By mid-august the division was triumphant­ly heading for the Seine.

Rather unfairly Goodwood was chalked up as a failure. Monty’s armoured fist had been fought to a standstill. Strategica­lly though the Desert Rats and the others had contribute­d to a victory. Goodwood forced the Germans to deploy the bulk of their panzers facing the Allies’ eastern flank leaving just 190 tanks facing the Americans. On 25 July 1944 the Americans started Operation Cobra which heralded the German collapse in Normandy.

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 ??  ?? British tank troops were strengthen­ed by the addition of the Sherman Firefly armed with a 17-pounder gun
British tank troops were strengthen­ed by the addition of the Sherman Firefly armed with a 17-pounder gun
 ??  ?? LEFT: MAJOR GENERAL SIR PERCY HOBART, COMMANDER OF 79TH ARMOURED DIVISION
LEFT: MAJOR GENERAL SIR PERCY HOBART, COMMANDER OF 79TH ARMOURED DIVISION
 ??  ?? Men of the 15th Scottish Division on 26 June 1944 during Operation Epsom Infantry from 15th Scottish Division supported by Churchills of 7RTR during Operation Epsom
Men of the 15th Scottish Division on 26 June 1944 during Operation Epsom Infantry from 15th Scottish Division supported by Churchills of 7RTR during Operation Epsom
 ??  ?? Caen was always the objective for Monty’s British and Canadian forces
Caen was always the objective for Monty’s British and Canadian forces
 ??  ?? Tankers from the independen­t 33rd Armoured Brigade who took part in Operation Charnwood, the frontal attack on Caen
Tankers from the independen­t 33rd Armoured Brigade who took part in Operation Charnwood, the frontal attack on Caen
 ??  ?? German defences to the south of Caen were extensive and included German nebelwerfe­r rocket launchers – known to the British as “Moaning Minnies” Although Caen was liberated during Goodwood much of the city was left in ruins
German defences to the south of Caen were extensive and included German nebelwerfe­r rocket launchers – known to the British as “Moaning Minnies” Although Caen was liberated during Goodwood much of the city was left in ruins

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