Zhukov: Stalin’s greatest general
The future Marshal and Red Army hero cut his teeth by soundly defeating the Japanese – something Hitler foolishly chose to ignore
Uncover how the Battles of Khalkhin Gol forged the Red Army’s strategic genius
During the summer of 1939 Russian General Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov crushed the Japanese Army on the steppes of Mongolia so decisively that Japan never meddled in Soviet affairs again. It ensured that Joseph Stalin was free to fight on just one front rather than two when the time came. When Adolf Hitler’s armies reached Moscow, Zhukov was there with his wealth of experience waiting for them along with his hardened Siberian divisions.
So, how did Zhukov, future hero of the
Battles of Moscow, Kursk and Berlin, born to peasant stock in 1896, become Russia’s most famous general? He was to achieve this largely through a combination of aptitude and being in the right place at the right time.
After the Russian Civil War the veterans of the Bolshevik 1st Cavalry Army manoeuvred themselves into positions of power. This was Stalin’s favourite formation. Despite his purges, an old boy’s network survived to ensure that the Red Army retained a few relatively competent commanders. Among them were Zhukov, Semyon Mikhailovich Budenny and Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko.
Zhukov’s military career began to progress when he served as a squadron commander under Budenny with the 1st Cavalry Army. More importantly Zhukov’s brigade commander was Timoshenko. He was conscripted in 1915 and subsequently joined the Red Army at the start of the Revolution. Zhukov first saw action during the civil war against the Whites near Shipovo in 1919, when his unit was attacked by 800 Cossacks. A key lesson he learned was that cavalry must be supported by adequate firepower. After the war he soon rose to regimental and then brigade commander.
Just over two decades later Timoshenko, by then a marshal and people’s commissar for defence, ensured Zhukov became his principal assistant, chief of the general staff in January 1941 at the age of 44. Neither Budenny nor Timoshenko would show the flare or indeed survival instincts exhibited by Zhukov before, or during the war.
Budenny was a very old-school cavalryman, with a deep rooted scepticism of tanks, and was not considered very bright by some. His main contribution to the Red Army seems to have been his ridiculously large moustache, and a comical looking civil war era cloth helmet, named after him.
Nonetheless, from 1937-39 he held the key posts of commander of the Moscow Military District, then the first deputy people’s commissar of defence and during the German invasion commanded the Southwestern Front.
Notably Zhukov, prior to his appointment as Timoshenko’s deputy, served as deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District. He prudently distanced himself from politics and escaped Stalin’s purges. Zhukov was appointed commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps in 1937, but shortly after was offered the 6th Cossack Corps. Zhukov discovered this latter formation contained an old command of his, the Don Cossack Division, as well the 6th Chongar and 29th Cavalry Divisions.
Border wars
Zhukov was offered the Byelorussian post at the end of 1938, commanding the cavalry and tank units, which were to comprise of around five cavalry divisions, some four detached tank brigades and other supporting units. Saying goodbye to the Cossack Corps, Zhukov travelled to Smolensk and during May 1939 conducted exercises near Minsk, little realising that this would soon be the scene of bitter battles with Hitler’s marauding panzers.
Hitler and his high command watched with great interest as the Red Army fought three brief and very different border wars in the second half of 1939. That summer it was involved in what seemed an inconsequential border squabble with the Japanese. Then in September, just 16 days after Hitler’s invasion of Poland, it rolled into eastern Poland, under the terms of the Nazi-soviet non-aggression pact. Polish opposition to the Red Army was negligible, which was just as well, as its conduct proved to be the complete opposite of the Wehrmacht’s highly efficient blitzkrieg. Then in the winter the outnumbered Finnish Army
“HOW DID ZHUKOV, FUTURE HERO OF THE BATTLES OF MOSCOW, KURSK AND BERLIN, BORN TO PEASANT STOCK IN 1896, BECOME RUSSIA’S MOST FAMOUS GENERAL?”
ran circles round the Red Army, after it became trapped in Finland’s dense forests.
The Soviet-japanese War could not have come at a better time for Zhukov and the Red Army. Zhukov would gain invaluable experience, developing his new armoured warfare tactics. He would also become familiar with the forces of the Transbaikal Military District, guarding the Chinese Manchuria-manchukuo border. This district came into being in the mid-1930s as a precautionary measure in response to Japan’s invasion of China. It also helped create a very useful reserve for the Red Army.
The main Japanese force in occupied Manchuria, known as Manchukuo, was the Kwantung Army. Japan coveted the Soviet port of Vladivostok, but to keep the Red Army at bay first needed to sever the Trans-siberian railway. As a precautionary measure the Red Army occupied Changkufeng Hill, near the mouth of the Tyumen River on the eastern border southwest of Vladivostok. Throughout the summer of 1938 the Japanese probed Soviet defences with a series of border incidents near Vladivostok at
Lake Khasan. The Soviet response was poor, revealing the true extent of Stalin’s purges. On 11 July 1938 fighting broke out when the Japanese tried to remove Soviet troops from Changkufeng, however they had fortified the area and remained in possession of the hill following an armistice on 10 August 1938.
The Japanese risked losing face after the formal ceasefire, however the Emperor, Hirohito, agreed to the General Staff’s plan to act much further west against Mongolia. Stalin’s paranoia had left the Red Army in disarray and with war brewing with Finland, which would tie up resources and severely stretch its capabilities, and tensions growing over Poland, he looked around for someone he could trust, who would swiftly put an end to Japanese adventurism. He chose Zhukov.
The Soviet high command was not ignorant of Japan’s conquest of huge areas of China and that this constituted a very real threat to the Soviet border. Zhukov was ordered to see Marshal Voroshilov, the People’s Commissar of Defence, in Moscow on 2 June 1939. Voroshilov told him, “Japanese troops have made a surprise attack and crossed into friendly Mongolia which the Soviet government is committed to defend from external aggression by the Treaty of 12 March 1936. Here is a map of the invasion area showing the situation as of 30 May.” Pointing to it Voroshilov added, “The Japanese had for a long time carried out provocative attacks on Mongolian frontier guards, and here the Japanese Hailar garrison invaded MPR territory and attached Mongolian frontier units which were covering the area east of Khalkhin Gol.
“I think they’ve started a big military gamble. At any rate, it’s only the beginning … could you fly there right away and if need be assume command of our troops?”
“ZHUKOV QUICKLY CAME TO THE ASSESSMENT THAT 57TH CORPS IN ITS PRESENT STATE, WAS NOT UP TO THE JOB OF DIRECTING OPERATIONS NOR STOPPING THE JAPANESE”
‘Pull no punches’
Zhukov jumped at the chance to show what he was capable of. He then went to see Ivan Smorodinov, Acting Deputy Chief of the General Staff. “The moment you arrive,” instructed Smorodinov, “see what’s going on and report to us. But pull no punches.” Zhukov understood only too well that his new appointment could make or break his career. Simply ousting the Japanese from Outer Mongolia would not be enough, the Japanese would have to be dealt such a blow that they would never consider tackling the Red Army again. In effect the security of the whole of the Soviet Far East rested in Zhukov’s hands. It was time to put into practice all his training in Byelorussia.
Accompanied by a small team Zhukov flew east, landing first in Chita, headquarters of the Transbaikal Military District. He found the city a secretive place. The Japanese had briefly occupied it for two years at the end of the First World War and prior to that it had been the scene of resistance to Tsarist rule. Under the Soviet authorities Chita was closed to most Russians and all foreigners, because of its proximity on the strategically important Trans-siberian railway and the Chinese-mongolian borders.
Zhukov met with General V.F. Yakovlev, the military district commander, and his officers. Yakovlev appreciated Stalin was taking the Japanese incursion into the Mongolian People’s Republic very seriously, especially if the people’s commissariat of defence had sent a special envoy, with the authority to take charge without recourse to any of the regional commands. In the first instance what Zhukov needed to make a thorough assessment of the situation was credible intelligence. He was informed that General N.V. Feklenko’s 57th Special Corps was forward deployed to the southeast in Mongolia, tasked with protecting the republic. This was good news as it meant that the Red Army had a corps level command and control structure in place in the MPR.
Worryingly it transpired that the Japanese
Air Force had been attacking Soviet troop movements in Mongolia, indicating a lack of support from the Red Air Force. Apart from this Zhukov was very disappointed by the vagueness and lack of detailed intelligence. It was immediately clear that Yakolev’s communications with Feklenko were very poor. It was also very evident that Feklenko did not have a firm grip on the situation. In light of previous border fighting Feklenko’s lack of urgency seemed very puzzling.
Just three days after his Moscow briefing, Zhukov arrived at 57th Special Corps HQ at Tamtsak-bulak in Mongolia and met with Feklenko, Regimental Commissar M.S.
Nikishev, who was Corps Commissar, and Brigade Commander A.M. Kushchev, Chief of Staff. To Zhukov’s irritation the situation was a complete mess. The HQ had little appreciation of the situation, communication between the Soviet and Mongolian commands was nonexistent and coordination lacking.
Zhukov was very unhappy that none of the commanders, except for Nikishev, had even visited the front and therefore had little idea of what was happening on the ground. Grasping the situation, he travelled up to the front and found that local intelligence was equally poor. Zhukov quickly came to the assessment that 57th Corps in its present state was not up to the job of directing operations nor stopping the Japanese.
He immediately sent his report to Voroshilov, stating he planned that Soviet-mongolian troops should maintain the bridgehead, on the right bank of the Khalkhin-gol river, while preparing for a counter-offensive. Voroshilov agreed and the ineffectual Feklenko found himself
“FORTUNATELY FOR STALIN, WHEN HITLER REACHED THE VERY GATES OF MOSCOW, ZHUKOV KNEW WHAT TO DO. HE WOULD SAVE THE RUSSIAN CAPITAL AND GO ON TO DEFEAT THE GERMANS AT KURSK AND MINSK, THEN CROWN HIS REMARKABLE CAREER WITH THE CAPTURE OF BERLIN”
immediately replaced by Zhukov. The latter’s first move was to request reinforcements for the air force, three rifle divisions and, more significantly, a tank brigade and artillery.
Zhukov, alert to the danger of his forces on the east bank being cut off, ordered a largescale triple-pronged counter-attack with 450 tanks and armoured cars. Under his command was the 11th Tank Brigade equipped with 150 tanks, the 7th Armoured Brigade with another 154 armoured vehicles and the Mongolian 8th Armoured Battalion armed with 45mm guns. The 11th Tank Brigade, under Commander Yakolev, was instructed to strike from the north, supported by the 24th Motorized Regiment, which pressed in from the northwest supported by artillery under Colonel Fedyuinsky.
In addition the 7th Armoured Brigade, under Colonel Lesovoi, was to attack from the south, supported by an armoured battalion from the Mongolian 8th Cavalry Division.
Heavy guns were moved up from the 185th Artillery Regiment to support the attack on Bain-tsagan and the 9th Armoured Brigade in the Khalkhin-gol bridgehead.
Zhukov’s armoured fist
At 7.00am on 3 July 1939, the Soviet Air Force and artillery commenced softening up Japanese positions. Two hours later tanks of the 11th Tank Brigade moved up with the full attack being launched at 10.45am. Japanese defences and anti-tank guns were inadequate and Zhukov began to make ground. The Japanese response was to launch a counterattack on 4 July, but it came to grief in the face of Soviet bombers and artillery.
That night Japanese commander General Kamatsubara gave the order to withdraw and his men were back over the river by 5 July.
Their engineers blew the remaining bridges to prevent the Soviet tanks following, leaving many Japanese with little option but to swim for it. Those troops remaining on the eastern slopes of Bain-tsagan were annihilated.
Although Komatsubara and his HQ got back across the river, hundreds of his men drowned. He left much of his 10,000 strong force behind strewn over the mountain.
In the face of a Japanese counterattack the Soviets held their ground and by 25 July the Japanese, having suffered over 5,000 casualties, gave up. The Japanese counterattacked again on 12 August and drove the Mongolian 22nd Cavalry Regiment from the Bolshiye Peski height to the south.
At this point it would have been prudent for the Kwantung to call it a day and summon the diplomats, instead more anti-tank gun units were brought up ready for another counterattack. They planned to attack along a 43-mile front on 24 August, however, the dynamic Zhukov was to beat them to it by four days.
Zhukov’s Soviet-mongolian command prepared for a knockout counter-offensive. Reinforcements were brought up, including two rifle divisions, a tank brigade, two artillery regiments as well as supporting bomber and fighter units. Stalin, conscious that Hitler would be closely watching events in Central Asia, despatched Zhukov further reinforcements. These included three infantry and two cavalry divisions, seven independent brigades,
“ALTHOUGH KOMATSUBARA AND HIS HQ GOT BACK ACROSS THE RIVER, HUNDREDS OF HIS MEN DROWNED. HE LEFT MUCH OF HIS 10,000 STRONG FORCE BEHIND STREWN OVER THE MOUNTAIN”
including five armoured, additional artillery and air force units to create the First Army Group. Zhukov had everything that he needed.
By now Soviet reconnaissance aircraft pieced together a good intelligence picture of the Japanese defences. The reconnaissance group from the 149th Motorised Rifle Regiment, under Regimental Commander I.M. Remizov, also provided a steady stream of prisoners for interrogation. Zhukov assessed that the Japanese were most vulnerable on their flanks. He knew that their greatest weakness was their lack of mobility, effective tank units and motorised infantry. This meant they would not be able to respond quickly to any Soviet breakthrough.
Zhukov’s armoured fist consisted of the
4th, 6th and 11th Tank Brigades and the 7th and 8th Mechanized Brigades. He planned to encircle the Japanese using his North, South and Central Groups, with his armour on the wings. The Soviets deployed 50,000 troops to defend the east bank and then Zhukov prepared to cross to the west, with three rifle divisions and his armoured forces.
Waiting at their jump off points were 35 infantry battalions, supported by a mobile force of 20 cavalry squadrons, 498 tanks, 346 armoured cars and 502 guns. At 5.45am on 20 August Soviet aircraft blasted the Japanese forward positions, followed by a three-hour artillery and mortar bombardment.
Zhukov’s tanks roared forward at 8.45am. By the next day to the south, his forces had swung behind the Japanese reaching the Khalkhingol’s east-west tributary, the Khailastyn-gol. On 23 August the Northern Group, backed by Zhukov’s reserves, the 212th Airborne Brigade fighting as infantry, seized the Palet Heights and swung south. Although trapped, the Japanese resisted to the last.
The two wings of Zhukov’s attack linked up at Nomonhan on 25 August trapping the Japanese 23rd Division. The following day Japanese forces outside the pocket tried to get through to them, but were met by Zhukov’s 6th Tank Brigade.
The Red Air Force also ensured that the Japanese could not bring up reinforcements. They dropped 190 tons of bombs during 474 sorties during the first week alone. Having trapped the Japanese Zhukov spent a week eradicating the survivors. By 31 August it was all over. Zhukov’s strategy had triumphed.
Feet of clay
On 1 September 1939 Hitler invaded Poland and when the shooting stopped Stalin occupied the eastern half of the country. Behind the scenes Stalin, alarmed by the ease with which the Wehrmacht had crushed Poland in just four weeks, feared that Finland and the Baltic States might provide a springboard for a Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. He imposed a mutual defensive agreement on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in October 1939.
This involved allowing the Red Army to be based on their soil and in July 1940 they were officially incorporated into the Soviet Union.
Then Stalin invaded Finland on 30 November 1939. Despite Timoshenko’s overwhelming victory, the terrible performance of the Red Army greatly influenced Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union. Stalin mobilised half his regular divisions in Europe and western Siberia to fight his tiny neighbour. He relied on brute strength, but Soviet troops, whilst brave, had crucially lacked initiative. Nikita Khrushchev realised the wider ramifications, “All of us – and Stalin first and foremost – sensed in our victory a defeat by the Finns.
“It was a dangerous defeat because it encouraged our enemies’ conviction that the Soviet Union was a colossus with feet of clay.”
After Khalkhin-gol, Zhukov singled out his tank brigades, especially the 11th under Yakovlev for praise, as well as the 36th Motorized Division under Petrov, and 57th Rifle Division under Galanin. The 82nd Division, now under Fedyuninsky, was to distinguish itself fighting the Germans, while Fedyuninsky would command the 42nd Army at beleaguered Leningrad. Potapov, who had acted as Zhukov’s deputy, ended up commanding the 5th Army.
On the assumption that Operation
Barbarossa went according to schedule, the German General Staff had to get their assessments of Soviet manpower, and indeed industrial capacity, right because it was vital they predict the Red Army’s response. Accurate intelligence regarding Soviet frontline units and reserves was crucial to the success of the entire enterprise. It was these judgements that convinced Hitler to invade and secondly fight the Battle of Moscow in the winter of 19411942, because he believed it would exhaust the depleted Red Army’s reserves.
Crucially, thanks to his experiences in the
Far East, Zhukov ensured that the Transbaikal Military District sowed the seeds for the Reserve Front that would help defend the western Soviet Union. Zhukov, by the end of June 1941, was anticipating being able to deploy just under 150 divisions running north to south in the Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa
Military Districts. The manpower of these units was 50 per cent less than an average German division. The Wehrmacht would have to overcome these, plus at least another 20 regular army divisions being assembled.
Just before Barbarossa commenced, Timoshenko and Zhukov, who by then held the top posts of commissar for defence and chief of staff respectively, did all they could to warn Stalin of the growing threat of invasion. Zhukov was instructed to prepare State Defence Plan 1941. While this was based on the premise that Red Army operations would be in response to Nazi aggression, the idea was to take the fight to the enemy in an offensive rather than defensive manner. Zhukov’s defence plan and Soviet mobilisation plans envisaged nearly all the Red Army being deployed in the west.
This meant of the Red Army’s impressive order of battle, which comprised a total of 303 divisions, the bulk of them some 237 divisions would be deployed in the west facing the Nazi threat. However, of this impressive overall total, 88 divisions were still in the process of being formed across the breadth and width of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s reluctance to mobilise and the logistics involved meant by the summer of 1941 only 171 divisions were in the field in the western Soviet Union deployed in three belts. They were to be strengthened by Stalin’s 20 new mechanised corps fielding about 1,800 heavy and medium tanks plus thousands of inadequate light tanks.
As a result only a third of the Soviet divisions were actually in the crucial first defensive echelon. Under such circumstances it was clearly impossible for Zhukov to conduct a forward offensive defence. The reality was that the first defensive echelon was little more than a trip wire. To add to the Red Army’s difficulties after moving into eastern Poland, it had abandoned and stripped most of the pre-1939 Soviet-polish frontier defences. This required the construction of new defences in the western areas of the frontier military districts. These new defences were a logistical headache and were not something that could be completed in a hurry.
“HAVING TRAPPED THE JAPANESE ZHUKOV SPENT A WEEK ERADICATING THE SURVIVORS. BY 31 AUGUST IT WAS ALL OVER. ZHUKOV’S STRATEGY HAD TRIUMPHED”
Zhukov saves the day
According to Zhukov it was General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, who persuaded Stalin in late March 1941 that Hitler would not attack in the summer. Ironically he produced an accurate report that warned that three German army groups were indeed massing on the Soviet Union’s western frontier, which could strike toward Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev between 15 May and 15 June 1941.
Golikov who had commanded troops during the Soviet invasion of Poland and in the war against Finland seemed destined for great things. Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin’s Communist party enforcer in Ukraine recalled, “I’d often seen him in Stalin’s presence when he was head of army intelligence.” Later at Stalingrad, Khrushchev was to form the opinion that Golikov was a coward.
Golikov’s reports, and similar ones from the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, were sent direct to Stalin, neither Timoshenko nor Zhukov were ever privy to them. “All the information General Golikov had was immediately forwarded to Stalin,” recalled Zhukov. “What I do not know is what intelligence General Golikov laid before Stalin on his own, by-passing the defence commissar and the chief of the general staff, as he often did. Naturally, this could not but affect the final situation analysis.”
This was all part of Stalin’s policy of keeping the Red Army compartmentalised and ensuring his generals never had the bigger picture. It meant that he was relying purely on intuition to determine the veracity of the intelligence landing on his desk. The net result was that he did not canvass the opinions of his experienced senior military leaders.
Only in late April 1941 did Stalin acquiesce to Timoshenko and Zhukov’s request to mobilise the reservists, as well as re-deploy troops from the Urals, Siberia and Far East to the west. This deployment could not be completed until 10
July – this was to prove three weeks too late. Fortunately for Stalin, when Hitler reached the very gates of Moscow, Zhukov knew what to do. He would save the Russian capital and go on to defeat the Germans at Kursk and Minsk, then crown his remarkable career with the capture of Berlin.