KÖNIGGRÄTZ
The Prussians isolated, trapped and destroyed the army of the Austrian Empire, using a combination of new technologies and hastening the process of German unification
Prussian battlefield tactics are pitched against overwhelming odds
The battle of Königgrätz (also known as the battle of Sadowa or the battle of Chlum) was the most decisive clash between the armies of Prussia and those of Austria and her allies during the short, seven-week long, Austro-prussian War in 1866.
The war itself is also known under several different titles. Königgrätz was one of the largest battles of the age with almost half a million men fighting on the field.
Rivalry of Austria and Prussia
The context of the Austro-prussian War was one of nationalism and the unification of German states. At the time, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia were the two largest and most dominant forces in the German-speaking world. There were actually 37 separate states in the German Confederation but their unification became a hot topic known as ‘The German Question’ in the post Napoleonic world. In the early 19th century Prussia and
Austria had been obligated to be allies against Napoleon, but from 1815 tensions had grown over which of the states would lead the new ideology of German nationalism; unification under Prussia was known as ‘Little Germany’ and under Austria ‘Big Germany’. Events of the 1848 Revolution, however, showed that Austria was not going to take the lead in such a nationalist movement and this opened the way for the kingdom of Prussia to be the key stakeholder. During the 1848 Revolution,
“IT IS STILL DEBATED WHETHER THE PRUSSIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER, OTTO VON BISMARCK, ORCHESTRATED ALL THESE EVENTS IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A WAR WITH AUSTRIA”
Austrian and Russian forces brutally crushed the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 (concessions would be granted in the aftermath of 1866, creating the Austro-hungarian Empire in 1867). The events leading up to the war of 1866 were the positioning of Prussia to be the dominant force in the unification of Germany.
Another debated topic in 19th century politics was the Schleswig-holstein Question. This involved the disputed land between Prussia and Denmark in the Jutland Peninsula. Denmark claimed the disputed territory in 1848 but a Prussian army came to the aid of the German-speaking majority. The war ended in Danish victory in 1851 but the question was unresolved. In 1863 another attempt to integrate the territory into the Kingdom of Denmark was made leading to a second war in 1864. Prussia again invaded, this time with Austria as an ally. The alliance was so successful that they invaded Denmark itself, eventually occupying all of the Danish mainland. The Treaty of Vienna ceded the disputed territories to Prussia and Austria from Denmark (losing 40 per cent of her total area and population). Prussia wanted to absorb the territories into her kingdom as provinces, but Austria wanted them to be independent autonomous duchies. Under the Gastein Convention of 1865, Prussia would control Schleswig and Austria Holstein.
The rest of Europe, as well as the other German states, reacted negatively to the Convention but it set the stage for war between the two rivals the following year.
It is still debated whether the Prussian Minister President and Foreign Minister, Otto von Bismarck, orchestrated all these events in order to bring about a war with Austria and even to
“KÖNIGGRÄTZ WAS ONE OF THE LARGEST BATTLES OF THE AGE WITH ALMOST HALF A MILLION MEN FIGHTING ON THE FIELD”
achieve
German unification with Prussia as the dominant power. This has been claimed, Bismarck himself doing so, but it seems highly unlikely since the outstanding successes of
Prussian arms were not anticipated at the start of 1864. Much more likely is Bismarck’s manipulation of opportunity and circumstance, especially quickly exploiting unexpected successes to Prussia’s advantage. He proved his abilities now in assessing the moment to strike against Austria in 1866. Russia, Austria’s ally in 1848, had been put off-side by Austria’s joining the French and British alliance against Russia in the Crimean War in 1854-55. Prussia had also supported Russia during the January Uprising in Poland in 1863, Austria had not. Bismarck also met with the French Emperor, Napoleon III, to seek assurances that France would not intervene
in an Austro-prussian conflict. Prussia also had an ally in Italy, who wanted to end Austrian control of several northern Italian provinces, meaning the Austrians would be facing an enemy on two fronts and would necessarily need to divert some of her forces south.
A pretext for war
In early 1866 the issue of the status and governance of Schelwig-holstein erupted. Austria brought the issue before the German Diet on 1 January, Prussia declared the
Gastein Convention null and void and, on 7 June invaded (Austrian controlled) Holstein.
The German Diet voted nine to six to mobilise against Prussia on 14 June and Bismarck declared that the German Confederation was ended and both sides mobilised for war.
The other German states were conflicted on which side to ally with. Several saw that they could not stand against Prussian arms but other autocratic rulers feared their own position if they did not side with Austria. Fear of Prussian expansion was also widespread. In the end the southern German states allied with Austria, including Hanover, Bavaria, Württemburg, Baden, but also Saxony and Hesse, and others. Prussia had allies in Oldenburg, Bruswick and both Macklenburg houses. Several states (including Liechtenstein and Luxembourg) remained neutral.
Preparations and technologies
The Second Schleswig War had shown that the military reforms in Prussia, undertaken since 1862 (and one of Bismarck’s first successes) had proved highly effective. These included the adoption of universal conscription (which made Prussia’s potential army much larger). Austria still used old conscription methods which meant the majority of her troops were poorly trained despite having a massive paper strength of ten corps of 83,000 men each. In reality she could only field 320,000 men. Prussian conscripts by contrast were drilled to a much higher degree. Prussian divisions theoretically contained 15,000 men, 700 cavalry and 24 guns each but actual numbers differed. Prussia, aided by a booming economy, also adopted the Dreyse needle gun, a breech-loading, bolt-action rifle capable of faster and more accurate fire than the older muzzle-loading Lorenz rifles of the Austrian army. Prussian troops could fire five rounds a minute, the Austrians could manage two.
Austria was also still burdened with the costs of the Hungarian Revolution and its aftermath. Also, while Prussian reforms had been incredibly effective against the Danish, they had shown that her troops were superior to those of her then-allies, Austria.
Another important factor in the Austroprussian war was the use of railroads. The Prussian rail system was more advanced and extensive than that in Austria and this allowed Prussian forces to mobilise, concentrate and be transported much faster than those in Austria. The Prussian Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, assessed that Prussia’s five railway lines could concentrate almost 300,000 men in under four weeks whereas Austria’s single rail line would take almost twice the time to amass less men. In actuality the use of rail was not seamless, but it marked the way of the future.
“THE PRUSSIAN RAIL SYSTEM WAS MORE ADVANCED AND EXTENSIVE THAN THAT IN AUSTRIA AND THIS ALLOWED PRUSSIAN FORCES TO MOBILISE, CONCENTRATE AND BE TRANSPORTED MUCH FASTER THAN THOSE IN AUSTRIA”
Invasion
Moltke mobilised his forces on the Prussian border for an invasion of Bohemia through Saxony. This began on 16 June. The Saxons, allied with Austria, were defeated near
Dresden and abandoned their own territory to concentrate their forces with the Austrians. The Austrians, meanwhile, had been amassing for a defensive strategy at Olmütz in Moravia in order to protect Vienna. Preliminary engagements were fought in the last days of June – an Austrian army defeated the Italians at Custoza,
and Hanover (unexpectedly) defeated a Prussian army at Langensalza, but surrendered two days later. Elements of the Prussian advance were met by Austrian forces, but these engagements were indecisive although the Austrians suffered heavy casualties.
The Austrians had checked the Prussians at Trautenau (Trutnov), their only victory against Prussian forces during the war, but the Prussians were victorious at Gitschin (Jicín).
The Austrians then moved to the fortress of Josefstadt (Josefov) and to defend the mountain passes into Bohemia. Marching against them were three Prussian armies: the First Army under the command of Moltke (although nominally commanded by King Wilhelm), Second Army (commanded by Crown Prince Frederick and Leonhard von Blumenthal) and the Elbe Army (commanded by Karl von Bittenfeld).
Using modern telegraph communications to his advantage, Moltke was able to coordinate and concentrate his three separate forces with precision. He guessed that the Austrian commander, Ludwig von Benedek, would retreat to the Elbe River. Benedek was of Hungarian descent but unwaveringly loyal to the monarchy and had come to fame in suppressing the Hungarian Revolution in 1849 and then in the battles of the Second War of Italian Unification in 1859, especially at San Martino. He was old-fashioned and believed courage and valour were the soldier’s most important tools on the battlefield. He also knew his limitations as a commander and this may have been the cause of his reticence on the battlefield. The preferred
Austrian method was Stoßtaktik (shock tactics), 1,000 man columns engaging with the enemy at close quarters. These tactics suited Benedek’s concept of war but were sadly outdated.
The accuracy and rapid fire of the Prussian rifles would decimate the courageous advances of the Austrians, inflicting huge losses.
Austrian backs to the wall
Benedek knew from the losses inflicted in the opening engagements of the war that his army faced annihilation if he faced the Prussians en masse. He also realised his dispositions had been in error. On 30 June, he requested that the emperor, Franz Josepf I, make peace but this was refused. Benedeck took position on high ground between Sadowa and Könnigrätz with the Elbe River at his rear.
His position was sighted by the Prussians on the evening of 2 July and plans were made to attack the following morning. The Prussian Elbe and First armies were in position but communication with the Second Army, on the Prussian left flank, was broken and so old-fashioned dispatch riders were sent, reaching the Second Army at 4.00am on 3 July. Nonetheless, the Second Army immediately leapt into action and marched to close the trap on the Austrians later that day.
Opening salvos
The Austrians had a superior position defended by artillery and defence works erected on high ground stretching from Problus (Probluz) to Chlum. They also outnumbered the two Prussian armies which initially opposed them; the Elbe army was 39,000 strong and the First Army had 85,000 men. The Austrians had 215,000 men, with the army of Saxony on their left flank. In the rain, the Austrian artillery opened fire just before 8.00am. The Austrians should
have had the edge in regard to artillery, with modern, breech-loading rifled artillery whereas the Prussians still used smooth bore, muzzleloading cannons. Despite the greater accuracy and longer range of the Austrian artillery, this edge would not prove decisive. This opening artillery barrage pinned the Elbe Army under Bittenfeld in place and allowed the Saxons to withdraw. On the left flank of the Prussian centre, General Eduard von Fransecky advanced with the 7th Division into the Swiepwald Forest where he clashed with two Austrian Corps.
Fransecky was tasked with clearing the Austrian centre and covering the Prussian right flank until the arrival of the Second Army. The First Army moved in support of Fransecky, capturing Sadowa and wading across the Bistritz (Bystrice) River. This advance was, however, halted by accurate Austrian artillery fire. All reserves were committed by midday but the Second Army had not yet arrived.
A battle lost?
Some commentators have argued that Benedek could have won the battle at the moment the Prussian First Army’s advance was halted if he had ordered a charge by his cavalry. Benedek had placed his cavalry behind both his guns and his infantry corps so it is unlikely he would have committed his cavalry to such a move. What is more, the Prussian 7th Division held the Swiepwald and were thus relatively immune to artillery fire and would discourage any cavalry charge since an Austrian cavalry charge into the Prussian centre would then have the Prussian 7th Division on their right flank and perhaps even in their rear. The damp ground was also a factor to dissuade Benedek from ordering a cavalry charge. Up to now Benedek’s superior numbers and the greater range of his artillery kept the Prussians at bay and the battle was going in his favour.
The Infantry battle being waged in the Swiepwald also meant that the Austrians could not use their artillery for fear of hitting their own troops. What is more, Austrian troops were only committed to the fighting a brigade at a time which meant they could be defeated by the superior weapons, faster rate of fire, and better training of the Prussians.
The 7th Division held off almost onequarter of the Austrian strength because they were not attacked in strength. In this way, Benedek nullified his own advantages whilst his men charged into the teeth of the superiorities of the Prussians.
At around 11.00am the Austrians began to manoeuvre to outflank the Prussian 7th Division on their right. Finally, an Austrian charge led by Colonel Pöckh of the 4th Corps, commanding of a brigade consisting of two infantry regiments and a feldjäger battalion, all but dislodged the Prussian 7th Division from the Swiepwald. Benedek, however, refused to order a charge against the pinned Frist and Elbe armies even though his commanders insisted he do so. If Benedek was waiting for a better moment we will never know, because the moment had passed and the battle had turned.
The arrival of the Second Army
Pöckh’s Brigade, flushed from their successful charge, had no time to savour their success. They were suddenly hit with devastating fire on their right flank as the advance units of the Prussian Second Army finally arrived on the field. Pöckh himself was killed and the brigade was obliterated, 2,000 dead in minutes and barely a man unwounded.
At the same time, the Prussian 8th Division strengthened the 7th and the Austrians, who had belatedly moved to outflank the Prussians on their right, now presented their own exposed right flank to the newly arriving Prussian Second Army. The bulk of the Second Army was not in position until approximately 2.30pm but this was still a remarkable feat – marching more than 20 miles and having only received orders at 4.00am that morning.
The balance now shifted decisively. Crown Prince Frederick and the Second Army brought 100,000 fresh Prussian troops to the field and they now outnumbered the Austrians. What is more, the new troops had a vulnerable flank to attack and they lost no time in taking advantage. The Second Army attacked the Austrian right flank as they made more piecemeal attacks on the reinforced Swiepwald. The artillery of the Second Army could also fire on to the Austrian centre. The Prussian cavalry of the 1st Guards Division of the Second Army broke through to the Austrian artillery forcing it to withdraw. It could therefore no longer support any attacks being made by Austrian forces. Benedek was forced to order the general withdrawal of his forces at 3.00pm. The Austrians had already taken heavy casualties but the attacks of the
“THEY WERE SUDDENLY HIT WITH DEVASTATING FIRE ON THEIR RIGHT FLANK AS THE ADVANCE UNITS OF THE PRUSSIAN SECOND ARMY FINALLY ARRIVED ON THE FIELD. PÖCKH HIMSELF WAS KILLED AND THE BRIGADE WAS OBLITERATED”
Second Army broke them. Units of the Second Army broke through the Austrian lines and took Chlum (which was in front of the Austrian line facing the Prussian 7th Division). The Austrians were now in complete disarray.
The Elbe Army, held in place since the opening of the battle, now advanced and broke through the Saxons and the Austrian left flank, taking Problus. Wilhelm ordered an advance across the entire Prussian line. The advancing units reached Chlum just as the Austrians had finally forced the 1st Guards Division back into the town. The superior firepower of the advancing Prussians proved decisive and the Austrians were unable to stand before them. A series of cavalry charges and artillery repositioned in the rear allowed the retreating artillery and infantry to cross the Elbe, but these were conducted at a heavy price.
The cost
The Prussians had lost in total 9,000 men killed or wounded, most from artillery fire and successful counterattacks in the Swiepwald. The Austrians had lost 44,000 men killed or wounded with a further 22,000 captured (along with almost 200 cannons). Some accounts claim these high losses are exaggerated and place the number of Austrians killed or wounded much lower at around 14,500, others that the 44,000 includes the prisoner tally.
The aftermath
The victorious Prussians did not pursue aggressively but continued to shadow the Austrians until the armistice on 22 July. Bismarck encouraged Wilhelm to make peace quickly so as not to cause acrimony towards Prussia amongst the other German states. Austria’s reputation and position within the German states was severely damaged, indeed the idea of a ‘Big Germany’ was essentially laid to rest – Austria was permanently excluded from German affairs. By contrast Prussia's position was enhanced and she absorbed several of Austria’s allies including Hanover, Hesse and Nassau. Schleswigholstein also became a province of Prussia. Saxony was not annexed but joined with Prussia the following year. Liechtenstein and Luxembourg became independent states.
With Austria excluded, Prussia formed and led the North German Confederation, created in 1867 and incorporating all states north of the Main River. Prussia chose not to demand any Austrian territory and thus not alienate the Austrian Empire entirely. Austria did surrender Venetia to France who then gifted it to the Kingdom of Italy. The remaining German states allied with Prussia in the (more decisive) Prussian victories which followed in the Franco-prussian War of 1870-1871.
This opened the way for both German unification and the creation of the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm I (and with
Otto von Bismarck as chancellor) in 1871.
The humbled Austria meanwhile, quickly compromised with Hungary, forming the dualmonarchy Austria-hungary in 1867.