KLUSHINO, 1610
An army of elite Polish winged hussars launched a devastating attack against a marching Muscovite army
The elite Polish Hussars take on a large Swedish-muscovite army
Polish hussars holding their lances upright emerged at dawn on 4 July 1610 from deep woods on the west bank of the Gzhat River 100 miles east of Moscow. In the faint light, the first to arrive reconnoitred a long fence that blocked their route of attack towards a cluster of small hamlets along the river. Beyond the fence lay their objective, a seemingly endless sea of tents for 36,000 Swedish and Muscovite troops and their camp followers that stretched towards the distant horizon.
Polish Grand Crown Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski, the round-faced, moustachioed, elderly Polish hetman commanding the Polish field army, directed his staff to form work parties. They were tasked with smashing holes in the fence for the horsemen to pass through in order to assault the enemy camps. As he did so, the hussars that formed the core of his army arrayed themselves for battle. The men in the camps began to stir, and a regiment of Swedish mercenary arquebusiers raced forward to defend the fence line.
When all of his 5,500 hussars were on hand, Zolkiewski gave the signal for the attack to begin. Kettle drums rumbled and trumpets blared, and hussars poured through the gaps in the fence.
The Swedish arquebusiers fired on the hussars at point-blank range but they could not stop the rushing tide of heavily armoured cavalry. One of the epic clashes of the Polish-muscovite War (1605 to 1618) had begun.
Time of Troubles
Although a state of undeclared war had existed between the Polish-lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Muscovy since 1605, Polish-lithuanian King Sigismund III Vasa did not actually declare war on Muscovy until February 1609. The catalyst for the war was Tsar Vasily IV Shuisky’s decision to enter into an alliance with King Charles IX of Sweden in order to obtain military assistance in the form of 10,000 professional soldiers.
Vasily IV ruled Muscovy during a protracted succession crisis that resulted in political anarchy known as the Time of Troubles. The succession crisis followed the death of the mentally deficient Tsar Fyodor I in 1598, who was the last in a long line of Rurikid rulers. One of key events of the Time of Troubles was a series of three pretenders to the throne, each of whom claimed to be the Tsarevich Dimitri, the son of Ivan IV whose death as a child in 1591 had been shrouded in secrecy.
The first of the three pretenders, known as False Dimitry I, was believed to have been a defrocked Orthodox monk. He emigrated to the Commonwealth and became a willing pawn of powerful Polish and Lithuanian magnates who wished to unseat Tsar Boris Gudonov, Fyodor’s successor, and replace him with the first False Dimitri. Backed by a private army of 3,500 Lithuanians and Cossacks, the first pretender invaded Muscovy in 1604.
When Gudonov died in April 1605, the Muscovites enthroned the first pretender as their new ruler. Tsar Dimitry I doled out prominent court positions not only to Polish and Lithuanian nobles, but also to Jesuit priests. After nearly a year of his pro-catholic rule, the Eastern Orthodox Muscovites could no longer tolerate Dimitri I. In an uprising that unfolded in May 1606, Dimitri was deposed and slain. Prince Vasily Shuisky, who had led the revolt, installed himself on the throne, but he was unpopular with the majority of Muscovite boyars.
The next pretender, known as False Dimitry II, enjoyed overt support from Sigismund and the Polish monarch sent troops into Muscovy to support him. In addition, thousands of disaffected Zaporozhian Cossacks from Ukraine flocked to his banner. The second pretender established a fortified camp at Tushino, just eight miles from Moscow, and his 18,000 troops soon began clashing with the tsar’s army.
A case of bad blood
As part of the alliance, the tsar agreed to allow Swedish General Jacob de la Gardie’s 10,000 troops to use Novgorod as a base for their operations. The tsar desperately needed the Swedish troops and their Western European mercenaries because they were better trained and disciplined than his mostly second-rate troops.
Bad blood existed between Polish King Sigismund and Swedish King Charles IX, who
was his uncle. Sigismund had once held the thrones of both Poland and Sweden, but his residency in Warsaw coupled with his Roman Catholicism made him unpalatable to the Lutheran Swedes. Charles, who previously was Duke of Sodermanland, successfully overthrew Sigismund in a brief civil war in 1597-98. To avoid appearing as a blatant usurper, Charles ruled the country as regent for six years before finally taking the crown in 1604.
Polish objectives
Sigismund hoped to retake the fortress of Smolensk, the gateway city to eastern Lithuania, as well as the surrounding region known as Severia (composed of modern-day northern Ukraine and eastern Belarus). Muscovy had taken Smolensk from Lithuania in 1514.
Sigismund thought that Smolensk would fall easily to his army, but he was wrong. He had been told by senior advisors that Mikhail Shein, the Muscovite garrison commander at Smolensk, was willing to hand over the fortress to the Poles. This was flawed intelligence, and Shein had no intention of doing any such thing.
Making matters worse, Gudonov had poured money into Smolensk to improve its defences. The Polish besiegers found they had to capture a well-defended fortress that boasted a 6.5km circuit of 11m high walls dotted with 38 watchtowers.
Sigismund arrived in September 1609 with 22,000 troops, most of whom were cavalrymen. Because he did not expect a siege, he didn't bring heavy cannon with which to batter the fortress into submission. His attempts to storm it the following month were unsuccessful, leaving him little choice but to starve it into submission.
Different tactics
Although the Poles might have struggled when it came to sieges, they had enjoyed great success in open-field battles against the Swedes during the Polish-swedish War of 1600 to 1611. That conflict was a struggle for control of Livonia, which had belonged to the Teutonic Order in the Middle Ages. The Polish-lithuanian Commonwealth had absorbed the remnants of the Teutonic Order in Prussia and Livonia into secular duchies in the 16th century. Sweden coveted Livonia because of its great ports and brisk trade with the Hanseatic League.
The most noteworthy of the many Commonwealth victories over the Swedes had come at Kircholm near the Latvian port of Riga in 1605. Lithuanian Grand Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz had used the shock power of his hussars to smash a Swedish army led by Charles IX that outnumbered him three to one.
The winged hussars formed the backbone of the Polish army. Polish King Stephen Bathory, who had preceded Sigismund, had greatly increased the number of hussar units. Hussars were cavalrymen who wore armour to protect their heads and upper bodies and went into battle with long lances that outranged the infantry pikes of the period.
When their lances shattered, the hussars could quickly catch their sabres, which were secured to their right hands with a wrist knot. In addition, they also carried on their horses a palash (broadsword) and a koncerz (long
thrusting sword). A hussar whose lance broke often used his koncerz as a backup lance by bracing its hilt against the pommel of their saddle. Affixed to the rear of their saddle was a painted strip of wood adorned with exotic bird feathers. This was the 'wings' of the hussar that made them look both magnificent and menacing.
Unlike the Polish army, whose strength was its hussar cavalry, the strength of the Swedish army at the time was its heavy infantry. Charles IX, like other Protestant rulers, strove to have his army adopt Count Maurice of Nassau’s cutting-edge tactics designed for heavy infantry.
Nassau’s battle tactics called for a linear deployment, as opposed to the traditional infantry square, which would enable arquebusiers to fire volleys that would produce a broader field of fire. King Charles had sent De La Gardie to Holland to train under Nassau. As for the Swedish cavalry, it fought in the German Reiter-style using the caracole method. This called for each rank of horsemen in a formation to approach the enemy, fire their pistols, and ride to the rear to reload. Its purpose was to maintain a somewhat steady volley fire.
The inferior Muscovite army lagged behind the Swedes and the Poles, despite reforms introduced by Ivan IV in the mid-16th century. Ivan’s most enduring achievement was the creation of the Streltsy musketeer units. But while the Streltsy performed well garrisoning strongholds where they were protected from cavalry, they did not perform well in open field battle unless in static entrenched positions or a wagon fort. The Muscovite light cavalry fought largely in the style of Cossacks and Tatar, each horseman armed with a short spear, bow, and sabre.
Allied forces unite
The Swedish troops, initially numbering 10,000, had arrived in Novgorod in early 1609. Shortly afterwards, they joined forces with a Muscovite army commanded by Mikhail Skopin-shuisky, the tsar’s nephew. By late spring 1610 the allied army had not only cleared northern
Muscovy of rebel forces, but also driven the rebels out of Tushino. Prospects of success for False Dimitri II were fading fast, and he fled south in a desperate attempt to raise a new army among the Don Cossacks. Most of the Polish troops and Ukrainian Cossacks marched west. Some of these forces joined Zolkiewski’s army, while others either joined Sigismund’s forces at Smolensk or returned home.
Word reached Sigismund in June that a Muscovite army was marching to relieve Smolensk. He instructed Zolkiewski to take 3,000 troops, among which were two regiments of hussars, and march east to intercept and defeat the relief army. When the hetman reached Tsaryovo-zaymishche midway between Smolensk and Moscow on June 22, he rendezvoused with three other hussar regiments operating in the area, as well as 4,000 Cossacks.
Meanwhile, a new Muscovite army commanded by Dimitri Shuisky, the tsar’s brother, had assembled at Mozhaisk, 70 miles west of Moscow, for the purpose of relieving Smolensk. This army consisted of 21,000 Muscovite troops. De La Gardie, who had split off from Mikhail Skopin-shuisky’s army, was marching to join forces with the tsar’s brother.
In preparation for a general advance towards Smolensk, Shuisky ordered his 5,000-strong advance guard to threaten the Poles at Tsaryovo-zaymishche. When they came within 6km of the Polish-lithuanian army, though, its conservative commander began entrenching.
The close proximity of the two armies prompted Zolkiewski to take steps to neutralise the enemy’s vanguard. He sent the Cossacks to encircle the Muscovite advanced guard’s camp and block any communications with outside forces. Not long afterwards, Zolkiewski received word from defectors from the Swedish army that Jacob De La Gardie’s army, which at that point was down to 5,000 troops after a year of hard fighting, was marching to rendezvous with Shuisky’s main army. A short time later defectors from the ranks of the Swedish army arrived at the Polish camp. These foreign mercenaries, who were angry at not having been paid, informed the hetman of the movements of the Swedish and Muscovite forces.
Shuisky’s main force and De La Gardie’s expeditionary force rendezvoused north of Tsaryovo-zaymishche near the village of Klushino. They advanced a few miles beyond Klushino and bivouacked on 3 July in separate but adjacent camps on the west bank of the Gzhat River. Shuisky failed to send scouting parties to locate the Polish-lithuanian forces in the vicinity, and also didn't establish picket posts around his encampment to provide early warning of an impending attack.
“HUSSARS USING THEIR KONCERZ AS LANCES SPEARED MANY OF THE SWEDISH CUIRASSIERS, KNOCKING THEIR OPPONENTS DEAD TO THE GROUND AND SENDING OTHERS TO THE REAR CLUTCHING GHASTLY WOUNDS”
Dawn attack
Leaving 4,000 Cossacks and 700 hussars to contain the Muscovite advance guard, Zolkiewski issued orders for his troops to prepare for a night march on 3 July. They set out two hours before sunset that day with the intent of attacking the larger Swedishmuscovite army at dawn.
If all went well, they would catch the enemy troops asleep in their tents and overrun their camps. Using local guides to speed their march, the Polish-lithuanian column, all of which was mounted save for 200 arquebusiers and two falconets, rode 18km through the dark
of night to reach its objective. The two heavy falconets became mired in the mud on the march, and the teams transporting them fell far behind the main body of hussars.
The Polish army’s deployment for the attack was much slower than was necessary to fully exploit the element of surprise, owing to the fence that initially impeded their advance. Zolkiewski arrayed his five hussar regiments with three regiments in the first rank and two in the second rank. He retained a few companies of hussars and a regiment of Cossacks as a reserve.
“The panic-stricken enemy began to stream out of their encampments in disorder,” wrote Samuel Maskiewicz, a hussar who fought at Klushino. “The [foreign mercenaries] were first to form up standing in their usual fieldworks, on boggy ground by the palisade. They did us some damage, by the numbers of their infantry armed with pikes and muskets.”
Swedish cavalry attacks
The right regiment of winged hussars steadily wore down the less-disciplined Muscovite cavalry. Hussar tactics called for companies within a regiment to charge in successive waves. After as many as ten charges, the Muscovite horsemen began to withdraw.
When the Muscovite cavalry withdrew, De La Gardie committed all of his mercenary cuirassiers to the fight. The battle grew in size and intensity as more Swedish units joined the battle. The hussars desperately needed the firepower of their 200 arquebusiers and the two falconets that had not yet arrived to offset the fire of the Swedish arquebusiers.
The hussars on the left wing timed their charges against the Swedish pistol-firing cuirassiers so that they advanced against them between volleys. As the fighting wore on, the hussars in the front rank of the army fought with their edged weapons having broken their lances.
The hussars began to charge the Swedish cuirassiers from two directions in an effort to disrupt them. Hussars using their koncerz as lances speared many of the Swedish cuirassiers, knocking their opponents dead to the ground and sending others to the rear clutching ghastly wounds.
As the fighting wore on, the hussar charges began to weaken in force due to the loss of lances and battle fatigue. “Our arms and armour were damaged and our strength ebbing from such frequent regrouping and charges against the enemy,” wrote Maskiewicz. “Our horses were almost fainting on the battlefield.”
A deadly combination
Just as the Polish hussars were reaching a state of extreme fatigue, the Polish arquebusiers and falconet crews emerged from the woods. Zolkiewski ordered the artillerymen to blast apart the remaining sections of the fence line. He also directed the two companies of Polish arquebusiers get astride the right flank of the Swedish infantry and rake it.
As the Polish arquebusiers began to inflict casualties on the Swedish right regiment, Zolkiewski committed his reserve force of hussars. Advancing at a fast trot with levelled lances, they were supported by the hussars already engaged. The weight of the fresh attack broke the Swedish infantry and the survivors fell back to their camp.
With the Swedish foot and horse having withdrawn from the field of battle, the hussars regrouped and charged the front rank of Muscovite foot arrayed in front of their camp adjacent to the river. “We crashed into the whole Muscovite force, still drawn up in battle order at the entrance to their camp, plunging them into disorder,” wrote Maskiewicz.
By that time, Shuisky and De La Gardie had exited the field in an effort to stem the panicked flight of some of the troops. Both commanders eventually returned, but by that time the surviving Swedish mercenary infantry had defected to the Polish side of the field. In the days leading up to the battle, Zolkiewski had sent word to the mercenaries that he would welcome them with open arms into his ranks.
Shuisky ordered his troops to abandon their equipment and retreat east to Moscow. As for De La Gardie, he led the native Swedish troops in a long march north to Novgorod. Making matters worse for Shuisky, the advanced guard encamped to the south surrendered to Zolkiewski.
The Polish suffered 300 killed and wounded at Klushino. For the Muscovite army, the butcher’s bill came to 2,000 killed and wounded. As for the Swedes, they suffered 1,200 losses.
When Zolkiewski returned to the main army at Smolensk, he and his officers presented Sigismund with Shuisky’s banner and his bulawa, an ornate ceremonial baton that was a symbol of his high rank.
Blame for the defeat
The unexpected arrival of the Polish army gave Shuisky little time to deploy his large, ungainly Muscovite army, and he therefore had directed De La Gardie to bear the brunt of the fight that day. Shuisky deserves a great deal of blame for failing to dispatch scouting parties or establish picket posts that might have uncovered the enemy’s approach towards his encampment. As for De La Gardie and his mercenaries, they performed with great skill given the difficult predicament in which they found themselves.
Although his army was outnumbered nearly six to one, Zolkiewski achieved a spectacular victory. He not only successfully led his troops on a difficult night march, but successfully directed their shock attack despite the fence that obstructed their initial advance.
Klushino was another resoundingly successful chapter in the ongoing sequence of Polish-lithuanian hussar victories over the Polish-lithuanian Commonwealth’s two principal foes, the Swedes and the Muscovites. Although Sigismund captured Smolensk in 1611, the Muscovites ultimately retook it in 1654 in a subsequent war between the two great powers.