PAUL BROWN
Author and historian Paul Brown uncovers new information on the ships lost in the 1982 War
The author of Abandon Ship uncovers new information on the Falklands War sinkings
The 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands posed a unique threat to Britain’s military. Located over 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic, any operation to confront the Argentinian occupation of the islands was bound to rely heavily on the Royal Navy. Yet at the time the navy was in a state of transition, with one of its carriers, HMS Invincible, was on the brink of being sold. Nonetheless, a task force sailed south, including civilian vessels pressed into military service.
By the end of the short but bloody conflict, several of these ships were sadly lost, along with them many lives. Atlantic Conveyor, a converted container ship used to transport Sea Harriers and helicopters, was lost to enemy action on 25 May. In his new book Abandon Ship,
Paul Brown chronicles the events surrounding this and the other major sinkings during the war, drawing from first-hand accounts as well as official reports. Here, Brown discusses the loss of Conveyor and what lessons the Royal Navy learned from the tragedy.
YOU REFER TO ATLANTIC CONVEYOR AS AN UNSUNG MEMBER OF THE BRITISH TASK FORCE. WHAT MADE IT, OR ITS CARGO, SO IMPORTANT TO THE BRITISH SOUTH ATLANTIC OPERATIONS?
She was rapidly converted from a combined container ship and car carrier to take Harriers and Chinook and Wessex helicopters down to the battle zone. These were the first reinforcements to the aircraft taken south aboard task force ships. The helicopters would be particularly important for transporting troops and heavy equipment from the landing beach at San Carlos to assault locations where the Argentine troops would be engaged, and the Harriers would replace any losses.
The upper deck’s edges were lined with a three-deep stack of containers and portacabins to provide additional accommodation and valuable aircraft repair workshop space, while also creating a sheltered pen for the helicopters and Harriers. Equipment and materials for the construction of a Harrier forward operating base ashore were carried below deck. This base would make a huge improvement to the combat air patrols, enabling them to stay on station for much longer. Also below deck was a host of vital military stores, including tentage and tent heaters for the entire military force in the Falklands, 12 combat support boats, floating rubber fuel tanks and pumping equipment, water desalination equipment, generators, lighting sets and munitions.
WHAT WERE THE MAIN DEFENSIVE PROVISIONS IN PLACE TO PROTECT THE CARRIER GROUP, AND OTHER SHIPS, AGAINST ARGENTINIAN AIR STRIKES?
The biggest threat to the carrier group came from Argentina’s 100 strike aircraft. Combat air patrols operated by Sea Harriers were designed to intercept incoming aircraft but were limited in their endurance. However, the 20 Sea Harriers from Hermes and Invincible (later reinforced by eight more aircraft) destroyed 23 aircraft in air-to-air combat for the loss of none of their own number in air combat. Another 17 aircraft were destroyed by the task force’s anti-air missiles and guns. Medium-range air defence was provided by Type 42 destroyers stationed to the west of the carrier group. Their Sea Dart missiles were hampered by the tactics of the Argentine pilots, who flew in low over land to defeat the destroyers’ fire-control radar, so
Sea Dart’s success rate against such aircraft was very poor.
For aircraft that got through these defences, Sea Wolf missiles launched by Type 22 frigates were deployed, with mixed success, accounting for two confirmed kills and three ‘possibles’ from eight launches. The obsolescent Seacat missile was widely used, with little result – there was no clear-cut case of a Seacat kill.
Nuclear-powered submarines were stationed close to the air bases on the Argentinian coast to monitor outgoing flights and give early warning of impending attacks.
HOW DAMAGING WAS THE LOSS OF CONVEYOR AND ITS CARGO TO THE BRITISH WAR EFFORT? AND WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE ON THE GROUND HAD THE SHIP AND ITS CARGO BEEN SAVED?
When Atlantic Conveyor arrived on station, her Harriers flew to the carriers, leaving the Chinook and Wessex helicopters on board when she was lost. They would have been of massive value to the advance of troops on Argentinian positions at Goose Green and Port Stanley. The troops could have advanced much more quickly and without the levels of fatigue they experienced.
The capture of Stanley and surrender of the Argentinian forces would have been accelerated, probably with some lives saved. Crucially, the troops which had to be taken by Sir Galahad to Fitzroy could have been transported by helicopter, eliminating the need for that ship to be risked and the loss of 48 lives, with many others badly injured.
The Harrier base ashore, although eventually
“THE 20 SEA HARRIERS FROM HERMES AND INVINCIBLE DESTROYED 23 AIRCRAFT IN AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT FOR THE LOSS OF NONE OF THEIR OWN NUMBER IN AIR COMBAT”
constructed, would have been operational much earlier, allowing greater protection to the fleet and troops by combat air patrols and the RAF ground-attack Harriers.
IN YOUR BOOK ABANDON SHIP YOU DESCRIBE THE CHANGING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DURING THE EARLY WEEKS OF THE CONFLICT, ESPECIALLY AROUND THE SINKING OF ARA GENERAL BELGRANO. WHAT EFFECT DID THIS HAVE ON BOTH SIDES’ PREPARATIONS?
While keeping their surface warships outside the total exclusion zone, the Argentines were aware that even then they might be attacked. The British rules of engagement precluded this, but were changed on 2 May so that the submarine Conqueror could sink the cruiser General Belgrano outside the zone.
Conqueror had been shadowing Belgrano for 29 hours so she was able to attack if the cruiser entered the exclusion zone or the rules of engagement changed. After her loss Argentina’s surface fleet retreated to their bases, removing the threats of their aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, the two modern Type 42 destroyers and older Exocet-armed destroyers.
However, one of the Argentinian submarines, ARA San Luis, was deployed inside the exclusion zone and made several attempts to attack British warships. These were unsuccessful due to problems with the torpedoes and the submarine retired to her base. But it was sobering that the Royal Navy’s considerable anti-submarine forces did not detect and destroy San Luis.
WHAT WERE THE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED, OR NEW MEASURES ADOPTED, BY THE ROYAL NAVY AS A RESULT OF ITS LOSSES DURING THE WAR?
The survivability of the Type 21 and Type 42 escorts when damaged was in question. The older and larger County class destroyer Glamorgan had survived an Exocet hit and Antrim had survived bombing, as had the older frigates Plymouth and Argonaut, but the later classes had been less resilient and were vulnerable to loss through fires.
The flammability of materials used, often to improve habitability, damage control and firefighting procedures and training would have to be re-examined. Changes to the design of waterproof doors and hatches, the provision of more escape hatches, making bulkheads more smoke-tight, the re-siting of fuel tanks, and additional fire pumps and breathing apparatus were all needed.
The advisability of using ships that had been built to mercantile standards of damage tolerance (such as Atlantic Conveyor and Sir Galahad) was questioned. Their use in transporting troops and equipment in combat zones was extremely hazardous and, if used, they needed to be equipped with close-in self-defence weapons and chaff launchers.
There were glaring shortcomings in the performance of escorts. The lack of good closein weapon systems (CIWS) had been exposed. CIWS would be fitted to the carriers, the assault ships, Bristol, and the Type 42 destroyers. Sea Wolf and Sea Dart missile systems would have to be improved to deal with low-level attacks and have all-weather capability. The shipborne radars in the Type 21 and Type 42 escorts would have to be improved: the lack of a true moving target indication mode had been a serious problem. Argentinian aircraft could not be seen against the background clutter of the islands, and aircraft or missiles flying low over the sea could not be detected. The newer radars in Exeter and the Type 22s had performed better than the earlier types.
The lack of airborne early warning was a big problem and was addressed by equipping Sea King helicopters with modified Searchwater radars. Chaff and electronic countermeasures would be further developed to deal with sea-skimming missiles. There was a need for more intensive training for air defence weapon system operators, using more realistic targets. The Type 22 frigate lacked a main gun, meaning it could not be used for naval gunfire support operations (this was to be remedied in the last four of the class).