Q-BOATS BRITAIN’S DECEPTION AT SEA
Allied Q-ships achieved notoriety among the U-boat service that would persist through two world wars
Countermeasures introduced to fight the U-boats included minefields, the defensive arming of merchant ships and the development of the Q-ship, or Q-boat. These were generally small tramp steamers, outwardly scruffy and unworthy of a torpedo, but equipped with hidden guns. As U-boats operated under Prize Law, these ships were designed to entice a U-boat into surfacing to sink the seemingly vulnerable Q-ship with gunfire or by scuttling. Once within range, a Q-ship’s camouflaged guns would be revealed and would fire on the submarine. It’s difficult to know the exact number of Q-ships used in the war – between 118 and 157 – as there were a variety of decoy vessels, but Q-ships sank at least ten U-boats, though losing 27 of their own.
Originally referred to by the Royal Navy as Special Service Vessels, they were only officially designated Q-ships for a period during 1916, apparently in relation to the majority basing at Queenstown (now Cobh) in Ireland, where Vice-admiral Lewis Bayly was charged with countering U-boat attacks within the Western Approaches. Somewhat ironically, this ‘Q’ title robbed them of their cover during construction and deployment as it was a sobriquet applied solely to U-boat ‘decoy’ vessels. However, it soon became a generalised unofficial term for any submarine decoy vessel.
It was not only the vessel that was camouflaged – the crewmen were clothed both at sea and ashore as merchant mariners in what Rear Admiral Gordon Campbell, former captain of HMS Farnborough (Q5) and winner of the Victoria Cross, called “outer slackness and inner discipline” in his memoir My Mystery Ships. Once attacked, a ‘panic party’ would go through elaborate and rehearsed motions of abandoning ship in haste, hopefully encouraging the unwary U-boat to approach with a sense of security.
The first successful destruction of a U-boat by an unassisted Q-ship took place on 24 July 1915 when HMS Prince Charles — a 373-ton collier converted in Longhope, Orkney Island — encountered U36 off the Hebrides. The merchant crew had all volunteered to remain aboard under the command of Lieutenant Mark Wardlaw, with another naval officer and nine ratings to man the 3-pounder and 6-pounder guns as well as rifles distributed fore and aft. Kapitänleutnant Ernst Graeff was inspecting Danish SS Louise according to Prize Law when Prince Charles was sighted and U36 began shelling her. At a range of 300 yards Wardlaw opened fire, hitting the U-boat, which was scuttled. Fifteen survivors, including Graeff, were later rescued. Wardlaw was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, two of the crew the Distinguished Service Medal, and £1,000 was given to be divided among the mercantile crew.
Perhaps the most infamous Q-ship was HMS Baralong, which sank U27 in the Western Approaches on 19 August 1915. Kapitänleutnant Bernd Wegener and ten crewmen survived the sinking but were executed under orders from Baralong’s captain, Lieutenant Godfrey Herbert. However, with the introduction of the unrestricted campaign in 1917 and subsequent convoying, the usefulness of the Q-ships came to an end. German U-boat commanders had also become aware of the potential threat, the grave perception of which persisted into the next war.
Kapitänleutnant Walter Schweiger’s U20 without warning on 7 May after being misidentified as an armed merchant cruiser. Despite Lusitania carrying munitions as part of its cargo, and therefore considered a legitimate target, the death of 1,198 passengers and crew, including 128 Americans, led to a barrage of condemnation and demands that Germany cease attacks on commercial shipping. Particularly keen to assuage American anger, the German Chancellor henceforth prohibited U-boat attacks on all passenger ships whether neutral or belligerent. However, two British liners were sunk in August and September – SS Arabic by U24 and RMS Hesperian by U20 – leading to additional diplomatic pressure and escalating fears of armed conflict with the United States.
As a result, on 18 September, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, head of the Imperial Admiralty Staff, ordered all U-boats withdrawn from the Western Approaches and English Channel to the North Sea, where they were to once again wage war strictly within Prize Rules. Rather than return U-boats to this untenable position, Pohl instead also withdrew from the North Sea and, influenced by a suggestion from Kaiser Wilhelm, opened a fresh campaign within the Mediterranean Sea, where few American ships were encountered. The U-boats’ first commerce offensive was over – despite some successes it had failed to inflict grievous losses on British shipping or dissuade neutral merchant traffic from traversing potentially dangerous waters to Britain.
Stalemate and renewed attacks
A U-boat blockade required greater numbers as well as the removal of politically motivated limitations. While in Britain Churchill gloried in the U-boats’ ‘defeat’, it was a reversal of Germany’s own governmental decisions rather than British victory by combat. Nonetheless, by the beginning of 1916 the British blockade of Germany began to bite, with shortages in food and clothing on the home front. In response, the German General Staff planned a two-fold thrust against their enemies. First the French Army would be bled to death by an offensive at Verdun, planned to knock France out of the war by the year’s end, and second, the U-boat anti-commerce campaign against Britain would be resumed to choke off its maritime supply. Aware of the dangers of stalemate and attrition, von Holtzendorff had modified his viewpoint and become an enthusiastic proponent of a resumed U-boat campaign, though with restrictions. While enemy merchant vessels could be sunk without warning within the declared war zone, and armed merchant vessels wherever they were found, all identified neutrals remained subject to prize rules and passenger liners were completely off limits.
The new offensive opened in February 1916 and although resultant U-boat success appeared similar to the previous year, the effect was compounded by greater demands being placed upon British mercantile traffic. Various military fronts required merchant shipping for supply, and shipyards were rammed to capacity with repairs to both civilian and military vessels.
Though falling short of the targets for tonnage sunk per month which could theoretically bring Britain to its knees (underestimated by von Holtzendorff to be 160,000-tons) U-boat pressure became more noticeable, until repercussions of a fresh incident resurrected fears of United States involvement.
On 24 March Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Pustkuchen in UB29 torpedoed a suspected minelayer near Dieppe, severely damaging French cross-channel passenger steamer SS Sussex. It was carrying 325 passengers from Folkestone to Dieppe, including 25 Americans, some of whom were among the 50 killed by the explosion. President Woodrow Wilson directly threatened war unless Germany restricted its U-boat operations and though von Holtzendorff and others baulked at doing so, the new Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, who had replaced the cancer-stricken Pohl, cancelled the new offensive on 25 April. All U-boats in the North Sea and around Britain were recalled by radio. Scheer was unwilling to use U-boats under strict Prize Law, intending instead to use them thereafter “in purely military enterprises”.
A failed attempt to ambush the British Grand Fleet immediately before the Battle of Jutland pitted its undiminished strength against the German High Seas Fleet in an inconclusive struggle that ultimately proved a strategic victory for Britain. Afterwards, the German fleet never sortied in strength again. The U-boat remained Germany’s only naval hope and on 4 July Scheer reported directly to the Kaiser that
“THE U-BOATS WERE ONLY FINALLY BEATEN BY GERMANY’S INTERNAL COLLAPSE IN OCTOBER 1918”
“a victorious end to the war within a reasonable time can only be achieved through the defeat of economic life”. During 1916 his words were proven true. As the British blockade inflicted greater hardship, France was not neutralised at Verdun, though greatly diminished. At the Somme, both sides bled massively, while on the Eastern Front, Austro-hungarian troops were in retreat. German army reserves in the west were stripped to the bone to prevent catastrophe in the east. Conferences at the highest level in Germany fiercely debated an unrestricted U-boat campaign as the only possible option left for Germany. However, fears of provoking not only the United States but also Holland and Denmark were insurmountable.
The compromise of a new commerce campaign in home waters, in accordance with Prize Law, was authorised for October 1916.
Germany’s gamble
During 1916, 108 new U-boats entered service, including larger ‘cruiser’ models capable of greater weapon loads and longer range, and shipping losses mounted appreciably as Britain struggled to find counter measures.
Von Holtzendorff upgraded his previously required tonnage-sunk estimate to 600,000tons monthly to achieve decisive results, and an average monthly figure of over 300,000tons was reached during the autumn despite restrictions. The mathematics did not lie and von Holtzendorff forcefully argued for limitations to be removed during a Crown Council meeting between Wilhelm and military and political chiefs at the Kaiser’s residence in Pless, Silesia, on 9 January. Likely American reaction was finally dismissed; not only after two years of empty threats but also in the belief that with a successful campaign, Britain could be brought to its knees within five months, long before an American army could be shipped to the front lines in Europe.
None of the assembled men were in doubt of the severity of an unrestricted campaign and likely international condemnation. Nor were they in doubt that without it, Germany was all but finished as Britain’s economic warfare inflicted ever harsher conditions on the German home front. Food shortages were acute, and clothes were now manufactured from anything, even paper. The Kaiser concurred and a new mercantile campaign of U-boat warfare, waged with the “utmost severity”, was to begin on 1 February 1917, fought by 105 U-boats: 69 in the Atlantic and off the Flanders coast, 23 in the Mediterranean, 10 in the Baltic and three at Constantinople. All shipping was open to attack without warning within principal war zones encompassing the British Isles, extending
400 nautical miles from the west coast of France, the Mediterranean Sea except Spanish coastal waters, and a lane provided for Greek steamers. During March, the Barents Sea was added, followed by most of the North Atlantic.
The results were spectacular. U-boats destroyed 25% of all Britain-bound shipping and reduced the nation’s supply of wheat to a six-week stockpile. The climactic month of April 1917 witnessed 413 ships destroyed totalling 873,754-tons: a figure never surpassed in either world war. Prompted in part by American shipping losses, the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April. Nevertheless, results appeared to justify the risks; neutral shipping was dissuaded from trading with Britain and shipyards choked with damaged ships. However, although America would be tardy in fielding an army, its naval power provided invaluable reinforcements at sea and finally allowed the institution of mercantile convoying. This defensive measure, beyond all else, robbed U-boats of their ability to inflict the fatal wound. Despite Bauer’s recommendation of Rudeltaktik – coordinated group attacks to overwhelm convoy defences – the Imperial Navy instead relied on throwing ever more U-boats individually into the fray. Despite inflicting grievous casualties, they were never able to surmount the defensive strength of convoying.
Though faced with gradually improving antisubmarine warfare tactics and technology, including depth charges and aircraft patrols, the U-boats were only finally beaten by Germany’s internal collapse in October 1918. It had lost 178 U-boats during the war but retained an operational fleet of 171 at the time of the November armistice, with 149 in construction. Ironically, the Allies’ mistaken belief that they had mastered U-boats in combat, rather than the power of convoying, led to lessons being forgotten until a punishing reminder was delivered by Karl Dönitz, beginning in 1939.