NASHVILLE, 1864
A veteran Confederate army desperately tries to change the course of the war in its final months
In the final months of the Civil War, Confederate forces in the west were on the brink of destruction
On the fog-shrouded morning of 15 December 1864, the soldiers of the 14th US Colored Troops broke through the thin screen of Confederate skirmishers posted in the rifle pits, in front of the Chattanooga & Nashville Railroad. After regrouping, they surged across the railway tracks in a bid to outflank the right of the Confederate lines on the outskirts of Nashville.
Suddenly, Confederate 12-pounder smoothbore guns in a lunette adjacent to the tracks erupted with canister – tin cans filled with deadly iron balls – which shredded the regiment’s ranks. Confederate infantry, which had been hiding in a stand of timber, fired a thunderous volley into the Union regiment’s ranks. The survivors fled in the direction from which they had come – within ten minutes they had lost 117 men.
It was the kind of tactical success that Confederate General John Bell Hood so desperately sought when he lured Union
Major General George Thomas to attack his earthworks on the south side of Nashville after a nearly two-week standoff between the armies.
In the war-ravaged South in the final months of the conflict, Hood lacked the troops that would be needed to capture Nashville. Because of this, the best he could hope for was to inflict heavy casualties on Thomas’ army, which had been cobbled together from various Union commands in the Western Theatre to take on the crack troops of Hood’s Army of Tennessee. If the Confederates could continue throughout the day to repulse other piecemeal Union attacks with similar success, Hood just might win a tactical victory against a much larger Union army.
Long odds for success
The battered armies of the Confederate
States of America faced near-certain defeat by fall 1864. After years of campaigning, General Robert E Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, was besieged in the Richmond-petersburg sector by the Army of the Potomac under the watchful eye of General Ulysses S Grant, who president Abraham Lincoln had made the commander of all Union armies in March 1864.
The Army of Tennessee under the command of General Joseph Johnston had been steadily retreating through northern Georgia since Major General William T Sherman began his offensive to capture Atlanta in March 1864.
“WHILE HOOD’S FIGHTING SPIRIT WAS UNDIMINISHED, HIS BODY HAD BEEN RAVAGED BY INJURIES SUFFERED IN BATTLE”
Sherman had a grand army composed of three formerly regional armies named after the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee rivers that totalled 112,000 troops.
Sherman had reached the Chattahoochee River just north of the city in early July. Confederate President Jefferson Davis, who was disappointed with 57-year-old Johnston’s performance, sacked him on 17 July and replaced him with the much-younger Hood.
Hood, a 33-year old Kentuckian who had graduated in West Point’s Class of 1853, had a reputation as a fighter from his days commanding a brigade and later a division in the Army of Northern Virginia. While Hood’s fighting spirit was undiminished, his body had been ravaged by injuries suffered in battle. He had lost the use of his left arm when it was hit by shrapnel at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in July 1863, and his right leg had been amputated at Chickamauga, Georgia, two months later.
Initially Hood had 60,000 troops with which to fight off Sherman’s legions. He attacked various parts of the Union juggernaut at different points around Atlanta between 20 July and 31 August. After these four bloody clashes, the fiery Confederate commander had nothing to show for his efforts. The grinding battles resulted in 16,000 Confederate casualties.
As August drew to a close, Hood abandoned Atlanta and Sherman took possession of it on 2 September. In late October Hood devised a plan to invade Tennessee in the hope of forcing Sherman to follow him. If Hood could capture Nashville it would boost Confederate morale and perhaps enable Hood to continue north into Union territory. With Confederate president Davis’ approval, Hood prepared to invade Union-controlled Middle Tennessee.
Thomas must defeat Hood
While Sherman prepared to march the best 60,000 troops in his army from Atlanta through the heart of Georgia to Savannah, he tasked Thomas with preventing Hood from retaking occupied territory in Middle Tennessee. Of his remaining troop, Sherman left some to garrison Atlanta and sent the rest to Thomas.
Thomas, who had graduated from West
Point in 1840, had a knack for defensive tactics, as shown by his brilliant rearguard action as a corps commander at Chickamauga in September 1863. He had single-handedly saved Major General William Rosecrans’ Union Army of the Cumberland from destruction. In recognition of his achievement, President Lincoln replaced Rosecrans with Thomas in October 1863.
Thomas arrived in Nashville in late October to oversee its defence and defeat Hood.
The forces under his control were scattered throughout the region. They included 8,000 garrison troops in Nashville; a Provisional Detachment of 8,500 troops in Chattanooga led by Major General James Steedman; and 30,000 veteran troops in Major General David Stanley’s IV Corps and Major General John Schofield’s XXIII Corps in Pulaski, Tennessee. In addition, Major General Andrew J Smith's 9,000-man XVI Corps received orders to march from Mississippi to join Thomas in Nashville. Thomas also had 9,000 cavalrymen under the command of Brigadier General James Wilson, but they needed to be refitted with fresh horses and new carbines for the coming campaign.
Rash decision at Franklin
Hood’s army set out for Nashville on 20 November. His army numbered 32,000 infantry organised into three corps and 6,000 cavalry. Hood hoped that his march into Middle
Tennessee would compel Sherman to pursue him, but Sherman had already given Thomas the forces necessary to contain Hood. Thomas instructed Schofield to offer battle to Hood if necessary to slow his advance northward to allow time for more Union reinforcements to arrive in Nashville. Schofield had great respect for Hood’s capabilities as a commander. “He’ll hit you like hell, before you know it,” he had told Sherman during the Atlanta campaign.
Hood’s army easily bypassed Pulaski to the west, reaching Spring Hill, Tennessee, on 29 November in the rear of Schofield’s position. Expecting Schofield to force his way through the Confederate army, Hood planned to ambush Schofield’s army but his corps commanders failed to successfully carry out his orders. Hood shared the blame for the debacle in that he had retired for the night and was not present at the front when Schofield marched right past the Confederate bivouac that night. “The best move in my career as a soldier… came to naught,” Hood wrote afterwards.
Schofield reached Franklin, which was 32km south of Nashville, the following morning.
Hood, who was furious that his generals missed an opportunity to destroy or heavily damage Schofield’s army, ordered what turned out to be a very costly frontal attack against Schofield’s troops in pre-existing earthworks at Franklin. Among the 6,250 Confederate dead and wounded were six Confederate generals. Hood’s decision to risk a costly attack against entrenched troops showed not only that he was rash, but also that he lacked the skills and experience necessary for high command.
Hood entrenches at Nashville
Federal forces had held the capital of Tennessee since February 1862. By December 1864 the city was protected by an inner and outer fortified belt, the flanks of which were anchored on the Cumberland River.
Schofield reached Nashville on 1 December, and Hood arrived the following day. The Confederate commander undertook a partial siege of the city, entrenching his army on a 6.5km front along an arc of hills south of Nashville. Lieutenant General Alexander Stewart’s corps held the Confederate left along Hillsboro Pike, Lieutenant General Stephen D Lee’s corps held the centre, and Major General Benjamin Cheatham’s corps held the right along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad.
The Confederate left was the most vulnerable to attack because beyond the Hillsboro
Pike there was ample room for Thomas to manoeuvre his troops for a large-scale attack. Hood instructed Stewart to refuse his flank and strengthen his earthworks by constructing five redoubts, each of which housed two or four cannon and 100 infantry.
Hood’s siege lines were from between one to three kilometres south of the Union fortifications protecting Nashville. Hood hoped that in the coming days Thomas would wreck his army trying to dislodge the Confederates from their position.
Hood sent Forrest’s cavalry to the southeast to tear up sections of the Nashville &
Chattanooga Railroad. Thomas decided not to send Wilson’s cavalry to engage Forrest because of its poor condition. He therefore sent the Union cavalry across the Cumberland River to Edgefield to rest and refit.
Grant browbeats Thomas
When Thomas informed Washington that it would be at least ten days before he launched offensive operations against the Confederate Army of the Tennessee encamped outside his fortifications, Grant demanded immediate action in order to prevent Forrest’s troopers from destroying bridges and track along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad.
With each passing day that Thomas failed to attack Hood, Grant grew more incensed. “Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remount of your cavalry,” Grant telegraphed Thomas on 6 December. Bowing to Grant’s wishes, Thomas scheduled an attack for 7 December, but an ice storm struck the region, making it unrealistic to take offensive action until the weather improved.
During this time, Thomas put the final touches to his battle plan. Steedman’s Provisional Detachment would launch a diversionary attack against the Confederate right wing to pin down Cheatham’s corps. The main attack would consist of a “left grand wheel” to strike that portion of Stewart’s line along the Hillsboro Pike. Brigadier General Thomas Wood’s IV Corps and Major General Andrew J Smith’s XVI Corps would lead the attack, and Schofield’s XXIII Corps would follow in reserve. Wilson’s cavalry would cover the army’s southern flank against a possible attack by Forrest.
“STEWART’S 4,800 CONFEDERATES, WHO WERE OUTNUMBERED FIVE TO ONE, WATCHED WITH APPREHENSION AS A 3KM-LONG UNION LINE OF BATTLE THICK WITH REGIMENTAL FLAGS AND GUIDONS HEADED THEIR WAY”
“Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements,” Grant wired Thomas on 12 December. The weather began to improve the following day, but Thomas still did not launch his attack. At that point, Grant made plans to travel from Petersburg, Virginia, to Nashville to take command himself. But Thomas attacked Hood before Grant entrained for Tennessee.
Yankees storm rebel redoubts
Thomas took up a position in the centre of the outer fortified belt to observe the progress of the Federal attack. A thick fog clung to the landscape on the morning of 15 December
as the ground continued to thaw. Steedman’s diversionary attack in the morning stalled in the face of determined Confederate resistance, and his effort failed to prevent Hood from shifting forces later in the day from the right wing to the left one.
As the three Union infantry corps began their left grand wheel, Stewart’s 4,800 Confederates, who were outnumbered five to one, watched with apprehension as a 3km-long Union line of battle thick with regimental flags and guidons headed their way.
Wood’s divisions attacked the northern half of Stewart’s line, while Smith’s divisions attacked the southern half of his line. Before Smith’s men could attack the earthworks, though, they had to clear the Rebels from Redoubts 3, 4, and 5, which were situated outside of the main line of trenches.
While veteran Confederate soldiers in the north held their ground against the Federals, the southern end of Stewart’s line came under attack from cavalry and infantry backed by rifled guns firing solid shot and fused shells. Wilson’s troopers on the extreme right of the Union line had an advantage in that they were armed with newly issued Spencer carbine repeaters.
When Thomas observed a large gap open as the two forward infantry corps veered away from each other, he ordered Schofield’s XXIII Corps to fill the space between them and add its weight to the attack.
Hood reinforces wavering flank
Hood ordered Major General Edward Johnson’s Division of Lieutenant General SD Lee’s corps in the centre to reinforce the left flank when he saw that it was the target of the Union army’s main attack. The first two brigades to arrive deployed on the south end of Stewart’s line where they were desperately needed to prevent his flank from being turned.
Smith attacked Redoubts No. 4 and No.
5 with overwhelming force. Dismounted troopers of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry with their repeating carbines spearheaded the attack on Redoubt No. 5 and were assisted by Smith’s infantrymen. After a brief melee inside the redoubt, the surviving Confederates retreated to the main line along the Hillsboro Pike. The combined force of the 5th Cavalry Division and elements of the Union IV Corps captured Redoubt No. 4 shortly afterwards.
As Colonel Sylvester Hill of Smith’s Corps prepared to lead his infantry brigade in a charge to capture Redoubt No. 3, his commanding officer, Brigadier General John Mcarthur, advised him to wait for additional troops to support him. Hill ignored the general’s advice. “Our brigade will go right up there,” Hill told Smith. “Nothing can stop them.”
Although his men captured the redoubt, a Rebel marksman shot Hill in the head, killing him as he was preparing to lead his troops in a charge against Redoubt No. 2. Angered by Hill’s death, Colonel William Marshal, the commander of the 7th Minnesota regiment, led his 200 men in a spirited charge that so intimidated the Confederates in Redoubt No. 2 that they fled without putting up any resistance.
The riflemen of Johnson’s two advance brigades on the far end of Stewart’s line found themselves under heavy artillery fire from the rifled Union guns. With the shells exploding among them, these troops fell back unexpectedly. “These Rebels appeared panicstricken and fired badly,” said a Union officer whose troops had exchanged fire with them.
The rout of Johnson’s advance brigades triggered the collapse of Stewart’s entire line at 4pm. Stewart ordered his division commanders to reform their troops nearly a mile east along the Granny White Pike. Complete disaster was diverted not only by the arrival on the Confederate left of Johnson’s two remaining brigades, but also by the arrival of 1,500 more troops from Cheatham’s corps that Hood had hurried to the point of crisis. Nightfall put an end to the fighting.
Union officers in the US Army’s telegraph office in Washington on December 15 received a message late that night from Thomas stating that his troops had driven back the enemy from one to three miles over the course of the day’s fighting. “The whole action of today was splendidly successful,” wrote Thomas.
“ALTOGETHER, HOOD HAD LOST NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF HIS ARMY IN THE BLOODY BATTLES AT FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE”
Confederates shorten the line
Hood’s army, which already was at a great disadvantage, was extremely low on manpower by the end of the day on 15 December.
Hood had suffered 2,200 killed, wounded and captured on the first day of the battle. Thomas and his corps commanders had every confidence that they would crush Hood’s weakened army if he offered battle again on the following day.
True to his nature, Hood intended to stand his ground because at that point he had few strategic options remaining. He believed that he could still bleed the Union army if his troops could hold a contracted line that stretched for 3km from Shy’s Hill on the west to Overton Hill on the east.
In preparation to receive a renewed Union assault on the following morning, Hood placed Stewart’s badly battered corps in the centre. The Confederates held strong positions on fortified hilltops on each flank. Cheatham’s corps deployed on the left side of the Confederate battle line atop Shy’s Hill, and SD Lee’s corps took up positions on Overton Hill on the right side.
Union troops rout Confederates
Thomas opened his attack the following day by sending elements of Wood’s IV Corps against Major General Carter Stevenson’s Division of SD Lee’s corps atop Overton Hill. The Union troops advanced at the enemy in three ranks. Well-entrenched Confederate troops backed up by massed Confederate artillery repulsed Wood’s attack. Next, Thomas ordered Steedman’s Colored Troops to assail the hill at midday, but this second attack also floundered in the face of determined Confederate resistance.
Union attacks, some ordered by Thomas and some spontaneous, occurred along the entire length of the Confederate position in the late afternoon. When Union troops from the XVI and XXIII corps attacked Cheatham’s men on Shy’s Hill at 4pm, his troops could not hold them off. At the same time, Wilson’s cavalry rode around Cheatham’s flank. At that point, the Southern troops on the left and centre fled towards Franklin Pike. Realising he was defeated, Hood ordered a general retreat south along the Franklin Pike.
Hood suffered 1,500 killed and wounded, as well as 8,500 captured in the two-day battle. Altogether, he had lost nearly one-third of his army in the bloody battles at Franklin and Nashville. Although Thomas suffered
3,000 casualties at Nashville, his much larger army could more easily afford the losses.
On 18 December Grant telegraphed his congratulations to Thomas for what he called a “great victory”.
Forrest ambushes Union pursuers
The Union pursuit of the retreating
Confederate army began immediately. Hood sent orders to Forrest to cover his retreat. The 'Wizard of the Saddle', as Forrest was known, carried out a series of well-laid ambushes that bought Hood the time he needed to get the rump of his army to safety. Even so, Union troops leading the pursuit rounded up thousands of Confederates who were too weary to keep up with the main body.
By 26 December the Army of Tennessee had succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River. Of the 37,000 Confederate troops that had set out for Nashville in late November, only 20,000 remained when it reassembled in northeastern Mississippi. Davis sacked Hood in January 1865.
Through careful planning and skilful handling of his forces, Thomas had eviscerated the Army of Tennessee and it played no significant part in the remainder of the war.