QUATRE BRAS
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Field MBE (Retd.) reveals how this overlooked 1815 clash, in which the famed Marshal Ney took on the Duke of Wellington, had a huge impact on the outcome of Napoleon’s final battle on 18 June
Experts discuss why this prelude to Waterloo was critical to Napoleon’s defeat
In June 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte launched one of the most dramatic campaigns in military history. Fought in what is now Belgium, his efforts ended in a decisive defeat at Waterloo – a battle that ended the Napoleonic Wars and changed the course of European history. Waterloo was such a momentous event that it is commonly forgotten that it was the culmination of two previous battles – Ligny and Quatre Bras. Both were fought two days before Waterloo with Napoleon’s intention being to divide the Allied armies of Arthur Wellesley,
1st Duke of Wellington and the Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher.
For Wellington, Quatre Bras was a critical engagement that he fought not against Napoleon but his famed subordinate Marshal Michel Ney. Occurring at a strategic crossroads, it was a bloody affair that Wellington almost lost and its significance has long been neglected. Here, historian and retired British Army officer Andrew Field discusses how Wellington’s largely inexperienced, multinational force narrowly defeated Ney’s courageous troops, and why Quatre Bras was so important to sealing Napoleon’s fate.
Divide and conquer
Although he had been defeated and exiled to Elba in 1814, Napoleon made a dramatic return to France in March 1815. The restored King Louis XVIII was forced to flee the country while the former emperor was reinstated. His return prompted the major European powers (known as the Seventh Coalition) to outlaw Napoleon and commit themselves to militarily end his rule.
Surrounded by enemies, Napoleon went on the offensive. “He very quickly realised that he was going to have to fight almost the whole of Europe and had little option but to take the initiative and attack,” says Field. “Wellington and the Prussians were already present in the Netherlands but the Austrians and Russians were only just starting to mobilise. Before he faced over 500,000 troops from across Europe, Napoleon decided it would be much better to attack and defeat those two armies in the southern Netherlands. He hoped that defeating the two armies and seizing Brussels might force the other allies into accepting peace rather than continuing the war.”
The campaign would be fought in what is now Belgium but was then the recently formed United Netherlands. Wellington commanded c.100,000 multinational Allied troops, while Blücher’s Prussian army had c.130,000 men. The outnumbered Napoleon had to devise a risky strategy. “His army was only 120,000 so it was imperative that he kept the two armies apart so that he could defeat them sequentially rather than as a combined army,” says Field.
Attacking the two armies from the west or east would disrupt Allied communication lines but Field explains why Napoleon didn’t take that
opportunity: “Although it was the option that Wellington most feared, Napoleon put it aside because he felt it would force the armies to join up. He took what most considered the most risky route, which was to drive between the two armies in order to separate them. He would then organise himself so that a small part of his army could keep one enemy force out of the way while the main part of his army would destroy the other.”
On the other side, Wellington was hampered by the unproven troops under his command. “He knew he didn’t have a great army,” says Field. “Only about one third of it was British, with the remainder being contingents from the Netherlands, Brunswick, Hanover and Nassau. They had all raised new armies once they had thrown off the French yoke during 181314 so all their soldiers were very young and inexperienced. Wellington knew that he couldn’t afford to face the whole French army with Napoleon in command on his own.” Coordination with the Prussians was vital for Wellington but on 15 June 1815 Napoleon crossed the Franco-netherlands border. The speed of his
advance gave the emperor a head start. “Both allies had to concentrate their armies so Napoleon did achieve some surprise,” explains Field. “He gave himself some time to develop his advance and could decide which army he would be able to face and defeat first before they joined up. He didn’t know which army that would be when he crossed the border.
“As the Prussians were providing the frontier force and outposts, it quickly became clear to Napoleon that it would be the Prussians who he would fight first. Having crossed the border and the River Sambre, he directed the bulk of his army against where the Prussians appeared to be concentrating around Ligny. He used his left wing, commanded by Ney, to advance towards Brussels where he expected Wellington to be marching to support the Prussians. Ney’s job was to hold Wellington at bay while Napoleon defeated Blücher.”
With Napoleon on the offensive, Wellington’s immediate attention focussed on the crossroads at Quatre Bras. Translating as
‘Four Arms’, Quatre Bras lies on the crossroad for the Charleroi-brussels and Nivelles-namur roads. It was held by the 2nd Netherlands Division commanded by Prince William of Orange. “On the morning of 16 June, Wellington rushed down to Quatre Bras to look at the Netherlanders’ deployment,” says Field. “He knew that some French were approaching but not their strength. The importance of Quatre Bras is that the crossroads controlled the communications between his position and the Prussians. They needed to be held so that once Wellington’s army was concentrated he could theoretically march to support the Prussians.”
Wellington was satisfied with the Netherlands’ division at Quatre Bras and rode over to Blücher at Ligny. During a discussion by a windmill the Allied commanders actually spotted Napoleon: “They saw from the heights by the windmill that there was a large French force in front of them and could actually identify Napoleon and his retinue moving around the battlefield. They were confident that the Prussians faced the bulk of the French army and discussed how Wellington should support the Prussians in the coming battle.”
“WITH NAPOLEON ON THE OFFENSIVE, WELLINGTON’S IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOCUSSED ON THE CROSSROADS AT QUATRE BRAS”