“THE BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE”
Michel Ney was one of Napoleon’s most famous and courageous marshals but by 1815 he was a troubled, doomed man
The son of a cooper, Ney had joined the French Army as a private in 1787 and rose to become a marshal. Dubbed “the bravest of the brave” by Napoleon for his extreme courage during the 1812 campaign in Russia, Ney’s heroism was beyond doubt, but Field explains that he had a mixed record as a commander. “He led from the front and was much respected in the army, particularly by the junior ranks,” he says. “However, he was a difficult subordinate and didn’t have a very good record from his independent commands. He had, on occasion, rashly engaged his troops – often against orders – and compromised the various plans of Napoleon. At a higher level he wasn’t particularly well regarded, certainly by Napoleon and other marshals.”
When Napoleon escaped from Elba, Ney (who had pledged his allegiance to the restored French monarchy) promised Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon to Paris in an iron cage. He instead reunited with the emperor at Auxerre, although he was not a prized commander for the Waterloo campaign. “Napoleon was short of marshals and felt he had no option but to call on Ney to take a command,” explains Field. “The decision wasn’t made until 11 June and Ney didn’t join the army until 14 June. He had no staff or headquarters so he was fighting at a disadvantage.”
There has been speculation that Ney’s conflicted loyalties affected his performance on campaign. “He realised that if Napoleon was defeated he had also compromised himself with Louis XVIII,” says Field. “If the French lost he would almost certainly face the death penalty – as of course he did. However, it’s hard to know how that might have psychologically affected him during the campaign. Before Quatre Bras he was accused of lacking the impetuosity and determination which had so marked him during previous campaigns.”
On 16 June 1815, Ney failed to defeat Wellington: “What we possibly see is a distracted Ney who was too focussed on the fighting at Quatre Bras and unable to understand the bigger picture. He was unable to understand Napoleon’s necessity to destroy the Prussian army rather than Ney achieving the limited tactics of defeating the army in front of him.”
Ney went on to command the left wing of the French army at Waterloo but was arrested after Napoleon’s downfall by Louis XVIII’S restored regime. He was executed by firing squad in Paris on 7 December 1815 but refused a blindfold – and even gave the order to fire.
Field says the exact details of this meeting are uncertain, particularly the promises Wellington made to Blücher: “We know with the benefit of hindsight that the Prussians were defeated [at Ligny] and that Wellington wasn’t able to come to their support. The Prussians went some way to blame their defeat on Wellington not supporting them as they say he promised to do. Wellington claimed quite clearly that he promised the Prussians he would come if he was not attacked himself. He was of course attacked by Ney’s wing, which stopped him from marching in support of the Prussians.”
Opposing sides
When the Battle of Quatre Bras began on the afternoon of 16 June, the 2nd Netherlands Division of 8,000 men faced Ney’s French force of 20,000-21,000 troops. The outnumbered Netherlanders were gradually reinforced by the rest of Wellington’s army. “Quatre Bras was unlike other battles where both sides took up positions facing each other – this was because Wellington’s concentrating orders initially directed everybody towards Nivelles,” explains Field. “When he realised what was happening he desperately marched his army towards Quatre Bras to support the Netherlands Division. British, Brunswicker and Hanoverian troops arrived bit by bit on the battlefield until Ney was considerably outnumbered by the end of the battle.”
The battle was also atypical of Wellington’s famous terrain-based engagements:
“Wellington was quite well known for his defensive positions. His favourite was the ‘reverse slope’ position where (as he did at Waterloo) he hid most of his men behind a ridge line so that the French didn’t know where his strength or cover was. That immediately put the French at a disadvantage but this didn’t happen at Quatre Bras.
“The battle was thrust upon Wellington by the advance of the French up the main road. Therefore, the way the ground was used was effectively chosen by the prince of Orange. Wellington returned from his meeting with the Prussians approximately one hour after the battle started and therefore wasn’t really in a position to influence the deployment or use of the ground.”