NAPOLEON’S LAST VICTORY
Zack White of the University of Southampton discusses the French emperor’s final military success at the Battle of Ligny
Fought on the same day as Quatre Bras, the Battle of Ligny saw Napoleon defeat part of the Prussian army commanded by Field Marshal Blücher. Almost forgotten today, Ligny still resulted in very high casualties and was – most intriguingly – the last battlefield victory in Napoleon’s military career. Zack White, PHD Researcher at the University of Southampton and host of the podcast The Napoleonicist, reveals how the emperor “clutched defeat from the jaws of victory” in a battle that did not reflect Napoleon’s military genius.
WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE BATTLE?
Ligny was meant to be the realisation of Napoleon’s strategy. The previous day he had stolen a march on the Anglo-dutch and Prussian forces by thrusting his army into a small gap between his two enemies. On 16 June he aimed to capitalise on that by destroying the Prussian force under Blücher, while Ney kept Wellington at bay at Quatre Bras.
For Napoleon, defeating the Prussians at Ligny was vital. He had gambled everything on the element of surprise and could not afford to squander the advantage he had gained. For Blücher, all that mattered was to not be beaten – or at the very least not be routed. He and Wellington met at a mill earlier in the day and agreed that Blücher would hold Napoleon off and Wellington would send reinforcements provided he wasn’t attacked at Quatre Bras.
WHAT WAS THE STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES?
Napoleon had 68,000 men and 210 cannons while Blücher had 84,000 men and 224 cannons. However, neither force was as skilled and experienced as their commanders would have liked. Napoleon had been forced to compromise on the standards that were applied to recruitment into his elite units such as the Imperial Guard. He also did not have all his best generals with him. Most famously, his former chief-of-staff, Berthier, was not with him, as he died in suspicious circumstances shortly before the Waterloo campaign began. Although his replacement, Marshal Soult, was a gifted commander he was not used to the role and the cohesion of the French army consequently suffered.
Blücher had much bigger problems. Half of his army was Landwehr who were little better than militia and poorly trained and equipped.
The army was therefore struggling in terms of discipline. Before the campaign even started, 14,000 Saxon and Silesian troops mutinied and had to be disarmed. However, it was a generally motivated force and Blücher was a revered commander.
HOW DID THE BATTLE UNFOLD?
In many ways, this was a classic Napoleonic-style bludgeoning match. Napoleon pinned the Prussian left flank in place with a threatening cavalry presence while he bombarded their army with artillery, wearing them down with attrition. Fighting was fierce all along the line, which covered an 8km stretch of the River Ligny. In the town of Ligny, in the centre, things were especially bloody, with some French units suffering 60 percent losses. Just as the Prussians were about to break, and Napoleon was poised to launch a hammer blow with his Imperial Guard, a mysterious body of troops appeared in the rear of the French army, causing confusion.
HOW WOULD YOU RATE NAPOLEON’S AND BLÜCHER’S PERFORMANCES?
This was neither commander’s finest hour. Napoleon’s plan was sound but the mysterious troops that I mentioned were the key failure of the day. They were actually D’erlon’s corps – 12,500 fresh troops who had been summoned from Quatre Bras to assist Napoleon but he was unaware they were so close. As the French paused to
determine who these troops were the Prussians were given vital time to regroup.
For Blücher, Ligny was not an ideal place to fight. The Prussian position was too exposed, which is why they suffered so much from French cannon fire. Wellington himself observed this when he met Blücher and was curtly told by Prussian chief-ofstaff General Gneisenau: “Our troops like to see the enemy.” Blücher fought bravely though and led from the front. He was even run over by his own men when his horse was killed.
WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE FIGHTING?
As soon as Napoleon realised D’erlon’s troops didn’t represent a threat, he was able to continue with the battle. However, D’erlon’s men were actually summoned back to Quatre Bras and so played no part in either battle. Nonetheless, at around 7:30pm Napoleon sent in the Imperial Guard, who managed to break through the
Prussian lines. Blücher led a cavalry charge in person to try and buy the army time but the Prussians were forced to retreat. Napoleon appeared on the verge of achieving his aim of dividing and conquering his enemies just 48 hours into the campaign.
TO WHAT EXTENT DID NAPOLEON’S DECISION TO GIVE MARSHAL EMMANUEL DE GROUCHY 33,000 MEN TO FOLLOW BLÜCHER AFTER THE BATTLE AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF WATERLOO?
Sending such a large force after the Prussians was a sensible move because Blücher’s force hadn’t been routed. Although it had suffered 16,000 casualties at Ligny, and around 10,000 desertions, it was still dangerous. It had to be kept occupied, otherwise Blücher might regroup and descend on the French army’s flank, exactly as they eventually did at Waterloo.
The issue was the timing of the decision. Grouchy was not despatched until late morning on 17 June, by which point the Prussians had broken away from the French. Grouchy therefore had little information on where they were, so had no chance to keep up the pressure. That failure was Napoleon’s fault.
It was an astonishing missed opportunity, and combined with a failure to pounce on Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras on 17 June was the point at which Napoleon effectively lost the campaign. By not acting sooner, he squandered everything he had gained from victory at Ligny.
HOW DOES LIGNY COMPARE TO NAPOLEON’S OTHER VICTORIES AND WHY HAS IT BEEN FORGOTTEN?
Ligny lacked the movement, flair and brilliance of many of Napoleon’s earlier victories. It was a battle of attrition won at huge human cost – the French suffered 11,500 casualties. Ultimately, Ligny decided nothing, though it offered Napoleon chances to win the campaign. With better situational awareness he could have used D’erlon’s troops to devastating effect at Ligny to crush the Prussians.
With the same awareness, he could have descended on Wellington on 17 June having achieved his aim of separating the two Allied commanders. Had he sent Grouchy after the Prussians sooner, he could have made it impossible for them to agree to support Wellington on 18 June. In any of those situations, Wellington would never have fought at Waterloo. Instead, Napoleon clutched defeat from the jaws of victory and Ligny was ultimately overshadowed when those missed opportunities came home to roost at Waterloo.
“IN THE TOWN OF LIGNY, IN THE CENTRE, THINGS WERE ESPECIALLY BLOODY, WITH SOME FRENCH UNITS SUFFERING 60 PERCENT LOSSES”
“Quite a mauling”
With the 2nd Netherlands Division holding the crossroads, Ney was directed to confront any opposition at Quatre Bras. “His job was to advance up the road, engage any troops from Wellington’s army, hopefully defeat them, and stop them interfering in Napoleon’s battle against the Prussians,” says Field. “But he advanced very slowly, with the evidence pointing to him having to wait before he was ordered to move forward. Napoleon was still developing his ideas for Ligny and ordered Ney to occupy Quatre Bras because he didn’t believe or know if there were Allied troops there.
The Netherlanders came under heavy attack and held the position before Wellington arrived with reinforcements. Their stand demonstrated how important Wellington’s non-british troops were: “Seventy percent of Wellington’s were made up of foreign contingents and he could never have stood against Napoleon at Waterloo with his 30,000 British troops. With the British arriving in dribs and drabs, the contribution of the Netherlands Division at the beginning of the day was vital. Without them, Ney would have been able to seize the position. This in turn would have allowed a sizeable force to help Napoleon at Ligny, which may have seen the destruction of the Prussian army.”
Quatre Bras soon turned into a bloody affair. “There is no doubt that the fighting was very severe,” says Field. “Some of the units suffered such heavy casualties that they were combined with other battalions to fight at Waterloo. More than half of the Netherlands Division was comprised of very green, inexperienced troops that were not capable of resisting the French in a way that some of the British were. They got quite a mauling and when fresh troops came forward Wellington took them out of the line so that they weren’t incapable of fighting again.”
Although reinforcements bolstered Wellington’s position, they were not immune from the onslaught: “The Brunswickers were some of the first to arrive at a time when the battle was quite critical. Several of their units were broken by the French but the heaviest casualties were borne by the British – not only on the open ground but on the western edge of the battlefield in the Bossu Woods. The French had pretty much captured it when the British Guards Division arrived. Wellington ordered them to clear the woods but the Guards suffered some of the heaviest casualties of the entire day. The Allies ultimately suffered more casualties than the French.”
Kellerman’s cuirassiers
The Allies were suffering but so were the French. In the late afternoon, one of the battle’s most dramatic events took place when Ney ordered General François Étienne de Kellerman to break through Wellington’s line with his cuirassier cavalry brigade: “Ney was receiving constant orders from Napoleon to send reinforcements to Ligny. He was getting desperate and only just managing to hold his position. When he received a final order at
5pm he’d almost run out of fresh troops and ammunition. Wellington was also putting more pressure on them.
“The only uncommitted troops Ney had were Kellerman’s cuirassiers. This brigade consisted of two regiments that were understrength with a combined total of 700-800 cavalrymen. Wellington had 30,000 men on the battlefield by this time but Ney had no option but to order the cuirassiers to charge the entire Allied army,” Field says.
Despite Kellerman’s reservations, he led the charge into the heart of the Allied position: “Although they were eventually repulsed through
weight of numbers, the cuirassiers achieved some astounding results. They rode down the British 69th Regiment and captured their colours. Two other British regiments broke and ran into what they saw as the shelter of Bossu Wood. Three British regiments were effectively dispersed by the cuirassiers but as their charge continued their horses became exhausted.
They were eventually overwhelmed by Allied firepower before they fled back to the French lines. Official reports say that 300 cuirassiers were killed or wounded in the charge. They showed great courage but it was really a suicide mission. I’m sure both Ney and Kellerman knew they were facing failure.”
“Courage and élan”
The cuirassiers’ bravery was just one example of the formidable French performance. Field believes this was down to the adoption of new tactics: “Several of the commanders, including Ney, had fought the British in Spain and were always defeated by them. For Quatre Bras, they clearly changed their classic ‘column’ tactics.
For example, they were often seen fighting in ‘line’, which maximised their firepower, and used skirmishers to cover their advance. They got the upper hand against the less experienced Netherlanders and Germans but also the British, so this was a successful tactic.
“Their cavalry performed extremely well and the artillery moved throughout the battle. Many Allied accounts talk about the intensity and effectiveness of the enemy artillery fire. If the Comte d’erlon’s I Corps had turned up there was a very real chance that Wellington might have been defeated. The French fought a very good battle at Quatre Bras and displayed their usual courage and élan.”
Kellerman’s charge, though brave, did not turn the battle in Ney’s favour while Wellington’s forces increased: “The French were getting exhausted and running out of ammunition, and as they got weaker Wellington was getting stronger as he received more reinforcements. He became superior in infantry – some 12,000 more than the French – and once Kellerman’s charge was repulsed he ordered an advance.”
Wellington’s line slowly advanced while the French retired to their initial position: “They withdrew until they reached the line they had started from in the morning and there they held firm. As the Allied army met them there the battle came to a halt. Both sides bivouacked in that position only a few hundred metres apart. It’s fair to say that both sides were exhausted by that time. As it got dark the battle pretty much petered out.”
Quatre Bras resulted in high casualties of approximately 4,800-5,600 Allied killed and wounded compared to 4,100-4,400 on the French side. It was a tactical Allied victory but the French determination rendered Wellington unable to assist Blücher at Ligny. When Wellington learned of the Prussian defeat, he withdrew his force north along the Brussels road even further away from Blücher, who had himself retreated northeast towards Wavre.
“Set up for failure”
Wellington’s successes during his military career were many and often celebrated, but Field reflects that Quatre Bras is not so well known: “It was fought on a smaller scale than his larger victories, which were primarily fought during the Peninsular War. Wellington hadn’t concentrated or formed his army to fight the French wing commanded by Ney so it wasn’t one of his typical battles. It was almost an ‘encounter’ battle, with more reinforcements arriving to replace exhausted troops. As a matter of scale more than anything else, Quatre Bras ranks lower than nearly all of Wellington’s former battles and it was of course completely overshadowed by Waterloo two days later.”
The titanic clash between Wellington and Napoleon on 18 June at Waterloo naturally dominates any perspective on the campaign in the southern Netherlands. As a result, Quatre Bras was neglected by survivors and historians for many years. “From a French perspective it hardly gets a mention, including from surviving soldiers,” says Field. “The British did write a lot more about it so it is at least clear that it was a very close and hardfought battle. Without a doubt I think it has been greatly neglected. The first book that was solely about Quatre Bras was only published in 2009, written by Mike Robinson. It has been overshadowed by Waterloo, which I don’t think is a good thing.”
Field concludes that although Quatre
Bras has been retrospectively neglected, it produced outcomes that were vital for the decisive Allied success at Waterloo:
“A lot of people who don’t know much about the campaign look at Waterloo and think, ‘Napoleon had a really good chance of winning.’ This is based on the fact that he had a small advantage in troops and had a more homogenous, experienced army that could have defeated Wellington – particularly if the Prussians hadn’t arrived.
“However, if you study the whole campaign, including Quatre Bras and Ligny, it becomes clear with hindsight that Napoleon had no chance of winning at Waterloo. He failed to destroy the Prussian army at Ligny and allowed it to escape, which enabled Blücher to march to Wellington on 18 June. Wellington was himself able to withdraw from Quatre Bras unmolested to take up position at Waterloo. Napoleon had therefore been set up for failure because of the actions of the previous few days. A knowledge of both Quatre Bras and Ligny is vital for an understanding of how Waterloo and the campaign finished.”