PARIS, 1870
In the final months of the Francoprussian War, the French capital was besieged by the German army
The Franco-prussian War of 1870-71 is viewed as a precursor to the First World War. It completed the work begun in 1864 (against Denmark) and 1866 (against Austria) in a series of short, sharp conflicts known collectively as the German Wars of Unification. Modern weaponry, especially breech-loading rifles, coupled with fast mobilisation via railway systems, gave these wars a distinctly modern feel. At the end of them, the various German states were unified under the leadership of Prussia, and Europe was arguably already on course for the two devastating conflicts of the next century.
In 1864, the Dreyse needle gun, a boltaction breech-loader, gave the Prussians a clear advantage over their brave but outmatched Danish opponents, while the Austrians failed to capitalise on interior lines of communication in 1866. The Prussians had not become invincible, however, despite their frequent depiction as an unstoppable military machine. When Otto von Bismarck provoked the French into war against the German states in 1870, the outcome was far from certain. In fact, the French were viewed as the greater power at the time, having performed well in a series of small overseas conflicts. The French, moreover, had a breech-loading rifle of their own in the form of the Fusil modèle 1866, more commonly known as the Chassepot.
The Second Empire of Napoleon III was well-respected, but its military system was not suited to a large-scale conflict. Its army was professional, but small, and it would take time for conscripts to become effective units. The Prussians had introduced universal military service and their system was already dominant in the northern German states. The Germans also had a far superior staff system, moulded by Helmuth von Moltke, who understood the need to concentrate force and deliver a speedy knockout blow.
The Germans were able to get three large armies mobilised and transported to the front quickly. Commanded by Karl Friedrich von Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles and the crown prince of Prussia, they were ready to move while the chaotic French system had
regiments and commanders blundering around trying to find each other. Nevertheless, the French were ready to take the field when the first actions took place in August.
The French may have been able to match the Germans with their Chassepot rifles, but artillery was a different matter. The Germans’ rifled guns dominated the French muzzleloaders and the war went badly for Napoleon
III, who was ultimately captured following the Battle of Sedan, on 1-2 September, triggering the fall of the Second Empire.
A new Government of National Defence was established and entered into talks with Bismarck, but the pugnacious Prussian was not yet ready to end the war and set such harsh terms that the French had little choice but to fight on. Strasbourg and Metz fell, and despite the French performing great feats in mobilising more men, the war came down to a struggle for the capital city.
German units had appeared in front of the Paris defences on 16 September. The city walls were formidable but of an obsolescent design, and the Germans had already forced the capitulation of many fortresses in a few short weeks, some without any resistance at all. The Paris defences had been augmented over the decades, taking into account improvements in siege artillery. They would have their work cut out against the German guns, which were mounted on newly designed elevated gun carriages, giving them an improved field of fire and also better protection for the gun crews.
Paris had been besieged at least 15 times before, including by Vikings, Romans and the English, and its defensive works had steadily grown in response to the repeated threats. With the city situated in a basin, with various points of high ground around it, it's a poor position for a determined defence. In technical terms, the Paris defences of 1870 consisted of a ‘bastioned enceinte’ with 98 fronts. The surrounding ditch was about ten metres wide and about six metres deep. The perimeter stretched for 33km, and was split into nine sections, each section having its own commanding officer. There was also a circle of forts built outside the walls, on a
perimeter of 58km, intended to stop artillery from getting close enough to bombard the main walls. The most recent of the outer forts had been built 30 years previously, and improved gun ranges had already reduced their value. The walls and external forts had also fallen into disrepair in many places, and the war moved so quickly that by the time it became clear the Germans were going to reach Paris, there was very little time to do much about it.
Still, efforts were made to improve the works, with some gates being closed and bomb-proof shelters being dug, and there were hasty efforts to throw up strongpoints even further away from the city walls to keep enemy artillery at bay. This was still ongoing when the first German units arrived, and they were able to easily take possession of some of the outer works.
There were around 1,350 guns in emplacements around the walls, with a further 600 field guns available, able to be moved around to concentrate in a single area if needed. Running along the interior of the walls was a railway, which allowed men and guns to be moved quickly to a threatened section.
In terms of manpower, the cupboard was not exactly bare, but it was close. There were between 60,000 and 80,000 regulars, along with a large number of Garde-mobiles (territorials) and around 350,000 National Guardsmen. Under the leadership of General
“PARIS HAD BEEN BESIEGED AT LEAST 15 TIMES BEFORE, INCLUDING BY VIKINGS, ROMANS AND THE ENGLISH, AND ITS DEFENSIVE WORKS HAD STEADILY GROWN IN RESPONSE”
Louis-jules Trochu, the National Guard was almost completely dismissed, and it wasn’t until far too late that he attempted to train them up into useful units.
By 19 September, the investment of
Paris was complete. An army of 220,000 sealed off the city. Perhaps surprisingly, the Germans would refrain from bombarding Paris until the following year, but that does not mean the siege was anything other than a traumatic and shocking experience for the two million civilians and soldiers trapped behind those walls.
The Germans may have held back from bombarding the city, but Parisians were still awakened at 4am on 19 September by the ominous sounds of artillery – French guns were attempting to keep the enemy from approaching too close.
The Germans quickly took possession of towns along the southern perimeter, including Versailles, Meudon, Clamart and Bagneux. To the east, they moved close to the outlying forts. Bridges leading to the city had been blown up overnight, but the poor state of the outer defences meant they quickly fell into German hands. The garrisons of these positions were reviled as cowards, but in unfinished structures they could hardly have been expected to resist for long.
The French expected (and hoped for) an immediate assault on their main walls, and they believed that it was only the Germans’ strict adherence to scientific principles that prevented them from attempting it. In fact, Moltke had no intention of wasting men in unnecessary frontal assaults on the strong walls of the city, and even a bombardment would not be unleashed with the intention of destroying it. “The object of [a bombardment] would not be to destroy Paris,” Moltke would later write, “but merely to exert a final pressure on the inhabitants; and this influence would be more effectual after a long blockade had shaken the resolution of the besieged.”
This would be a careful, methodical siege, and there could be only one outcome.
One of the most immediate ordeals for the intelligentsia of Paris was the fact that they were almost completely isolated from the outside world. Accustomed to being at the heart of global affairs, and considering their city to be the most civilised and advanced in the world, it was a novel and unpleasant experience to be cut off from all news. Imaginative and often fanciful ideas were put forward, from messenger dogs to glass globes floating down the Seine (the old-fashioned ‘message in a bottle’ approach) but the hot air balloon proved itself to be the only reliable method. The first balloon took off on 23 September, with another following two days later. The director of the postal service, M Rampont, was impressed (and enterprising) enough to suggest a regular service every two or three days.
Of rather more importance was the departure by balloon of Léon Gambetta, Minister of the Interior in the new Government of National Defence. Gambetta played a key role in the raising of new armies – the fall of the Empire had triggered a wave of national resistance as democracy re-established itself
in the form of the Third Republic. Guerrilla bands (francs-tireurs) materialised and began to torment the men guarding the German supply lines, so much so that civilians were executed if their houses were used by snipers.
The Army of the Loire would be the most important of the new National Armies, and it enjoyed some success, recapturing Orléans on 9 November. To the north, the aptly named Army of the North enjoyed some small-scale successes under Louis Faidherbe, a colonial administrator who showed a flair for command. He came unstuck when mounting pressure on Paris forced him to attack at Saint-quentin, where he suffered catastrophic losses and was effectively knocked out of the war.
Despite these serious efforts to relieve Paris, the city was mostly on its own. Unknown to its inhabitants, a debate was raging at the top of the German command. Bismarck wanted to bombard the city, while Moltke was unwilling to unleash such destruction and potentially turn the opinion of the world against them. As the year wound to a close, starvation became the Germans’ most effective weapon.
Controls on food production and pricing were imposed almost as soon as the siege began. It did not take long for horses to be added to the menu, but the needs of the populace were huge. In the early days of the siege, 1,000 sheep and 500 cattle were being slaughtered every day, and by the end the citizens had earned notoriety for unconventional visits to the zoo (the two elephants, Castor and Pollux, being the most famous victims).
Parisians remained upbeat, but hopes that foreign powers would come to France’s aid quickly turned to bitterness. The newspapers, still publishing, asked pertinent questions:
“Has England forgotten Inkerman?”, “Has Italy forgotten Solferino?”, “Has America forgotten Lafayette?” On 27 October, the populace was shocked by rumours of the capitulation of Metz, rumours that were quickly confirmed, and the fear grew that Paris might soon be stormed.
Trochu was not an aggressive commander, but he was unwilling to just sit in Paris and wait for the Germans to starve him out. If the Germans wouldn’t attack, then the French would. Early, tentative sorties met with enough success to convince the general to draw up an ambitious plan for a major offensive against the German forces to the west of the city. This plan, known as Le Plan Trochu, underwent modification, the most significant of which was that it struck eastwards rather than to the west. On 30 November, French units led by Auguste-alexandre Ducrot made a significant impact on the German lines, but nowhere near enough to break through. Trochu rallied his men for another assault on 21 December, but this was less successful.
Just days later, on 5 January, the German guns began to fire upon Paris. It had taken this long for them to bring up heavy guns and prepare positions within range of Paris itself. A total of 17 batteries (with 98 guns) opened fire on the south of the city.
By this time, dog, cat and rat had joined horse on the butchers’ slab, while frantic attempts were made to find scientific solutions to the insurmountable problems facing the trapped population. Synthesised milk and foodstuffs, fanciful weapons (as well as some genuinely interesting ideas, such as armoured wagons)
“BISMARCK WANTED TO BOMBARD THE CITY, WHILE MOLTKE WAS UNWILLING TO UNLEASH SUCH DESTRUCTION AND POTENTIALLY TURN THE OPINION OF THE WORLD AGAINST THEM”
and more innovative ways of manufacturing gunpowder all offered sparks of hope, but the situation was grim.
“God have mercy on us!” an American eyewitness recorded in his journal. “At this moment the shells are falling near the center of Paris… They fall here and there and everywhere on the south side of the city.” As proved the case in the Second World War, however, the attack on a civilian population did not provoke panic or uprising, but rather a bitter stubbornness. “Everyone is filled with rage and no one is alarmed,” the American witness noted.
The bombardment could not go unanswered, and Trochu made the last of his great sorties on 19 January, sending 90,000 men to attack the German lines around the Château of Buzenval. The assault was gobbled up by the Germans at a cost of 4,000 casualties, and the French had made their last roll of the dice. After the bombardment of the city intensified, with siege guns now being used against the north of the city as well, the inevitable armistice negotiations were opened.
Peace terms were agreed on 28 January
1871, and were punitive in the extreme. As well as losing Alsace and most of Lorraine
(which would remain bones of contention and contributing factors in the start of the First World War), France was also ordered to pay five billion francs in compensation. A ‘German Empire’ was announced at Versailles, and Bismarck had achieved his goal of uniting Germany under Prussian leadership. The consequences of a militaristic and united Germany would be devastating for Europe and, eventually, the world.