TSAR NICHOLAS I
PLUG THE TECHNOLOGY GAP
In Ukraine, the influx of NATO weapons and Russia’s need to raid old stockpiles to arm new units mean that just as Kyiv is beginning to field a 21st-century army, Moscow’s is sliding back into the 20th. Mobile, long-range rocket systems such as US HIMARS and Britishsupplied M270s mean that Russian artillery and supply lines are now being hit almost with impunity, while Javelin and NLAW missiles have neutralised much of Russia’s vaunted tank fleet.
This is hardly the first time a technology gap has been crucial.
In the Crimean War (1853-56), the armies of Tsar Nicholas I found themselves facing the most advanced European military powers of the time, Britain and France. Steamships, railways and telegraphs enabled the allies to supply, reinforce and coordinate their armies much more effectively. Rifles such as the British Enfield and French Minié had a massive advantage in range and accuracy over the old-fashioned muskets most of the Russian soldiers were still using.
Meanwhile, in the northern naval operations to blockade Russian trade ports – which were actually of much greater significance than the bloody side-show in Crimea – the gap between naval technologies was just as obvious. This was apparent in 1854, when an Anglo-french flotilla was able to destroy Bomarsund fort on the Russian-held Finnish Åland islands with humiliating ease, as their cannon outranged even the heavy coastal guns in the fort.
Nicholas was a soldier by training and had already been concerned about the security implications of Russia’s growing backwardness. He had toyed with fundamental reform to try and modernise and industrialise the country, but held back for fear that it would destabilise the state. He died during the war and his successor, Alexander II, embarked on a serious although ultimately incomplete effort to address this – albeit one which did indeed stir up serious unrest and the terrorist movement that assassinated him in 1881.