JIHADI POLITICS

A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE BLOODY INFIGHTING WITHIN THE GLOBAL JIHADI MOVEMENT THAT SET AL-QAEDA AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE, WITH CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE STILL FELT TODAY

Author: Tore Hamming Publisher: Hurst Price: £30 (Hardback) Released: Out now

Tore Hamming’s analysis of militant Islamic fratricide is a meticulously researched account of intra-jihadi conflict, seen through the jihadis’ own lens. The author, who is director of Refslund Analytics at King’s College London, has conducted on-the-ground research on his subject throughout the Middle East and Africa, in countries where jihadi fighting was at its most violent during the 2014-19 civil war period.

What took place in the jihadi movement during those five years was a counterintuitive and self-destructive sequence of infighting among groups engaged in a struggle to destroy a common enemy, namely the West. Hamming brings to light the ideological paradox that set al-qaeda against Islamic State, two factions that on the surface would appear to have had everything in common. Another riddle addressed in the narrative is precisely what tore apart a movement that had a lot more to be gained by uniting forces against their foe. “Would collaboration with like-minded associates against a common enemy not be a wiser strategy?” asks the author. The book takes the reader through the beginnings of the jihadi crusade, starting in the early 1960s with its ideological foundation in the Muslim Brotherhood. The second current, the so-called solidarity jihad, began in 1979 and lasted until the mid-1990s, focusing its attention on the anti-soviet struggle in Afghanistan. What is referred to in the West as global jihad marked the third and most widespread outbreak of jihadi terror and open warfare, now with the United States and not Israel as the principal enemy.

Jihadi leaders are aware of the counterproductive dangers posed by fitna, or internal conflict, which diverts their action from the primary adversary and deprives the militants of precious resources. As recently as June 2019, a senior al-qaeda fighter warned of the perils of giving the kuffar (unbelievers) the opportunity to laugh at them. Yet the bickering and allegations persist and, according to the author, the pressing question is how the jihadis will attempt to manage internal tensions and rivalry. The challenge they face is how to ensure that fratricidal conflict doesn’t spiral out of control to the extent it threatens to destroy the jihadi project.

Events post-2019 illustrate a replay of earlier inner turmoil, underlining the fact that the struggle between factions is likely to continue. The year 2020 had only just begun when the situation in the Sahel in Africa exploded. A tenuous coexistence had been worked out between the local Islamic State and al-qaeda affiliates, but in early January tensions started to manifest themselves in the form of skirmishes between militants. In Nigeria, the already uneasy situation between Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) and Boko Haram began to escalate. Then, following the surprising Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021, it was not long before infighting between the new Islamist rulers and their rival, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), flared up once again.

Hamming says that many of the jihadis acknowledge the necessity of change in order to adjust to the evolving political and social environment. They all recognise the importance of popular support for their movement, but the challenges arise when this is combined with the need to align such support with religious principles and political and strategic interests.

“WHAT IS REFERRED TO IN THE WEST AS GLOBAL JIHAD MARKED THE THIRD AND MOST WIDESPREAD OUTBREAK OF JIHADI TERROR”