Becoming Grey Wolves
The mystique of a stereotyped U-boat commander of the Second World War is perpetuated in the historiography of the Kriegsmarine’s submarine arm, and often inaccurately. Dr. Axel Niestlé lays to rest some common misconceptions as to how it was and the real
With the appearance of submarines as a new and powerful weapon at the start of the 20th century, their advent also saw the beginning of new myths surrounding their commanding officers. This was especially so for the achievements of the German U-boats during both World Wars, and these myths laid foundations for the commander’s perceived epitome of elite, recklessness, decision-making and responsibility. Pushed into the wider public eye by wartime propaganda, the often highly decorated U-boat officers were portrayed as swashbuckling fighters in newsreels, books and newspapers. Statistically, no other military service branch offered better chances for high awards during the Second World War, and about 11 % of the German front-line U-boat commanders were awarded the prestigious Knight’s Cross.
Today, their names, biographies, sinking figures and personal fates in battle are all well documented on the internet and in numerous publications, fiction movies and documentaries. It was also the case that the successful film production Das Boot of 1981 catapulted the stereotyped figure of its commander into wide public awareness.
In strong contrast, however, to the mass of information on the operational achievements of German U-boat commanders during the Second World War, almost nothing is known about the criteria for naval officer selection for service as U-boat commanders, details of their training and the great changes that U-boat commander training underwent during the course of the war. Quite understandably, the more than 1,400 German U-boat commanders appointed between 1935 and 1945 were not a homogenous group - whether by background, age, training or personal experience. Their distinctive differences, however, had a major influence on the military situation in battle, and the outcome of the U-boat War; known by the Allies as the Battle of the Atlantic.
U-BOAT ‘ACES’
Under the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, Germany was forbidden to develop or construct any kind of U-boat. Likewise, any former U-boat commander who continued to serve in the new German Reichsmarine, which succeeded the former Imperial German Navy, quickly outranked the position for command of a U-boat. However, in summer of 1930, the German Reichsmarine secretly started a small training programme for future U-boat officers with the help of friendly navies in other countries. Six officers were seconded to the Finnish navy in 1930, while three others trained with the Spanish navy. Both countries had purchased U-boat designs from the secret German U-boat construction company, IVS, based in the Netherlands. The submarines were later tested under the supervision of German war-time U-boat engineer and naval construction officers.
In January 1933, four officers of the line joined a threemonth lecture in basic U-boat training and tactics at the Technical Naval School, Flensburg.
On 1 October 1933, the newly formed U-boat School, acting under the cover name ‘Anti-u-boat School’, started the first training course with eight officers including one engineer officer. U-boat construction was originally planned to start at the same time, but the plan was delayed for political reasons and to avoid tensions with France and Britain at that time.
In June 1935, an Anglo-german Naval Treaty eventually paved the way for the new German U-boat Arm. The commanding officers for the first batch of U-boats, numbered U-1 to U-12 (built from prefabricated components until September 1935) were all recruited from the officers secretly trained in preceding years. On 1 October 1935, official U-boat officer training started at the U-boat School, including 28 officers of the line and 9 engineer officers. Among these were many future recipients
of the Knight’s Cross, including two U-boat ‘aces’: Prien and Schepke.
Standard pre-war training for future U-boat commanders included a 12 week course in basic U-boat operations at the U-boat School, 11 weeks torpedo training plus a special two-week U-boat torpedo training course at the Torpedo School, followed by a one-week radio training course at the Communication School. Officers who had graduated from any of these courses prior to joining the U-boat arm, jumped the relevant steps. Subsequently, all officers served a twoyear assignment as Officer of the Watch aboard an active U-boat. The first officers of the newly trained group took over as U-boat commanders during the regular changes of command in the autumn of 1937.
Archive records covering pre-war training details and routines have not been located among German naval records, but it appears that watch officers on active U-boats, which were under constant recurrent training of all kinds, were indoctrinated into the art of being a U-boat commander. No special course or examination had to be attended, but command certainly depended on biannual evaluations.
ELITISM, AGGRESSIVENESS AND SUPERIORITY
Until the beginning of the Second World War, a total of 81 officers assumed command of a U-boat, and of these, 57 were active U-boat commanders on 1 September 1939, the majority of the rest serving in staff positions within the U-boat arm or related positions in the Kriegsmarine. Only one former U-boat commander was transferred to a surface fleet vessel, while another was killed in a flying accident. However, after the outbreak of war, all officers outside the U-boat arm were soon redrafted into commanding officer positions.
Prior to 1939, the U-boat arm represented only a small and unimportant branch within the German Kriegsmarine. But its commanding officer, Kommodore Karl Dönitz, instilled his officers and crews with elitism and created a strong feeling of aggressiveness and superiority. Rigid selection as regards to physical fitness and performance supported this esprit de corps, with Dönitz following the mantra that the Kriegsmarine should be first among the armed services in the German Wehrmacht, with the U-boat arm representing the crème de la crème.
The quality of pre-war U-boat commander training is difficult to quantify, but the group did include 19 officers who would be among the top 35 ship killers during the war. In contrast, almost half were killed or became POW during the war, many during the first year of conflict. It is also a fact that beside sound training, varied unforeseeable factors play a role in success or survival during war. This includes technological and tactical advances on the enemy side, as well as often random fortunes of war.
The start of the Second World War, however, hit the U-boat arm completely unprepared, both in personnel and materiel aspects. The pre-war mobilisation and building programme made a rapid increase of U-boat figures unlikely. Even from the new naval building programme of October 1939, which focused mainly on U-boats, substantial numbers of new constructions were not expected before the end of 1940. To make matters worse, the U-boat arm suffered severe losses in the first twelve months of the conflict. The average monthly loss rate figured as 17%, meaning that one out of six boats on patrol did not return. This fact is often overlooked, with a general impression of great successes by a small number of capable U-boat commanders often presented. In the same period, however, some 39 % of the pre-war U-boat commanders were killed, taken POW or dropped out of the service arm for other reasons. The loss of their U-boat experience was hard to compensate.
EXPERIENCED VOLUNTEERS
Following the outbreak of war, several organisational changes were necessary to accelerate U-boat commander training. Because the pre-war training schemes were no
longer feasible, the system of Commander Torpedo Firing courses (Kommandanten-schießlehrgang - KSL), which lasted four weeks and had been invented during the First World War, was revived. The first course started on 11 September 1939, with nine officers. The main goal was to qualify future U-boat commanders in the art of live dayand-night torpedo firing under all conditions. Each officer had to fire at least 30 to 40 torpedoes against escorted dummy convoys in the Baltic Sea.
To provide the necessary number of training U-boats, a new training flotilla (U-ausbildungs-flottille, eventually designated 24. U-flotilla) was commissioned the following month, in addition to the U-boat School flotilla. Initially, only small Type II U-boats with just six torpedoes were available, and so the training rhythm was mainly dominated by exercises at sea and reloading in port.
The regular training schedule for future U-boat commanders at the start of the war is shown in table 1. Officers with previous service in the U-boat arm usually had already graduated from the U-boat specialist courses and joined a KSL directly. The broad pre-war torpedo training course (Tb-lehrgang), however, was condensed to eight weeks for U-boats and was now designated Tu-lehrgang.
A total of 51 active naval officers took part in six KSL courses during the first year of the war. Of these, 41 (or 82%) had previously served in U-boats for varying periods (see graphic 1). The rest were hand-picked and experienced volunteers from other commands. None of the candidates failed, although a few had not participated in torpedo firing courses owing to pressing needs for new commanders.
When German U-boat building eventually came into full swing at the end of 1940, new construction figures quickly
outpaced the available number of candidates for command within the U-boat arm. Even worse, active frontline U-boat numbers dropped to an all-time low at the beginning of 1941 due to losses and the growing need for school boats to cope with the training requirements of new officers and crews. Consequently, the years 1940 and 1941 saw a first huge influx of active officers from other naval vessels into the U-boat arm (see graphic 2).
The bottleneck in commanding officers had been foreseen by the C-in-c. of the Kriegsmarine, who issued a general order on 8 December 1939 to the effect that all line and engineer officers belonging to classes between 1921 and 1934, were to be examined immediately for U-boat fitness and results reported directly to the manning department.
LACK OF U-BOAT EXPERIENCE
The general situation of the Kriegsmarine in 1940/41 also favored the recruitment of volunteers from other branches because many officers on capital ships down to destroyer size had lost their vessels, (e.g. during the Norwegian campaign) or were attracted by the promise of fame and awards after German propaganda boosted the achievements of U-boats in combat. Highly decorated U-boat officers were a prominent feature in the German news, soon becoming well-known heroes. In addition, a large number of ambitious naval officers, temporarily detached to the German Luftwaffe to form the nucleus of a fleet air arm, were reassigned to the navy after initial plans to build a carrier force were abandoned, the Luftwaffe having strongly opposed the idea of an independent naval air arm.
Volunteer figures usually exceeded available places on the training courses, although the number of participants was raised up to 27 officers within a single course, making proper individual training difficult. Although attendance in all special U-boat officer training courses now became compulsory for commanding officer training, most candidates suffered from a complete lack of active U-boat experience (see graphic 3).
This deficit was partly compensated for by that fact that most future commanders then were at least seasoned naval officers with often more than 10 years of service. To provide these officers with at least a minimum of operational U-boat experience before taking over their own boats, many joined frontline boats as ‘supernumerary commander under training’ for the duration of one patrol.
From the beginning of the war, the basic principle was that no officer should command a U-boat without prior graduation from a commander firing course. However, operational necessities caused a few exceptions to that rule during the war: - School boats in the Baltic were sometimes temporarily lead by frontline experienced U-boat officers until they joined the next free place in a commander firing course;
– Appointments to Type XIV supply U-boats (without torpedo armament) whose commanders were often reserve officers drafted from the merchant marine; – Commanding officer changes in the Far East, or during the evacuation of France after the Allied invasion, when no properly qualified officer was available.
The small number of officers who had graduated from a firing course already during the First World War were not required to repeat the course before taking over U-boat commands during Second World War.
TO COMPENSATE FOR LOSSES
At the beginning of 1942, the U-boat arm had grown to 252 boats in commission with 89 boats in frontline service and another 104 to join them after completion of workup training in the Baltic. The larger number of boats now offered the chance to recruit all future commanding officers from the officer pool within the U-boat arm.
In 1942, the required number of new commanding officer candidates was calculated as 300 per year, based on a construction figure of 20 new boats per month. This left 60 officers for frontline replacement or as a
back-up to compensate for other losses, e.g. graduation failure, illness or loss during the period as supernumerary commander. The average number of KSL participants was now 15 officers with two courses each month; that is, except during January/february, when icing-up in the Baltic made regular sea training impossible.
New commanders were now almost exclusively recruited from watch officers serving on frontline U-boats. Their average frontline experience time had dropped, by then, to just three patrols. Also, 1942 saw the first reserve officer appointed as a U-boat commander - Leutnant zur See der Reserve Botho Bade in U-626.
The youngest commanders during 1942 had entered the Kriegsmarine in 1938, constituting a service time of 57 months, which was only half a year less than their comrades from earlier officer classes. Older officers fit for U-boat service serving in the U-boat arm staff had already been totally combed out by 1942.
To balance the lack of experience of new candidates, new tactical simulator equipment (Fahrgerät) was introduced in January 1942. This used a dummy conning tower and ship models in a convoy scenario to simulate battle sequences and prepare participants for onboard torpedo training at sea. The simulator course, which allowed training for all kinds of day and night attack modes under changing light conditions, however, normally lasted two weeks maximum.
A ‘CHILDREN’S CRUSADE’
By 1942, the following basic rules concerning future appointments of new commanding officers had been established: – Top graduates from each KSL course were often appointed as replacement commanders to a frontline flotilla. However, only officers with previous frontline experience were eligible for frontline replacement. Until 1942, about 20 officers were appointed to command in this way with about half having already served previously as First Watch Officer on their new boats. From April 1943, officers designated to replace a frontline commander usually attended a refresher course at the 27th Tactical U-flotilla before taking over their new command. – Average graduates (or graduates without previous frontline experience) were generally appointed to commission newly built boats, which thereafter had to spend a work-up period of several months in the Baltic. This allowed the new commanding officers to ‘mature’ in their new positions. – Below average graduates were given school boat commands to gain more training and experience in all fields or else went away to shore commands.
These rules remained in force until the end of the war. Failures were sometimes allowed to repeat the KSL once, or were drafted to other commands outside the U-boat arm. However, due to rigid selection before being appointed to a KSL, until the end of 1942 the percentage of failure was below 1%, usually owing to health problems.
The U-boat manning department sometimes showed a good sense of humor by appointing officers to individual command. Thus, Leutnant zur See der Reserve Herbert Engel (angel) was ordered to command the “devil boat”, U 666. Likewise, in some cases, noble officers were sent to command ‘namesake’ boats.
In the 1980’s, some authors claimed the German U-boat campaign after 1943 had been a ‘children’s crusade’, with commanding officers often aged just 21 or 22. However,
these allegations are not reflected in the available records.
As shown, U-boat commander appointment followed a strict rule without exceptions or out of line commands. Table 2 gives the first ever command, separated to positions and officer classes, and based on the evaluation of some 7,000 U-boat officer personnel files. It is apparent that the average service time for individual commands became shorter during the war. The highpoint was reached in the first half of 1943, when the active officer corps within the U-boat arm was stretched to the limit, with the transfer of reserve officers or officers from other branches within the Kriegsmarine into the U-boat arm having just started.
The 46th KSL, lasting from mid-april to mid-may 1943, represents a typical example for the youth-trend at that time. With the average age of all seventeen officers at 25 years, the youngest candidate was 22 and the oldest already 33. Like all KSL candidates in the first half of 1943, the officers had previously served as watch officer aboard a frontline boat with the youngest having completed no less than four patrols. Apart from two reserve officers and one promoted from the ranks, all candidates were active line officers from classes between 1935 and 1939. By the end of the war, seven had been killed, three became POW, four remained in command of a frontline U-boat, one served on a school boat and two had been transferred to shore commands.
In early 1943, the youngest commander of a frontline U-boat was 22.5 years (Leutnant zur See Eberhard Dahlhaus, born on 24 July 1920) with four previous patrols as Second or First watch officer on his record. The age trend in the U-boat arm conforms with wartime affects, including shortened training periods and increased demands. It does not differ significantly from other services or units in the German Wehrmacht. However, the officer manning problems in the U-boat force was greatly increased by the disastrous losses starting in the spring of 1943. Out of 236 frontline boats on 1 May 1943, no less than 120 (51 %) were lost in the following six months. This also meant the loss of at least 120 future commander candidates in this same period.
PLANNED BUILDING FIGURES
The increased U-boat building ordered during the summer 1943, which initially demanded 40 new boats each month, eventually called for an average of more than 50 boats in 1944. This would have required an annual output of at least 600 new U-boat commanders per year. Although the planned building figures were never achieved, 1944 nevertheless saw the largest output of new U-boats from the building yards during the entire war despite the British and American strategic bombing campaign on German
industry targets and numerous terror attacks against the civilian population. The greatly increased demand for new commanding officers could not be provided from the officer pool within the U-boat arm or the existing training system.
Recruiting suitable new candidates for commanding officer training from outside the U-boat arm initially focused on officers with seagoing experience serving on smaller combat ships like torpedo boats, minesweepers or escort vessels. In a first recruiting period between February and June 1943, 222 new officers were transferred to the U-boat arm from other branches within the Kriegsmarine. Of these, 159 later graduated from a KSL course with 145 eventually assuming command of U-boat (see graphic 4). Of these, 92 graduates were active officers, while 61 were reserve officers and six had been promoted from the ranks.
In addition to the enlarged group of reserve officers, no less than 42 graduates were ex weapons or administration officers and Luftwaffe pilots without previous nautical experience. To process the increased number of candidates, the training organisation was expanded in September 1943, when a second firing flotilla (23. U-flotilla) for commander torpedo firing was commissioned in addition to the existing 24. U-flotilla. From then on, four regular six-week KSL courses took
place each month, with between 12-15 candidates each.
Owing to the steady drain from the officer pool of the German surface fleet, by mid-1943 active line officers fit for U-boat service with a minimum experience at sea had been largely combed out. Consequently, during the following recruiting period from July 1943 until January 1944, when a total of 459 officers newly joined the U-boat arm, almost half were former naval artillery officers without any nautical experience. For these officers, a three-month nautical course at one of the naval schools was obligatory.
Out of the total drafted in the second period, 154 officers eventually graduated from a KSL during the war (see graphic 6). Reserve officers now dominated the group of graduates, representing 59%.
OUTDATED BOATS AND WISHFUL THINKING
In an attempt to compensate the lack of seagoing experience among future commanding officer candidates in 1944, U-boat commander training was supplemented by 10 weeks of sea training as supernumerary watch officer on a school boat, and a 12 week navigation and harbour training course at the newly formed 19. U-flotilla. Despite these additional steps, the number of repeaters or lowperformance candidates who failed and were drafted away, grew steadily. The lack of seafaring experience among a large portion of the new KSL graduates was so apparent that even the system of supernumerary pupil commanders embarked for one patrol on frontline boats, abandoned at the end of 1942 after growing losses, was revived in early 1944 despite the horrific loss rate of nearly 50% in the months thereafter.
The regular training of new U-boat commanders stopped on 27 January 1945 owing to the advance of the Red Army along the Baltic Coast. With a single exception, no officer drafted into the U-boat arm after January 1944 was able to complete his commanding officer training.
In all, 114 KSL courses with almost 1,550 officers had been carried out. The growing absence of seagoing experience, often accompanied by a lack of basic technical or tactical skills, resulted in a steady process of de-professionalisation among U-boat commanders from mid-1943. During the last nine months of the Battle in the Atlantic, more than 50% of commanding officers sailing on their first patrol had no previous combat experience in U-boats whatsoever (see graphic 5). The rest had often served no more than a single patrol as U-boat watch officer. By 1945, the U-boat arm had drifted miles away from the pre-war elite, although that elite ethos still lived on among its members who stubbornly carried on until the bitter end.
New U-boat commanders faced almost insurmountable
problems on patrols under the prevailing conditions in the Atlantic of 1944/45. Unlike their Allied adversaries, the German U-boat arm had no refresher training schemes to update officers and crews in new offensive or defensive tactics based on information from intelligence or investigations on Allied tactics and weapons. In fact, German knowledge about Allied anti-submarine warfare in 1939-1945 was only ever superficial, manifesting an almost complete failure of the naval intelligence and advisory departments. U-boat commanders were therefore often helpless against new Allied techniques or tactics, and numerous advisory or warning radio signals from U-boat Command offered no substitute for proper information.
With numerical, technical and tactical advantages on the Allied side, the chances of success and survival were limited, even for experienced commanders. The German U-boat arm in 1945 still fought with boats technologically designed well before 1939. In 1945, many of these technologically outdated boats were destroyed in their first serious encounter with enemy forces during outbound transfer, or within the assigned operational area.
In the final months of the war, when the U-boat loss rate around Britain and in the Atlantic stood at well above 50%, the U-boat campaign took on an almost suicidal character (see graphic 7). No military unit can sustain such losses for a long period. U-boat Command already realised this development at the end of March 1945, but political fanatacism among the top command level prevented it from drawing the proper conclusions. Hence, only military defeat at land saved the remaining officers and crews of the U-boat arm from total extinction and useless killings.
Any wartime or post-war statements, suggesting that the new U-boat types designed and built at the end of the war might have changed the tide again, must all be seen as wishful and fanciful thinking in the light of the missing experience and lack of proper training for commanding officers and crews.