Panzer Taktik
In the first of a two-part series, Oberst a.d. Wolfgang Schneider examines the tactics which led to the often overwhelming battlefield successes of the German Panzer force, even when faced with superior technology and weight of numbers.
During the early phase of the Second World War, the German Army ruled the battlefield and repeatedly achieved success even though outnumbered. In terms of armour, however, and when looking at its technical performance alone, it was far from being a guarantor for battlefield effectiveness. Many historians have tried to analyse the reasons for this. Mostly, they have concluded that while Germany used armour on the point of main effort (the ‘Schwerpunkt’), its enemies followed outdated defensive tactics. In addition, German tanks, with radio communication equipment, could be used in a far more flexible and situationorientated manner.
A majority of analysts, however, fail to focus on decisive tactical and operational aspects, but concentrate instead on verbose examinations of debates held within the German military after the First World War, as well as on the memoirs of German Generals. Several of the latter are compositions of bended truths, personal boasting and grandstanding.
Another oft-repeated myth is that any officers who displayed progressive thinking were in a relentless struggle with the Heeresleitung, where old Generals indulged in outdated tactics. A further problem of many attempts to explain the effectiveness of armoured formations is that many analysts have no military experience or any understanding of internal procedures. Thus, they lack the professional insight necessary to evaluate tactical and operational results.
LEARNING FROM THE PAST
One noteworthy fact, and one which runs through the whole range of German military literature published after the First World War, is that warexperienced officers, with meticulous precision and in a result orientateed manner, set their minds on drawing lessons from the often painful operational experiences of the past with the goal of developing pioneering and new principles for the future. While the German Army remained sceptical about the value of the tank, even after the first major armoured offensives conducted by the Allies on the Western Front in 1917, this quickly changed from the following year. A résumé commonly shared in the community of German veterans, and those who continued to serve in the Reichswehr, was that Germany had slept through the technological progress and its obvious influence on modern mobile warfare. An early and very influential visionary was Ernst Volckheim, an experienced officer who had been in commanded of one of the few German A7V tanks
(No. 506, ‘Alter Fritz’). He had personally witnessed the effect that such a weapon system had on the battlefield, and he understood that these were areas of technological progress which Germany should not underestimate again. As early as 1922, in his pamphlets ‘Der Kampfwagen der Zukunft’ (The Combat Vehicle of the Future) he described the important role that armoured combat vehicles would play on the battlefield of the future, along with references to the ongoing vehicle modernisations in other countries. He did not, however, belong to the group that advocated an independent tank force operating autonomously from the infantry.
In his book ‘Der Kampfwagen in der heutigen Kriegsführung’ (The tank in modern warfare), Volckheim proposed the formation of light ‘Kampfwagen-bataillons’, and to distribute them among the infantry at company level. Heavy tank formations - as a kind of breakthrough weapon - were supposed to be deployed at a tactical level wherever the heaviest resistance was to be expected, and paired to the slow speed of the infantry. Had this concept been put into use, it would have resulted in significant problems as early as the Poland campaign in 1939. It was clear, however, as Walther Nehring put it:
‘...that the old attacking speed of the infantry, even under application of all available aid, can’t be essentially raised to a level which is sufficient to gain operational success.’
Germany, surrounded by powerful armies and always expecting further occupational events (like the Ruhr Crisis of 1923), felt compelled to raise a powerful army of a quality that would allow it to at least partially compensate its quantitative deficiencies. Clearly, an army like this needed advanced weapon systems.
Important future-orientated momentum was also applied by Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, the chief of the OHL, who personally encouraged the implementation of new operational tactics which were required to balance out the numeric deficiencies of the Reichswehr. On 1 September 1921, the regulation ‘Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen’ (Leadership and Battle with combined arms) had been published. While it did not specifically mention the operational use of tanks (which would have been forbidden, anyway), it addressed ‘mechanisation’ and ‘combined arms operations’.
Much more directly addressed were matters of training, during which larger scale manoeuvres with motorised formations were conducted, partially with requisitioned civilian vehicles. Later, tank-dummies based on the chassis of the BMW 3/15 Ps Dixi, were used. In 1927, now retired, von Seeckt stipulated that the new weapon system should form the basis of an entirely new service arm and that it should serve as a means of transportation for personnel, guns and other requirements of the army. In conclusion, he stated:
‘The tanks are growing into a specialised troop next to the infantry, cavalry and artillery.’
NEW TANK FORCE
In 1922, Heinz Guderian, then only a Hauptmann, was transferred into the ‘Inspektion der Verkehrstruppen/abteilung In 6’ from where he would quickly pave the way for a new Kampfwagentruppe, or tank force, by focussing intensively on the range and application of motorised troops.
In the winter of 1923/34, manoeuvres took place under the supervision of Oberstleutnant Walter von Brauchitsch with the aim of trialing possible collaborations between motorised troops and aircraft. Guderian had been entrusted
with the conception and execution of the Kriegsspiel (war game). Encouraged by a series of simulations and smaller field-exercises of the Kraftfahrtruppe, he expressed the expectation that transition from the supply troop into a combat troop could be expected. The personal opinion of his inspektor, Oberst von Natzmer, mentioned here for the sake of thoroughness, stood in stark contrast and in the lofty tradition of the cavalry:
‘To hell with the combat troop! You are supposed to transport flour!’
Unprogressive officers like him, however, did not prevail - even in the light of equipment initiatives of neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the Truppenführungsvorschrift (operational command regulation) H.DV 300, published on 17 October 1933, was still worded in a strictly infantry-centric manner:
‘...in a future war, the infantry will remain the main arm, and will be supported by other service branches with the goal to make it reach the enemy with an impetus and firepower sufficient to enable it to achieve a deep breakthrough and to break his resistance.’
In the Vorschrift (regulation) D76: ‘Panzerangriff im Rahmen einer Infanteriedivision’ (tank attack in conjunction with an infantry division) it was stated that tanks, used as tactical tools, would find use as: ‘...valuable reinforcement of the attacking power of an infantry division.’
The H.DV.89 regulation expressed it in an even less realistic manner, stating the main task of tanks was: ‘defence against enemy tanks’. Outdated views that, if they had become part of operational leadership, would have quickly ended the Second World World War for Germany. Other arms of service went to great efforts to raise their own motorised troops, socalled ‘Kavallerieschützen’ and ‘motorisierte Aufklärer’ in the cavalry and ‘motorisierte Infanterie’ in the infantry.
An early grouping of the cavalry and the new tank arm would have been appropriate and would have avoided unnecessary parallel developments. In the end, it would take
until 6 July 1939, before the two arms were combined into the so-called ‘schnelle Truppen’ (fast troops), and put under the command of Guderian.
TANKS CALL THE TUNE
From 1925, Germany began developing its own tank chassis and for reasons of secrecy these were given code names like ‘Großtraktor’, and even in the face of a multitude of opposition, the innovative approaches of Guderian and other proponents gained acceptance. In contrast to what is often incorrectly claimed in existing literature, General Ludwig Beck was among those to put things on the right track by demanding armoured support vehicles for the infantry and other service branches. It was a demand that would later be realised with the development of the legendary Sturmgeschütze (assault guns). Guderian later wrote:
‘If coupled with the infantry, the tank alone will never gain decisive importance. The study of war history, exercises in England, and our own experiences with our dummies, had corroborated my belief that tanks could only be enabled to achieve their highest performance when other service branches, on whose support they will always have to rely, can be brought on common ground in terms of their speed. In their formation, it is the tanks which have to call the tune. All others have to follow the tanks. One must not attach the tanks to infantry divisions, but raise Panzer-divisions, which contained the supporting arms on which the tanks relied to be effective!”
This was the lesson which would form the basis of German success on the battlefield up to the final years of the war.
Far from this strategic deliberation, it was now of utmost importance to set the right course on a tactical-operational level as well. This was fostered by the secret German-soviet cooperation in the Kama Tank School in Russia. From 1928, field-exercises took place here which allowed the testing of theoretical approaches on the ground. In Germany, it was still entirely impossible to trial the early tank prototypes - let alone field-test them in formation. The lessons from these field trials were summarised in 1936 by Guderian in his book ‘Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit den andern Waffen’:
‘The mass of tanks will functionally combine into Schlachtkörper (lit: combat bodies). In battle, the Panzertruppen have the task of bringing a decisive outcome by their combined and sudden deployment. They incorporate firepower with mobility and armour protection. As such, they form a specialised offensive arm which differs from the other terrestrial arms in that it fights on the move’.
In his book ‘Kampfwagen an die Front’ (1935), General Walther Nehring concluded that for the duration of a war:
‘...all forms of armoured fighting vehicles will play the dominant role, as an organic component of the infantry and a supply vehicle on the battlefield, and most of all in the form of armoured formations as an autonomously operating main arm’.
On 1 November 1933, the first German armoured training formation was raised in Zossen under the codename ‘Kraftfahrlehrkommando’ (motor vehicle training command). Within a few months, more company sized formations were formed which were soon combined into Abteilungs -a regimental - (US: battalion sized) sized formation. During the army’s rapid expansion after 1935, all these lessons paid off. The new Panzertruppe could be grown from within. There was no need - as with other nations – to raise formations using new and untrained leadership personnel. In Germany, this principle was known as ‘Kalben’ (‘calving’).
QUANTITY OVER QUALITY
One frequently encountered legend is that the birth of the Panzerwaffe in this particular form can be ascribed to Adolf Hitler. Certainly, the NSDAP’S seizure of power in 1933, and the immediate annulment of the Treaty of Versailles, facilitated the expansion of the Army. Hitler himself, however, was busy consolidating his position and in 1934 he issued orders
to create the new German Wehrmacht by reintroducing compulsory military service and with full support of Germany’s armament industry. The industry - and German High Command - stood under enormous pressure which, among other things, resulted in prioritising quantity over quality and to quickly deliver the means of training.
As a direct result, large numbers of Panzer I and II were produced, which - even at that time - were not ideally suited for combat use. The construction of large numbers of these models allowed for propaganda shows with great public appeal, but greatly reduced the production capacity for the much stronger Panzer III and IV models - all of which led to a technological deficit within the early German Panzertruppe.
The great public reveal (also, in the eyes of the world), and the importance of the new Panzertruppe itself, was manifested with the creation of three capital formations: the 1., 2. and 3. Panzerdivision. These had strong infantry components (partially motorised / lorries), drawn artillery and with two full tank regiments at their core. The creation of troop formations is one thing, but crucial - next to technical equipment - is an operational doctrine. And with that, one can start to find an answer as to why German tank formations during the war were significantly more effective in the face of numerically and sometimes technically superior enemy forces. Several things need to be taken into consideration.
Limitations on the size of the Reichswehr to 100,000 men, and with prohibition of compulsory military service, were surely, at first sight, drastically restrictive. The fact was that ‘only’ long-serving personnel of all ranks (12 years and more) had had the advantage of a level of training and individual qualification which was incredibly high. When limitations were removed, many enlisted men could, without delay, be employed as NCOS. This greatly aided the growth of formations, and even in newly raised units the personnel core was fully trained. The only thing lacking was training above company level, but that problem could be sorted within weeks because operational principles did not essentially differ.
Usually, newly raised troop formations take a long time to become operational. The density of the Reichswehr’s rank structure, and accompanying higher qualifications, meant that training orders with operational relevance (as well as routine tasks) did not require detailed and elaborate written reports. In training and in combat, assignments were concentrated into essential information while conventional instructions were unnecessary as everyone already knew the basics. A subordinate was then free to execute mission assignments within given parameters, but in the way he saw fit and without having to constantly ask or wait for orders. It could be said that the professional quality of leaders, as well as their own aspirations, were both high. This in turn put far greater demand on leadership recruits. In other armies, such recruits were used to receiving highly detailed orders, were not encouraged to show personal initiative and were even stopped from doing so. In Germany, this leadership philosophy is known as Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) in contrast to what were Befehlstaktik (order tactics). Another important aspect was to foster and grow a corps spirit by sending recruits and trainee NCOS - and young officers
where possible - into the same units. This forged a close bond of comradeship and greatly strengthened self-confidence, allowing recruits to deal more quickly with the peculiarities of ‘complicated’ superiors etc. There was no need for timeconsuming familiarisation.
AUTONOMOUS ACTION
Training courses focussed on passing on the knowledge relevant to fulfil required tactical tasks, and on imparting leadership know-how. Officers were not trained in academies with elitist academic aspirations which were far removed from their troops, but had ‘on-the-job’ training, focussed on future tasks and on the current and next level of command. An accurate analysis of this can be found in Dr. Martin van Creveld’s comparative study: ‘Fighting Power’.
If one compares German training methods with that of other nations (past and present) one cannot fail to realise that the latter use standardised and drill-like methods with rigid guidelines on everything from organisation to movement and combat. Another great disadvantage for those armies was that leaders at all levels were forced to permanently issue instructions and individual commands, to give approval and so on - a fact which had an adverse effect on individual initiative of subordinate commanders, platoon leaders etc. Especially so when they were reprimanded for acting autonomously. The effectiveness of this concept can be seen by looking into a German tank during combat.
The Panzer Richtschütze (gunner) seeks out targets autonomously, immediately fixes them in his sights before giving a short report such as: ‘Armoured personnel carrier!’. On his own accord, the loader choses the correct type of ammunition and declares: ‘Loaded!’. The Panzer commander only interferes if - for example - he has identified a more immediate threat or if he doesn’t want to betray his current position. Acting in such a manner results in a far higher speed of action than constant issuing of and waiting for orders, especially when it is all about split-second decision making.
In the German Army, subordinate commanders were and are not pestered by wordy and highly-detailed orders. When a platoon leader with his five tanks is tasked to ‘secure the right flank of the company’, he and all his tank commanders know where they have to focus their attention and the Zugführer will only allocate a route or position changes if necessary. In the same way, the company commander can fully focus on his own individual task without having to micromanage subordinate commanders.
Key to achieving this is, of course, mastery of the weapon system. In addition, the phases of mindless, individual drill have to be kept low as the core focus has to be training as a team. In the Panzertruppe, all crew members learn to do the job of the others, basic driving skills included, and so positions can be changed if required. Only tasks which require speed and confidence of action are drilled. On lowtier training levels (single tank/platoon), the training focuses on the correct use of terrain and the avoidance of mistakes such as the neglect of camouflage, cover etc. If all platoon leaders and tank commanders have mastered this, then they are able to fulfill autonomous tasks in the appropriate manner.
Platoon or company commanders with mastery of the principles of ‘fire and movement’- with mutual surveillance - will be able to apply these principles on a higher level. German leaders-to-be were and are trained in a manner allowing them to familiarise themselves with the command level above their own. This ensures that overarching
requirements are known to them, and this increases efficiency and speeds-up the issuing and fulfillment of orders.
Great store was laid on the bonding of unit personnel and individual crews.
ANNIHILATION OF THE ENEMY
In so-called ‘Geländebesprechung ohne Großgerät’ (terrain reviews without large equipment), combat tasks and order execution were calmly discussed in an environment where making errors was explicitly ‘allowed’, and where young aspirants get first-hand support from their mentors. Centralised career courses were reduced to an absolute minimum, while the vast majority of training was conducted in a company framework where officers received supplementary training at battalion level. Trained like this, leaders act correctly even in larger attacking formations.
To ensure the desired striking power and effect, certain tactical operational principles were required which - more than the quality of the technical equipment - would prove to be decisive. If one takes a look into German regulations of the period, however, it is found that there are hardly any detailed instructions. There were clear specifications on ‘what’ had to be done, but there are no prescribed ways on ‘how’ to achieve it. As a result, a plethora of so-called ‘Ausbildungshinweise’ (training advices and regulations) of varying qualities were published, while training units composed their own ‘wrong and right’ sketchbooks and booklets to teach recruits basic principles; this was such as how and in which formation a platoon, company or Abteilung could make best use of the terrain and how to advance (in ‘wedge’ or ‘inverted wedge’ formation for example. These were, of course, only methodical aids for recruit crews and did little in terms of tactical schooling.
An essential key to German battlefield success - no matter at which tactical level - was that in addition to demanding autonomy and creative will, all troops had it hammered into them that one must never lose the initiative or abandon principles of brutal concentration of force. These two principles allowed German troops to destroy or repel even superior enemy forces acting in a more rigid and cautious manner. If the first blow is annihilating, it doesn’t need a second one.
This preference, which specifies that it is not about the seizure and defence of terrain, but primarily about the annihilation of the enemy and to seek a decision by encircling or flanking, was a decisive premise for the successful conduct of operations. If the coherent order of an enemy is destroyed, he will not be able to strike back efficiently. Once outflanked, remains of enemy troops are easier to control, they cannot be resupplied easily and are mostly unable to initiate coherent countermeasures.
POWER OF ATTACK
In more static, safeguarding and defensive actions, an ultimate tank advantage can only be sought out in the initial engagement phase when it lets the enemy run aground and unexpectedly opens fire. The longer this engagement lasts, the more chances arise for the enemy. With the first shot being fired, a tank betrays its position. Room for movement is usually towards the rear, while the enemy in turn thrusts forward and takes the initiative. With this, the enemy owns all possible ways to act. He decides the disposition of his forces and the point and time of attack.
As a consequence, it can be concluded that, for a tank, rugged defence of a section of terrain can only be a prerequisite for a following movement orientated engagement. An enemy running into an ambush in a defensive position often loses only a few leading tanks, and after withdrawing quickly has a good knowledge about the disposition of the other side. In this phase, he can deploy all his combat and aerial support without delay so as to pin his foe down, and (if not annihilating him), to at least stop him from taking evasive measures before swinging the decisive flanking blow. Thus, it is a matter of principle that after the first shots have been exchanged, the law of action always passes to the more aggressively acting side. A battle is nearly always decided in an attack, the defence is often not more than preparation, and is hardly ever more than that.
This aggressive deployment of tanks is mirrored in German leadership regulations. H.DV.470/7 ‘Die mittlere Panzerkompanie’ (‘the medium tank company’ - which was also applicable to Tiger formations) where only the attack and no other types of combat are mentioned. In: H.DV.470/10 ‘Panzerregiment und Panzerabteilung’, a very short section is dedicated to defence, and only to emphasise the need to counter-attack the enemy.
But that alone was not sufficient. It is decisive to correctly commit one’s forces, and up to the end of the 1920s German military leaders quarreled over various concepts of deployment and to clarify the methods with which to break a superior enemy force fighting in a more rigid and terrain-focussed manner. In other countries, the rule was a sectoral commitment of force. In depth, rigidly linked to major supporting infantry formations and, in width, a linear orientation in an order of strictly defined release and phase lines. This was - in many cases - a quite mindless act, as changing terrain characteristics were often inadequately taken into account. Rigid operational targets often led to some spectacular failures of Soviet mass attacks and also resulted in the meagre offensive speed of Allied troops in the West during 1944 and 1945. Aggressiveness was a major key to German success; attacking troops focussing on only segments of terrain advantageous to further the conduct of operations and destruction of the enemy in the Schwerpunkt, or point of main effort.
Focussing on a general seizure of terrain, and on annihilation of all enemy forces, would have rendered impossible any extensive attacks into the core of the foe. An outflanked and by-passed foe doesn’t usually pose a threat to one’s own forces, especially if without options to withdraw and without having access to strong reserves for counter-attack.
The core of German planning on an operational level was the definition of objectives and so-called ‘intermediate’ objectives. The latter were usually allocated to specific units and were an effective means of flexibly planning movement after having broken through the first enemy defensive lines or areas. It is decisive that - as a rule - the paths towards an objective were not rigidly ordered or defined and with only the desired times and orders of arrival being set.
CATERPILLAR AND LEAPFROG
When planning attacking operations, one can mostly only reliably plan for the first engagement phases, the approach and the breakthrough of the furthermost enemy forces.
This is due to the fact that an enemy will react to an attack, or because unforeseen occurrences arise which benefit future conduct of operations. The German side achieved this essentially flexible operational conduct by abandoning rigid guidelines. Only one line was defined: the so-called ‘Ablauflinie’, the line of departure, which guaranteed all forces deployed at the front at the time of attack were able to plan their approach routes accordingly and avoid frittered commitment of forces. It was crucial that as a matter of principle no rigid paths to reach those operational objectives were defined, only the desired order and time of arrival.
With consideration of varying terrain, it was the unit leader (battalion/regiment) who was solely responsible to indicate waypoints and routes to the units under his command. At a lower level, commanders were issued with so-called direction points, often distinctive and visible on the horizon with the naked eye. Tactical leaders knew that constant and preferably fast movement was the key to success. A hesitant advance aided enemy target reconnaissance, and remaining in position in open ground (known as ‘Scheibestehen’ - lit: ‘standing target’) was to be avoided. The ‘raupenartiges Vorgehen’, or ‘caterpillar style’ of advance (where some tanks remain stationary to protect the advance of the others), used during the early stages of the war was soon dropped due to increased casualties in favour of the socalled ‘überschlagender’ (leapfrog) advance, with constant movement and mutual overtaking if necessary.
Each leader always expected to receive new directional input or new objectives via the radio and, more importantly, were encouraged to make corresponding suggestions themselves because only they had direct enemy contact and could thus recognise beneficial situational developments. It was this flexible operational use of terrain, and the exploitation of beneficial situations, which from 1941, and thanks to widely present operational experience, was perfectly mastered on all levels. And it was the key to the success of the Panzerwaffe on all fronts.
A brief and concise summary of the essential leadership principles for tanks, found in H.DV.470/10 regulation, ‘Richtlinien für die Führung und Kampf des PanzerRegiments und der Panzer-abteilung’, ultimately formed the basis of the tactical superiority of German tank formations in the Second World War:
‘The leadership of an armoured formation has to be bold and flexible. Commanders carry their troops along to victory by personal example. Careful terrain and map study has to precede every operation. Aerial photographs can offer valuable indications for assessment of the terrain of attack. Surprise of the enemy has to be ensured by permanent, meticulous camouflage and by speed of movement. The forces have to be kept together for coherent, simultaneous deployment. Any kind of split-up has to be avoided.’
The last sentence was the final key to success - a bold concentration of force and the uncompromising drive to achieve a breakthrough at the decisive location.
One has to also understand that leadership in battle is ‘organised’ chaos. In the face of the enemy, and one’s own casualties, in adverse weather conditions, hearing desperate shouts over the radio and occassional situational unawareness, a leader has to force himself to maintain an overview and keep calm. If he fails to do so, he effectively abandons his troops. This kind of cold-bloodedness cannot be acquired by training alone, nor can it be expected from everybody or in every situation. To achieve it, it is essential that soldiers at all levels are trained to the highest possible standard, allowing them to act with a high degree of dependability.
Leaders had to learn how to phrase reports and orders and keep the information flow short, precise and to the point. What at first might seem constricting and formulaic, actually creates security in action in a situation defined by fear and stress. Radio messages - just like commands for movement and fire - were (and are still) relayed in the same scheme:
1. Enemy (location and direction)
2. Own situation/decision
3. Execution/follow-up actions/requests Leaders on all levels, firmly acquainted with this system, used it effectively in combat and avoided running into the danger of becoming verbose or to forget important information. Thus, it was ensured that there was ample time for the actual leadership process, for permanent situational evaluation and implementation of correct resolutions.
ROUGH START IN POLAND
Hitler’s rash decision to wage war against Poland issued a great challenge to the Panzertruppe (and the Wehrmacht in general), as it was still under development. Their use during the Spanish Civil War had already clearly shown the Panzerkampfwagen I and II to be unsuited for use on the modern battlefield. They did, however, form the mass of armoured vehicles at the time and comprised 77% of the armoured strength in September 1939. Only 89 Panzer III and 211 Panzer IV were available, and the few Panzer 35 (t) and Panzer 38 (t) (219 and 59 respectively) were requisitioned in Czechoslovakia and did not substantially change the general problem.
Essentially formed into three attack wedges, six German Panzer Divisions, four light, four motorised divisions (plus 40 infantry divisions) attacked from Silesia centrally into the direction of the Vistula, in the north in the so-called ‘Polish Corridor’, and from Slovakia in the south. It was decisive that the Luftwaffe managed to gain aerial superiority in a very short time, allowing it to effectively stall Polish counterattacks and cut reinforcement routes.
On the Polish side, German forces faced 30 infantry divisions, 11 cavalry brigades, two motorised and a single armoured brigade. Even though attacking Panzer formations usually prevailed on a tactical level, the outdated Panzer Is suffered tangible losses. Leadership superiority could not on their own make up for deficiencies in equipment. The fact that Poland was defeated came down to two strategic aspects: even though they declared war on 3 September, there was no effective support from Britain or France, and, on the other hand, the Red Army marched into Eastern Poland 17 days later.
Many important lessons were learned during the campaign, mainly relating to organisation and equipment. However, as a direct result of those lessons the weak light divisions were reformed into Panzer divisions, while the construction of the more powerful Panzer III and IV types was accelerated.
Another decision, made after the campaign, was that the Panzer divisions would no longer have two subordinated Panzer regiments, but only one.
Continued in the next issue of Iron Cross magazine.
Although there is no room here for a more detailed analysis of German tank tactics, it is described in-depth in the authors work ‘Panzer Tactics’ a new edition of which will be available in November 2020. Publisher: Stackpole Books. ISBN: 978-0811739306