AN IRON ROOF

The value of Germany’s Flak defences during the Second World War is often underestimated or largely overlooked in the narrative of the European air war. Marc Garlasco re-evaluates the role of the Flakartillerie.

German Flak defences of the Reich proved formidable for the combined forces of RAF and USAAF aircraft and crews, upon whom the gunners exacted a terrible toll. Marc Garlasco tells how the Flakartillerie fought with determination until the final moments of the war.

The historiography of the air war of the Second World War in Europe is dominated by aerial combat, the pilots and aircraft taking centre stage. The focus has often been on ‘aces’ who engaged in air combat, the strategists who crafted the Allied bombing campaign and the men who endured long frozen treks at high altitude to drop bombs on the Reich. In that narrative, the effectiveness of the Flak artillery has largely been lost. The Flak arm’s perceived reputation spanning a spectrum ranging from: ‘… at best inconsequential’ to: ‘…at worst a massive drag on resources with little benefit’.

These popular myths ignore the fact that more aircraft were shot down by Flak than fighters, though even this metric fails to account for the contribution of anti-aircraft artillery to the defence of Germany.

German air defences shifted greatly through the war as lessons were learned, enemy tactics improved, and shortages forced dramatic changes in

the Flakwaffe. Early in the war, Flak was split between tactical and strategic applications, with little systematic integration to provide adequate defence. This shifted in response to roundthe-clock bombing of the homeland as Germany developed the world’s most formidable air defence network, comprising Flak cannons, searchlights, sound detectors, smoke generators, barrage balloons, and a radar early warning system. Working in tandem with the fighter force, the Flakartillerie fought to defend the homeland from aerial destruction.

The benefits of the Flak defences were so many they are difficult to quantify. While the metric of aircraft destroyed is useful to consider, there were many other effects Flak had on the air war. And they are harder to measure.

DEADLY COMBAT

German anti-aircraft doctrine stressed the joint role of ground-based defences and the fighter force - coordination of the two showing the true strength of Germany’s air defence system. Many bombers dropped out of their massed defensive streams due to damage from anti-aircraft fire. Though not destroyed, they tried to limp home - many falling to fighters going for an easy kill. There are no numbers for joint kills, but anecdotal evidence points to substantial losses of Flak-damaged aircraft to the Jagdgeschwadern.

The most significant effects of Flak were not destroyed aircraft, however, but effects on bombing accuracy; as altitude increased to avoid Flak, so bombing inaccuracy increased. Accuracy was also impacted by evasive manoeuvres; with bombers needing to fly straight and level to ensure their bombs hit home. Any deviation could send bombs wildly off-target. Some pilots tried to swerve out of the way of Flak or dropped their bombs early to avoid it. Curtis Lemay complained,

‘Too many times, the command pilot, who is supposed to lead a mission, is the one who causes it to fail. Every time he sees a burst of Flak, he takes the wheel and swerves his plane. That causes trouble for the whole group.’

In fact, a study showed evasive maneuvers resulted in only 48% of bombs falling within three miles of the aim point. Some pilots suffered posttraumatic stress disorder brought on by the fear of flying in Flak but were dubbed ‘Flak Happy.’

The terrible mental toll was an effect

of an uncertain fate; even if aircraft returned safely, crews could be injured or killed by shell splinters. And damage from Flak was extensive, with some 20% of all Eighth Air Force bombers taking damage. These bombers had to be repaired, necessitating operational delays, and tying up manpower overhauling aircraft. The logistical need to support bomber repairs thus caused massive personnel, materiel, and time wastage. But Flak was more than just guns, and associated support units also contributed. For example, a study by the Operational Research Section of RAF Bomber Command found searchlights increased the numbers of bombers hit by Flak by 50%. Smoke generators obscured target areas, and bombers had to account for barrage balloons - again pushing aircraft ever higher and reducing further their efficacy.

The majority of Flakartillerie, in the end, was engaged in deadly combat on all fronts and the success of Flak was impressive. If we judge only those aircraft shot down, the record is remarkable. If we factor in bombers that had to turn back because of damage, or those that dropped their bombs early because of fear, or reduced accuracy because of the altitude necessary to avoid Flak, we see

I saw ‘planes taking direct hits from Flak, igniting all their fuel tanks aboard, propellers flying off from engines, spinning wildly through the 12-plane formation, again.” aircraft dropping never to be heard from (Captain Horace D (Chris) Chriesman, 323rd Bomb Group, 453rd Bomb Squadron, Eighth Air Force)

the true tally was extraordinary.

From July 1942-April 1945, Flak destroyed 1,345 RAF aircraft, or 41% of all losses due to enemy fire and it was responsible for 56% of USAAF losses to enemy fire in Europe. In the east, the Soviets lost 17,000 aircraft to Flak. On top of that, countless armoured vehicles from Africa to Russia and to France were destroyed by the venerable 88s. Everywhere, though, the Wehrmacht was stretched too thin, and the fighter force ultimately collapsed. As the war dragged on, all-too-often the Flak was the only defence German citizens could count on.

FIRST TO FALL

On 12 November 1870, two balloons lifted off from Paris carrying men, mail, photographic equipment, and pigeons intended to improve communication links with the besieged city. They flew high over Prussian lines, well out of range of infantry weapons. But these balloons would soon meet a historic fate.

German anti-aircraft artillery scored its first kill when the French balloon ‘Daguerre’ was shot down by the first purpose-made anti-aircraft gun - a 37mm Ballonabwehrkanone (balloon defence canon) designed by Krupp and mounted on a wheeled carriage. The pilot, Sylvain Jubert, and his passenger, Ernest Nobecourt, were both captured. Its sister ship, ‘Niepce’, was also hit and made an emergency landing.

The crew and passengers survived but their mission scuttled because their equipment was destroyed. Although the Prussian gunners didn’t know it, their small victory showed the efficacy of purpose-built ground-based air defences. Then, after the turn of the century, with the advent of aircraft, militaries began experimenting with ways to defend against them.

The first aircraft downed in warfare by groundfire was during the Italo-turkish war when Italian Lt. Piero Manzini was shot down by rifle fire on 25 August 1912. However, it was a German aircraft with the distinction of the first machine shot down by anti-aircraft artillery, with Serbian gunner, Rodoje Ljutovac, destroying a German machine on 30 September 1915, at Kragujevac, Serbia. Serbian soldiers opened fire on three German aircraft as they dropped bombs, but machine guns were ineffective. Ljutovac pressed a converted canon into service, scored a direct hit, brought down the aircraft and killed its pilot, Hauptmann Von Scheffe, and his gunner Oton Kris. These isolated incidents hinted at potential for development of ground-based air defences.

In 1914, Germany fielded eighteen Krupp M1914 77mm anti-aircraft guns. These tactical assets grew in importance as the use of aircraft expanded, the nascent German Flak defences fielding 2,558 guns in 1918. Strategic thinking on how to apply ground-based air defences continued to evolve, though the foundation for Flak employment was set earlier than one might think.

Germany’s core values for air defence were conceived in a Prussian War Ministry report of 1914, calling for an air defence network centred on critical sites. Germany thus laid out its air defence doctrine. Little would change in core precepts throughout both wars. What did change was the importance Flak would have in the German military. Beyond the increase in the number of guns was their success rate, with the German Flak arm improving steadily, shooting down 322 Allied aircraft in 1916, 467 in 1917, and 748 in 1918. This was due to many factors, one being there were simply more targets to hit. But there had also been improvements in ammunition, fuzes, and the formation of a professional anti-aircraft force.

However, the war ground Flak down in 1918, as would the next war, thereby creating strong parallels that should have led to lessons being learned. The aircraft of the time were slow and low flying, which aided ground-based defences greatly. But aircraft would fly higher and faster as the war went on, and also used nighttime to mask their approach. Flak had become dependent on visual observation, and unless things changed,

then it would never catch up with advances in aviation. And there were constant battles as to which should be primary defenders: aircraft or Flak?

THE FLAK ‘ELITE’

In 1930, Oberstleutnant Günther Rüdel assumed command of the anti-aircraft training staff in the Reichswehr. Proving a visionary, he shaped the Flak arm for the next decade and rose to Generaloberst and Inspekteur der Flakartillerie. He realised that aircraft were rapidly advancing in capabilities – primarily, speed and altitude. Additionally, he understood that Flak would need to engage aircraft at night or above clouds, making visual detection and targeting impossible. Finally, he recognised that armoured aircraft would be more difficult to destroy, necessitating better ammunition.

Eventually, aircraft would outpace capabilities of ground-based air defences and Rüdel called for development of improved guns, improved fire control systems (including gun-laying radar) and munitions with improved fuzes. Though Germany never fielded a proximity fuze like the Allies, improvements in pre-fragmented shells greatly enhanced lethality.

Muzzle velocity was key to hitting targets flying high and fast, and his vision led to the eventual introduction of improvements to the 88mm weapons guns based on First World War designs. These improvements significantly upgraded velocity, and the altitude at which aircraft could be engaged increased to over 31,000 feet. More than enough to hit bombers. He also introduced the 105mm and 25-ton 128 mm, arguably the most capable antiaircraft gun of the war. These massive weapons could only be placed on static mounts, such as Flak towers in Berlin, Hamburg, and Vienna, or on rail cars to provide mobile strategic reserves.

Rüdel emphasised mobility, harking back to his army career, and rail Flak (Eisenbahn Flak) became the ‘elite’. He identified the need for developing methods of tracking and engaging aircraft at night and in cloud, and the Luftwaffe tested radar and infrared tracking systems. The Kommandogerät 36/40 were predictors used early in the war to calculate predicted paths of aircraft. Deadly during daylight, they had minimal use when bombers were invisible. Germany followed with the Würzburg gun-laying radar in 1941, providing an all-weather day/night firing solution. Passive defences (eg barrage balloons) were also part of the plan for the enlarging forces. But the first battle for the new pre-war Flakwaffe was a bureaucratic one.

Flak had been controlled by the army until the early 1930s, partly to mask the growing size of the force in the face of the Versailles Treaty, and partly because it trained artillery personnel to rapidly expand the force. However, soon after the Nazi party took control there was a push to move all air defences under the Luftwaffe. On 1 April 1935, the Flak arm was officially transferred to Luftwaffe control, there being no doubt that it would be the heart of German air defence. Luftwaffe Regulation 16 set this role down on paper:

‘From the start of the conflict, the air forces bring the war to the enemy, while the anti-aircraft artillery directly protects the homeland. The primary mission of the anti-aircraft artillery is the defence of the homeland in coordination with the fighter force.’

The regulation further spelt out the critical support of fighters; the planned focus on home defence would serve as a wake-up call to the army as the doctrinal role for Flak was strategic home defence, leaving ground forces no cover from tactical air. It comes as no surprise that in 1936 the army general staff recommended the formation of a substantial defensive tactical Flak force. The Luftwaffe had won the battle for bureaucratic control, but created a schism leading to two separate Flak forces and even two separate Flak badges worn by the crews: one with an army eagle and the other bearing the Luftwaffe eagle.

The Heer (army) developed their own anti-aircraft units to support infantry and armour, using heavy and light guns that would be pressed into service as direct fire weapons on the ground. Early army Flak units were simply part of the infantry, only later was an army Flak organisation created. The two roles of the Flak (tactical ground support and strategic air defence) even led to the creation of different decorations for Flak gunners in anti-air and anti-ground roles. Many gun crews wore both.

The newly modernised Luftwaffe Flak forces were baptised in combat in Spain in 1936. During the war, the Flak was used primarily in ground support as artillery, but successfully engaged Nationalist aircraft, destroyed 59 aircraft. Hajo Hermann, who later led the night fighting ‘Wild Boars’, was liaison between the Luftwaffe Flak and the Spanish due to his linguistic skills. Hermann later helped integrate night fighters and Flak during the Second World War.

The success in Spain led to massive investment, and by 1939 the Luftwaffe Flak arm fielded 100,000 men.

GERMANY’S ACHILLES HEEL

Flak soldiers were initially highly trained, attending school for six to eight weeks. Officer cadets attending Luftkriegsschule (Air War School) were required to master every position on the Flak gun and crews were trained in target acquisition, ballistics, command and control, detection, and creation of firing solutions – all against aircraft moving in three dimensions.

There were three dedicated schools where skills were taught to the Flakartillerie and particularly bright candidates were sent to radar school in either Berlin or Dresden to learn how to operate the early warning system critical

to Germany’s defence. These men were largely spared from service in ground forces later in the war due to their skill sets.

The rail Flak gave the Germans a strategic reserve they could send to defend critical areas and received the best guns, including the 128mm which was considered the most effective antiaircraft gun of the war. The war was of relatively low intensity for Flak crews in the early years, with the first 1,000 bomber raid not coming until Operation Millennium, RAF Bomber Command’s raid on Cologne of 30/31 May 1942. The advent of the bomber stream in 1942 put great stress on German defenders, with Hitler demanding massive investment in the Flakwaffe. But the stresses of war were also severely impacting the Flakartillerie.

As early as 1942, the strains of a multifront war were apparent - most notably in personnel. With the war stalled in North Africa and Russia, the Wehrmacht was in dire need of men. Flak batteries were manpower intensive, requiring 179 to man a light motorised battery and 143 for heavy motorised batteries.

Adapting to this, the Flak began to focus on static sites, thus saving personnel who could be used elsewhere. But even these measures could not keep up with demands for personnel. In response, in 1942, the Luftwaffe began a programme of replacing men of fighting age manning anti-aircraft units in Germany as Göring created the Heimatflakbatterien, or Home Guard Flak batteries.

Flak defences, bled dry as men were shifted to ground forces, were now replaced by aged factory workers, the wounded, women, and even children. Faced with war on multiple fronts, it was more than could be borne. Everywhere, the Wehrmacht was stretched thin, and the fighter force ultimately collapsed.

These units used mostly old or captured guns with personnel required to work as normal but prepared to defend against bomber attacks as others in the factory took shelter. This early crack in defences showed Germany’s Achilles heel: they could build more guns, but who would man them? There was a massive investment in more guns in response to Bomber Command strikes on Germany, but as the number of batteries rose by 65% between 1942 and 1943, the strain on personnel increased.

CHILDREN OF THE FLAK ARM

As the bombing campaign intensified in 1943, postal employees were mobilised to join the Heimatflak, and POWS were pressed into service to provide physical labour support. Needless to say, these were not the highly trained men who started the war, and while these men allowed able-bodied personnel to be transferred to other units, they reduced combat effectiveness of these defences. This shift of well-trained, qualified men from the Flak continued throughout the war. Unfortunately, the transfer of men also diluted ground forces as those transferred to Luftwaffe ground units received minimal, sub-par training and equipment. They also took massive casualties.

On 22 January 1943, the Luftwaffenhelfer (HJ), commonly referred to as Flakhelfer, were created by the order of the Kriegshilfseinsatz der Jugend bei der Luftwaffe (Auxiliary War Deployment of Youth to the Luftwaffe). Fighting on multiple fronts had stretched the Luftwaffe to breaking point, and the order called for drafting males born in 1926 and 1927 into a military corps, supervised by the Luftwaffe and Hitler Youth. Eventually, this draft extended to those born in 1929. Thus, Germany turned to child soldiers with children as young as 16 manning the guns.

These youths continued a limited education programme and political indoctrination and undertook military duties. The children of the Flak batteries were thus active participants in the war, taking the same risks as the men in Flak units inside Germany. Along with the risk of death from aerial bombardment came rewards, modest as they were. The Flakhelfer were authorized to receive military awards (including the Flak Badge) and sometimes received decorations for personal bravery such as the War Merit Cross.

Flakhelfer manned all elements of the batteries under supervision of Luftwaffe veterans, too old or infirm to participate in frontline duties and only serving on batteries within German borders. As the war dragged on, these children faced more intense bombardment. Nor was serving in anti-aircraft support a

Flak defences, bled dry as men were shifted to ground forces, were replaced by aged factory workers, children.” the wounded, women, and even

a guarantee against seeing frontline service. Many eventually served on the front lines as they matured, transferring into Luftwaffe, Heer, or Waffen-ss units.

WOMEN OF THE FLAK ARM

The combined bomber offensive began in 1943 with round-the-clock bombing of Germany, and saw the USAAF bombing by day, Bomber Command by night. Allied losses were extreme, with the life expectancy of an Allied bomber crew member in 1943 only 40%. The Luftwaffe was then still an effective fighting force, with German fighters swarming undefended bombers and working in concert with Flak. On the ground, Germany was haemorrhaging.

With the loss of thousands in North Africa and Stalingrad, there was ever increasing demand for able-bodied fighting men. The Wehrmacht would continue to bleed the Flak, and so the Luftwaffe now turned to the Rei char be its di en st( RAD ), or Reich Labour Service, to replace crews sent to the front. The RAD was an organisation requiring compulsory labour of young

men for six months prior to military service. Over 400 Flak batteries were created with over 60,000 RAD men seeing combat. This time, the personnel shift was more effective - a UK study calling RAD batteries: “…one of the more successful Flak personnel experiments.” 1944, though, saw a massive shift.

The Luftwaffe was effectively defeated over the skies of Germany by February 1944 as ‘Big Week’ concentrated bombers and long-range fighters against Luftwaffe fighters and targeted factories and airfields. Now that Allied escort fighters were able to reach the Reich, the Luftwaffe fighter arm collapsed, giving the Allies air superiority. In the spring of 1944, Flak was the sole line of defence against air raids and for the first time scored more kills than fighters. The defence of Germany from the air now depended almost totally on Flak.

Training was cut in half, and while this allowed new recruits to man the guns sooner, they were less skilled, and effectiveness suffered. With the invasion of Normandy, and fighting in the west, the Luftwaffe lost most of its early warning radars as Canadian and British forces charged through the Netherlands and Belgium, further complicating the air defence picture. Still, Flak was impressively effective with 2/3 of all RAF bombers lost over Germany in the summer of 1944 brought down by Flak. Nearly 13,000 bombers were damaged. This is largely attributed to dramatic increases in heavy guns. In 1939, the Luftwaffe fielded over 2,600 heavy Flak guns. (In 1944 they had 13,500 heavy guns – comprising 88mm, 105mm, & 128mm)

However, Germany faced further massive losses in 1944, on both fronts, with hundreds of thousands killed or captured. The manpower shortage was so acute that Germany now turned to women, mobilising the Flakhelferin, or female Flak helpers. Britain and the United States employed women much earlier than Germany in combat

In the spring of 1944, Flak was the sole line of defence against air raids and for the first time scored more kills than fighters. The defence of Germany from Flak.” the air now depended almost totally on

support services, and in the Soviet Union women were engaged in frontline combat from day one, but in Germany, women were first relegated to work supporting medical units and eventually weapon production. But Germany had an antiquated vision of women – a vision represented by the awarding of the ‘Mother’s Cross’ to women giving birth to children of the Reich. The role of women in Germany could not be clearer: they were supposed to raise families, not arms. This vision was changed by the reality of total war as it sucked men away from support roles, plunging women into work they would never have been seen as suitable for. Jobs in communications and early warning in occupied Europe began to open-up to women, releasing men to combat arms. It was only a matter of time before women joined the Flak.

In March 1944, a female Flak office was created and that spring over 11,000 women were serving in air defence in some capacity. Far from helpers, these women were involved in direct combat against enemy forces. The addition of women to the Flak allowed the Wehrmacht to continue to draw men from defensive Flak positions throughout greater Germany to frontline service. Women operated early-warning devices such as sound locators, rangefinders, searchlight batteries, and even the guns. The one limit on women’s service was that they could only serve within the borders of Germany, but this did little to protect them, with the women facing 24-hour air assault.

By 1945, all searchlight batteries in Germany were crewed by females and 50 Flak gun batteries were 100% female. Women were finally recognised for their sacrifices and front-line service on 6 January 1945, the Luftwaffe allowing women to receive the Flak Badge. This was the only war badge ever authorised for bestowal to females. Although no evidence has surfaced of a woman earning the Flak Badge, the mere fact women were recognised as combatants on a par with male counterparts was revolutionary.

GERMANY’S SOLE DEFENDERS

Germany was pummeled from the air in 1944, with almost 1,000,000 tons of explosives dropped on it. This dwarfed all other years; 1943 saw just over 200,000 tons dropped on Germany for example. With the fighter force in disarray, the Luftwaffe Flakartillerie were Germany’s sole defenders against bombers.

In 1939, the Flakwaffe stood at 100,000 strong. By the end of 1944, these numbers rose to a high of 1,110,900. But this was a hollowed-out force made of only some 360,000 Luftwaffe men below the age of 39. The rest were old or infirm, with 40% of them armed civilians and children. Most able-bodied Luftwaffe men remaining in Flak units were eventually transferred to Flak-sturm-batterien, or Flak assault batteries. These units were almost purely ground combat units.

Hundreds of Flak batteries with remaining Luftwaffe personnel were transferred to Russia in 1944, and the Flak arm, once thought a refuge from the trials of combat, was anything but. If a Flak crewman survived the daily bombings of Germany, he was now facing the harsh reality of ground combat on one of several precarious fronts. Far from being a drain on manpower, Flak was now Germany’s strategic reserve.

By April 1945, 44% of the Flak forces were manned by civilians, and only 10% of units in Germany were manned solely by Luftwaffe personnel, and then only by those either too old to otherwise fight, or those injured in the war. The story of ‘lost divisions’ wasted in the Flak is a hollow myth. Germany’s Flak, once the model for the world, had degenerated into a force of postal and factory workers, prisoners, women, and children. Of them, Göring would say:

‘My anti-aircraft batteries are like a League of Nations meeting.’

General Hap Arnold, on the other hand, said:

‘We never conquered the German Flak artillery.’

On 25 April 1945, the Eighth Air Force launched its final heavy raid of the war with B-17s hitting the Skoda arms factory and B-24s hitting rail yards around Berchtesgaden. Although no fighters rose to challenge them, the Flak was intense, and 200 bombers were damaged.

Many try to determine the effectiveness of German Flak during the Second World War based on simple metrics: how many bombers did they down, how many artillery rounds were expended per bomber destroyed, how much steel was used in the guns that could have been used elsewhere? These questions entirely miss the point.

The German Flakartillerie was a critical and generally reliable component in the defence of German cities and strategic centres, and greatly reduced bombing accuracy while providing desperately needed defence to civilians and industry. It took a horrific toll on the Allies, taking many of the 47,286 lives lost by RAF Bomber Command, 26,000 of those lost by the Eighth Air Force and the 21,000 lost by the Fifteenth Air Force.

For all the horrors of war, the Flak did its job and defended Germany to the end. In that end, the Flakwaffe was asked to carry an impossible burden, and the world’s most impressive anti-aircraft defences literally bled to death. As the Wehrmacht crumbled, and long after fighters stopped flying, the Flak stood as the lone defender against aerial onslaught.

Then the guns fell silent.

(Colourisation by Johnny Sirlande) ■ Left: Flak stands for Flugzeugabwehrkanone, or anti-aircraft artillery. The most famous Flak gun was the venerable “88” feared by both pilots and tank crews. The key to the gun was its high muzzle velocity allowing it to either attack aircraft at high altitudes or pierce the armour of tanks. The rings on the barrel denote the gun’s victories. ■ Right: As late as 1943 the life expectancy of an Allied bomber was only 40 hours. The effects of Flak went beyond destruction of the aircraft as they caused accuracy to plummet when evasive manoevres were initiated. Only by flying straight and level did the bomber have any hope of coming close to the intended target.

■ This B-17 took a direct hit from Flak, killing three and wounding one. This image exemplifies how difficult it is to measure Flak’s effectiveness. While this aircraft returned to base, it would require many long hours to repair. More importantly, three crewmen were dead and another wounded, putting great pressure on the men of the USAAF. ■ Right: The 77mm Krupp M1914 Leichtes Kraftwagengeschütz was the first dedicated anti-aircraft artillery fielded by Germany. During the First World War, they would down numerous aircraft over the Western Front. Ironically, especially given the events of 1944 and 1945, these weapons were pressed into service as anti-tank guns in 1918.

■ Günther Rüdel was the first Inspekteur der Flakartillerie, shaping the forces of the anti-aircraft artillery. He initiated most of the advances made in German Flak development, including high-velocity guns, more capable projectiles, and most importantly gun laying radar that could track aircraft at night and through clouds to provide targeting data to the guns.

■ This veteran of fighting in Russia bears both the Luftwaffe Flak Badge and Luftwaffe Ground Assault Badge. The Flak Badge was awarded for participating in shooting down aircraft while the Assault Badge was given for participating in three separate ground assaults. This young Obergefreiter earned his Flak Badge first before transitioning to the ground war - a story typical of men in the Flakwaffe.

■ Left and right: Men of the rail Flak, or Eisenbahn Flak. This is the 4. Batterie (Schwere) Flakabteilung 535 (Eisenbahn) in Berlin in December 1943. The rail Flak gave the Germans a strategic reserve they could send to defend critical areas as need arose. The Flak built more and more stationary emplacements to conserve men and materials as the war dragged on, thus rail Flak became one of the few mobile assets Germany possessed after the invasion of Europe and the loss of many units in France. These units were armed with the most capable anti-aircraft gun of the war: the 128mm. These 25-ton monsters could only be mounted on massive Flak towers or railway wagons as seen here. The men of the rail Flak were the elite of anti-aircraft forces, provided the best training and equipment including rail-mounted gun laying radars.

(AS) ■ An Army crew manning a 20mm Flak 30. Though rail Flak was used by the Luftwaffe as a mobile reserve to protect strategic centres, the Heeresflak used anti-aircraft units on rail to protect materiel such as armour and troops during transport from low-level attacks.

■ Manning the Flak could be perilous and Leopold Tiefenböd was killed in an air raid on 1 November 1944. B-24s from the 461st Bombardment Group, 15th Air Force, flying out of Torretta Airfield, Italy, targeted marshalling yards around Graz but the clouds were so thick they hit their third alternate target. They were hammered by heavy Flak, destroying the H2X ground-scanning radar. Later photos showed they missed their targets and the after-action report noted they returned to Italy with a ‘… healthy respect for the Flak at Graz which had holed nine airplanes over the target.’

■ In 1943, postal and factory workers were pressed into service with the Flak. Many bore the yellow ‘Deutsche Wehrmacht’ armbands to identify them. They toiled at their jobs all day and were responsible for defending the factory when attacked. These men served as Flak crewmen at the Junkers aircraft and engine factory in Dessau.

■ An 88mm gun battery in action against RAF night bombers over the Reich.

■ Germany relied on child soldiers to augment the anti-aircraft defences of the Reich. The children of the Flak batteries, some only 16 years old, were active participants in the war. They manned all aspects of the Flak batteries under the supervision of Luftwaffe veterans too old or infirm to participate in frontline duties. The Flakhelfers only served on batteries within the borders of Germany.

(AS) ■ A rare wound badge document to a Flakhelferin demonstrates that women serving in the Flak faced the same dangers as the men. Wally Fuhrmann served on the Flak-batterie (z.b.v.) 6943 in 1944 when it was attached to the Leichte Flakabteilung 762 protecting one of the airfields in Schleswig, north of the Nord-ostsee Kanal between Kiel and Flensberg. The “z.b.v.” stood for ‘zur besonderer Verwendung’, or ‘for special employment.’ These units formed from 1943-44 were made up of remnants of units destroyed at the front, replacement, or training units. This one was augmented by Flakhelferinnen. Fuhrman was wounded by fighters strafing the airfield. That day, 19 Allied bombers and five fighters were lost.

■ The extreme youth of Flakhelfers is well illustrated in this photograph.

■ Men of an RAD Flak Battery paint another victory ring on their gun barrel.

■ Left: A 20mm Flakvierling 38 gunner scans the sky for enemy aircraft during the Battle of Normandy. These light Flak guns proved troublesome for Allied ground-attack aircraft.

■ Above: The Luftwaffe Flak Badge. It was the only German war badge ever authorised for issue to women. (AS)

■ A staged propaganda photo showing how searchlights illuminated aircraft to assist Flak gunners in target acquisition.

(AS) ■ The men of 1. Batterie (schwere), Flak Abteilung 305, 20 October 1944, Florence, Italy. This unit was a combined Italian-german unit, likely manned by Italian Kampfwillige serving freely in German units after the Italian surrender on 8 September 1943. Facing a choice of POW camp or fighting with the Germans, tens of thousands of Italians chose to fight. Some served in Italian units under German control or were combat troops (Kampfwillige) or support troops (Hilfswillige) incorporated into German units. Many Italian units were turned back to Italian control after Mussolini reformed his armed forces in spring 1944. ■ This wartime postcard depicts a Luftwaffe Flakartillerie man with the rank of Gefreiter, his red collar patches denoting the Luftwaffe’s Flak arm – who might be considered the ‘last defenders’ of the Reich.