FROM THE ARCHIVES: PERCEPTIONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

In a new occasional series we look at military archives which reveal hidden stories of German military forces. Here, Robin Schäfer examines some reports on how the German army viewed its opponents during the Battle of the Somme.

In a new occasional series, we look at German military history through official archives. In this issue, we focus on how the German soldier saw his British and French adversaries in WW1. That perception and assessment will come as a surprise to many, but it was a view seemingly shared by a Canadian general who was captured in 1916.

Throughout history, the world’s militaries have attempted to learn from experience. For the most part, however, they have tended to extract from those experiences only what supported their preconceived notions. Without doubt, the most self-critical military force during the World Wars was the German Army. Its willingness to be self-critical, and to strive to learn from experience, was a major factor in its battlefield performance and resilience.

Throughout the First World War, German military formations (often down to company and platoon level) compiled ‘Erfahrungsberichte’, or experience-reports. These reports, written immediately after or during a unit’s time in the front line, were submitted to higher echelons of command to rapidly share experiences and lessons learned with other formations. German commanders had

no fear of compiling honest, critical comments and evaluations - not only of their own unit‘s performance, but also that of the enemy.

While ‘Erfahrungsberichte’ were compiled from the very first day of the war, it was during and after the gigantic ‘Materialschlacht’ on the Somme in 1916 that they were systematically produced in large numbers, summarising and disseminating knowledge about tactics, equipment, weaponry and techniques employed by both sides.

Today, these reports form a fascinating medium to learn how the German Army innovated and allow us to glimpse how it perceived its opponents on the battlefield, untainted by political agenda or propaganda.

THE GERMAN ARMY OFFICERS’ VIEWPOINT

One such ‘review’ of the English and French was requested by the OHL on 27 July 1916. German formations at the Somme were requested to supply:

a) A report of the conduct of British and French troops in battle, their degree of training, differences between enemy troops attacking at an early stage of the battle and later replacements and an evaluation of the individual man.

b) A report on conduct of British and French officers with an evaluation of the same and combat leadership.

c) An evaluation of the British and French artillery.

d) A comparison between the value of British and French troops.

Below are reports of the battalions of Kgl. Bayer. 8. Reserve-infant erie regiment (K.B.RIR 8- Royal Bavarian 8th Reserve Infantry Regiment) and the attached Mas chin en ge wehrs cha rf schütze n-trupp Nr .82- one of the most famous German regiments of the Somme campaign and who had conducted the counter-attack which recaptured the Schwaben-redoubt. They were also one of the most battle hardened regiments of the Bavarian Army.

Maschinengewehr-scharfschützen-trupp Nr. 82, 2 August 1916. Leutnant Zimmermann

Due to the experiences gained in recent fighting, I am to some extent able to form an adequate opinion about some of the requested articles. a) Attacking English troops appear like a sluggish, slow mass, which doesn’t understand how to have individual sections work together to achieve a goal. This is especially noteworthy as the individual English soldier certainly doesn’t appear to be sluggish or clumsy at all. The reason for it can thus only be found in lack of individual training and cooperation between units and in a distinctive lack of soldierly quality - the so-called military instinct. b) It is without doubt true that the French understand far better how to bring their arms - hand grenades and machine guns - to bear with success and to to take possession of a position far more quickly and in a cannier manner than the English. Their overall bearing in combat is indicative of their more practical and thorough training.

I./kgl. Bayer. 8. Reserve infant erie-regiment. Major Oskar Prager

a) At the beginning of the offensive, the English NCOS and enlisted men advanced with great bravery. This may be because their superiors told them that they would only encounter corpses in the German trenches. They conducted themselves equally fearlessly in later more minor operations which were preceded by artillery preparation. In the defence of counter-attacks, they hold themselves with the utmost stubbornness - also when without leaders. It has been seen that the English infantry is only trained for the attack on a shot-up position and for its consolidation. For the latter, they are immaculately organised and plentifully supplied with the required equipment. In the course of that, they bring a disproportionate number of machine guns and muskets [light machine guns] into the furthermost line, without regard that these will be lost in a counter-attack. With this, however, they still fail to achieve what a better trained unit could do. One notices that the training of the individual man has not not been finished. To a certain extent, his movements are clumsy and ponderous. In making use of the terrain in particular, he is far behind the skills of the French soldier. They are very well trained in hand grenade throwing. This seems to be trained as a particular sport. On average, the English soldier is cold-blooded and brave in attack and persistent and tenacious in defence. He is, however, easily bluffed when surprised. b) The individual English officer is brave and stouthearted; on the other hand, he has not been educated for his trade. During the attack he recklessly and often clumsily exposes himself to enemy fire. Prisoner interrogations have shown that the trust the men have in the military skill and knowledge of their officers is very limited. The English officer carries no self-loading pistol but a revolver - similar to the old German Army model - which fires soft lead bullets. c) The cooperation between English artillery spotters and aerial observers, which, with a marvelous coldbloodedness, come low over our lines, is excellent. Accuracy, however, is not quite equal to that of the French. d) English troops are inferior to those of the French because of their short period of training and their lack of experience, but mainly because of their poorly trained leaders.

II./KGL. Bayer. 8. Reserve infant erie-regiment.

Major Otto Rösch

a) English NCOS and enlisted men have shown themselves spirited and brave in attack and in the defence of counterattacks. They won’t stand in the face of an energetic attack; without leaders, they don’t measure up to difficult situations. The grade of training appears to be good, and great is their skill in throwing hand grenades. Rifle and machine gun operators work together to assist one another and the hand grenade throwers are good. Marksmanship is good. b) English officers make a good impression and many can be found in the furthermost lines where it is not below them to participate in throwing of grenades. No observations could be made regarding the conduct of the lower leadership levels. c) Excellently supported by its flyers, the English artillery shoot well. The observers are also very good. Movement out of cover, even that of single people, was spotted and immediately taken under fire. There were many duds among the shells. It was noticeable that the 1st and 2nd trench were far less fired upon than the 3rd trench. The communications between the 2nd and 3rd trench were taken under fire mostly at night time. In some cases, a faint smell of gas was noticeable (probably originating from gas shells) but it was mostly not necessary to put on gas masks. The grooves on some of the duds and blown-out shrapnel containers were rather shallow, a sign of heavy wear of some gun barrels. d) Due to the short period of time in

which the recent actions took place, it is not possible to compare the value of English and French troops. In general, however, it appears that the English soldier - as long as there is someone to command him - is more or less equal to the French one, who knows how to fight autonomously without leadership.

1.MGK/KGL. Bayer. 8. Reserveinfanterie-regiment. Leutnant Ernst Fischer

a) The English infantry encountered by our company belonged to excellent regiments whose men - as seen in their identification papers - have often been in the field since autumn 1914. The men are physically strong, but lack an inner bond and soldierly spirit which, on our side, is created by tradition and military education. As long as everything runs as planned, and as trained for, then all goes well - the troops (including officers) will fail, however, as soon as they need to make independent decisions - as seen after the breakthrough into the Schwaben Redoubt. b) The captured English officers make a physically fit but totally un-military impression. The younger ones seem to see war as a kind of sport. No other experiences. c) Day and night, English artillery keeps up relentless harassing fire with a great amount of ammunition. It is directed at the position, but especially against the rearward trenches, less against the 1st and 2nd trench. Several times per day, the fire intensity grows into longer barrages (up to 1 ½ hours). Mostly shrapnel with impact and timed fuzes. Heavy calibres above 12cm are not common. The fire is relatively precise, but fire plans hardly ever change, which make it possible to avoid dangerous locations. It is mostly quiet in the mornings between 05:00 and 10:00. The ammunition, especially that of light calibres is not very good. Many duds. d) A) The French infantryman is superior to the English one in his military prowess - I can’t judge if this also applies to his physical performance. The equipment of the English infantry, in quality and abundance, is better than that of the French.

B) The English artillery seems to have learned a lot from the French, but fails to match the cunning technique of the French.

C) The audacity of the English flyers is superior to that of the French, in addition, English combat aircraft seem better than French ones.

CO of Kgl. Bayer. 8. Reserveinfanterie-regiment. Oblt. Gotthold Grabinger (Adjutant)

From 1 to 3 July 1916, the regiment stood in combat with Ulstermen, and from 3 July up to and including 7 July, with Yorkshiremen - both belonging to Kitchener’s Army. These English infantrymen were, throughout, personally brave and spirited. Thus, they refuted the underestimation we held for the men of the young Kitchener-army.

All of them had been ingrained with boundless confidence in the effect of their own artillery which would open up an uncontested path into our trenches. As such, the first main attack on 1 July 1916 was carried forward at walking pace and in dense formations. Hand grenade splinter damage on all dugout entrances

shows that a cleansing of trenches and dugouts in the attack zone had been thoroughly trained.

In single combat, which soon developed after our counter-attack on the Schwaben Redoubt, and which continued in the fight against several ‘English nests’, the English soldiers’ bravery and boldness, and his conspicuous eschewal of cover, became apparent. Their main strength is certainly a masterful use of the hand grenade (which they throw with athletic ardour) and that of their numerous machine guns.

In general, they only abandoned positions when attacked from several sides, and then often sought to escape in wild sprints over open fields. In other instances, they staged fighting withdrawals. The first of those we encountered during our counter-attack on the Schwaben Redoubt. Here, concentric pressure applied by our forces caused a literal panic among our numerically massively superior foe. The latter was encountered during the clearing of trench sections still held by the foe after 1 July.

Any essential difference between the Ulstermen deployed between 1 and 3 July and the Yorkshiremen encountered between 3 and 7 July was not apparent.

Since 7 July, no more infantry attacks were made. From those days onwards it became noticeable that infantry in the English trenches stayed quiet; one could move outside one’s own trenches in full view of the English without being opposed. Here and there, enemy machine guns fired. But in general, the impression prevailed that from 7 July the English used worn-out troops in the now quiet section of the front. English corpses from the fighting between 1 and 4 July were still lying close to the enemy trenches at the end of July.

All in all, the English managed to turn their young soldiers (who in their physical characteristics were nearly all young and strong people from the working classes) into useful warriors. The spirit of the English was good. There were no defectors. There have been reports from German soldiers who managed to evade capture, that some English have robbed prisoners and the dead.

Their training is good. Yet they seem to be drilled in certain attack and defence methods during training. This explains why their men were unable to adapt to surprising situations and then, in their plight, took to their heels. Their supply lines were accurately and well organised, and each man knows his role. In addition, English military administration has furnished its troops with downright first-rate equipment. That the English infantry has not managed to exploit their initial success is, to a large part, based on the fact that it is impossible for young soldiers, despite the greatest care and effort, to acquire combat experience in training. Even more so, it is the lack of expertise of their leaders, the NCOS and officers, who failed to adapt and react to unexpected situational changes.

The personal behaviour of English officers in combat is beyond praise. They are dauntless and brave, their conduct and virtue serving as glowing examples to their men. They recklessly expose themselves to danger and disdain the security of cover. They lay great store on being seen by their men, and could often be seen standing upright in shrapnell and shellfire. Prisoners state they have the greatest respect for the personal bravery of their mostly very young officers.

On the other hand, however, they lack military skills to cope with unexpected situations. When facing those, they cease to be leaders and turn into fighting soldiers - just like their subordinates. It is apparent that the English officers lack

any thorough or exact education; they seem to be more sportsmen than officers. When it comes to combat leadership by subaltern-officers, the English don’t seem to expect very much and often send older officers into the furthermost lines to fulfill tasks which could have well have been left to junior officers or, on our side, by an NCO.

On 5 July, a Captain was found in command of a reconnaissance patrol conducted by the foe against C2 (Pierredivion). During the final clearance of trenches C2 and C3 on 7 July, a Colonel and his Adjutant were found in command of the 150 metre stretch of trench still held by the English. The NCOS are young, without leadership experience, but again display great personal bravery.

Reports such as these were composed throughout the Battle of the Somme and up to the very last day of the war. That French troops were, in general, more highly rated than their British counterparts would not change. It is a fact that stands in stark contrast to the general and popular depiction of French troops in Britain. The same applies to an evaluation of the British officer class.

■ French Poilu. The infantrymen of France were very highly regarded by their German opponents.

■ British prisoners with their German captors on the Somme, July 1916.

■ British captives on the Somme in 1916. In this photograph, it appears that their officer is being searched. While the steadfast character of the typical British soldier was much lauded by the Germans, reports as to the training of British officers was far from complimentary – although the Germans were at pains to complement young officers on their bravery.

■ Comic German postcards of the period poked fun at the ability and fighting spirit of the British soldier, even showing a German soldier frightening a Guardsman with a beer stein.

(Brett (Butterworth, colourisation by Johnny Sirlande) ■ If any photograph depicts the hardened fighting spirit and determination of the French soldier, then it is this one. This tough looking machine gun crew have as a macabre trophy a German skull wearing a battered helmet.

■ Cartoons of a different kind appeared in British publications, of course. This example shows a grinning but slightly injured ‘Tommy’ of Kitchener’s New Army after the Somme battles of July 1916. He is depicted as victorious and with a German Picklehaube helmet on his bayonet. This cartoon appeared in ‘Punch’.

■ Of these soldiers of the East Yorkshire Regiment, one German assesment noted: ‘These English infantrymen were, throughout, personally brave and spirited. Thus, they refuted the underestimation we held for the men of the young Kitchener-army’.

■ Overall, the German view of the British soldier was that he was a ‘useful warrior’ but poorly trained and badly led. Otherwise, he was generally a tough and tenacious enemy – albeit that it was felt he was less soldierly on the battlefield, although this was largely a training issue. He was, thought the Germans, superbly well equipped.