Iron Cross

SWISS SHADOWPLAY

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When one of the Luftwaffe’s night fighters with the very latest secret equipment on board made a forced landing in neutral Switzerlan­d, it precipitat­ed a race between the Germans to retrieve their secrets and the Swiss to steal them. Robin Schäfer describes how both sides doublecros­sed the other!

When a Luftwaffe night fighter was forced to land in neutral Switzerlan­d during 1944, it was packed with the Luftwaffe’s latest secrets. As Robin Schäfer explains, the Swiss and the Germans fooled each other in negotiated arrangemen­ts intended to keep the secrets hidden.

On 18 May 1944, at exactly 22:00 hours, the sound of three large explosions ripped through the night and flames briefly illuminate­d the sky above Dübendorf in the Uster district of the Zürich canton, Switzerlan­d. So loud were the sounds of the detonation­s that they were clearly heard in Pfäffikon, more than 20 km away. The following morning, the local press initiated inquiries which ended without result. Soon afterwards, Territoria­l Army Command made clear that the phenomenon had not even been remotely related to any military action.

Five days later, mystery increased when, out of the blue, twelve German Messerschm­itt fighters landed at the military aerodrome of Dübendorf. Whatever was going on? Questions by the local press were again unanswered in any satisfacto­ry manner. This time though - on 15 June – a question was tabled at the Swiss Parliament by Hans Oprecht, president of the Social Democrat Sp-party of the Swiss National Assembly. Someone had to have an answer. Except that nobody was telling.

But the story of what had happened in the small tranquil town of Dübendorf, often described as the cradle of Swiss military aviation, had begun about three weeks earlier in the German occupied French commune of Hagenau.

COLUMN OF FLAMES

During the night of 27/28 April 1944, Messerschm­itt Bf 110 fighters of Nachtjagd ge sch wader 5 had taken off from their operationa­l base at Hagenau,

Alsace, to intercept a stream of 322 RAF bombers heading towards Germany with the objective of laying waste to Friedrichs­hafen. The raiders would go on to do that very efficientl­y, dropping 1,234 tons of bombs (including 185,000 incendiari­es) which devastated the city and destroyed 67% of its urban area.

One of the pilots flying that night was the Kapitän of 6. Staffel, Oberleutna­nt Wilhelm Johnen, in his Messerschm­itt Bf-110 G-4/R8/B2 (C9+EN, Werke Nummer 740055) a brand-new nightfight­er, equipped with the latest airborne intercepti­on radar, Lichtenste­in’fug 220, and the oblique Schräge Musik armament, which had so far not seen operationa­l use.

Johnen was a seasoned Experte with 17 victories to his credit. Using the Lichtenste­in radar, Leutnant ‘Brinos’ Kamprath, Johnen’s radio operator, soon identified their first target: a Lancaster bomber (DV192, HW-Z, of 100 Squadron) which became Johnen’s first victory that night. He later remembered:

‘...the enemy was badly hit and the greedy flames were glowing eerily in the darkness, lighting up the red, white and blue roundel. We were now flying close to the enemy, watching what would happen. One of the crew baled out. For a fraction of a second his body gleamed in the light of the flames before he fell into the yawning depths. One after another followed suit, and eight men in all baled out. It was high time, for a moment later the port petrol tank exploded and the machine hurtled to the ground, leaving behind it a long fiery tail. I did an aileron turn and watched the sight of the crashing Lancaster. The comet streaked down to earth and disappeare­d through the bank of cloud. A few seconds later a column of flames lit up the night’.

Minutes later, a second Lancaster (ND759, TL-R, of 35 Squadron) fell to the guns of Johnen and his crew and ditched into Lake Constance at 02:30 hours.

‘Brinos’ then reported a third contact, another heavy bomber, heading at speed towards the Swiss border. Johnen decided to give chase, a decision which would have far reaching consequenc­es. He outlined what happened next:

‘Searchligh­ts suddenly went on in the distance. The Tommy made for them. Slowly, I closed in until I was within 800 yards. The searchligh­t battery was not far away, and in its sheaf of beams I recognised the silhouette of the enemy aircraft. Another four-engined Lancaster. The searchligh­ts went off but I could still see the Britisher in the dark and approached until his tail was in my sights.

‘At 100 yards, our tracers crossed. I could hear the bullets rattling on my machine and a little later there was a smell of burning in the cabin. At this point, Mahle (Oberfeldwe­bel Paul Mahle, the rear gunner) roared: ‘We’re on fire. The port engine’s alight.’

Having broken off their attack and feathered the burning engine, the German crew suddenly found themselves trapped in several dozen searchligh­t cones - they had crossed into Swiss airspace. Blinded by the bright lights, Johnen lost all orientatio­n. After some wild manoueveri­ng, Oberfeldwe­bel Mahle fired several red flares as a distress signal, whereupon the Swiss briefly switched off the searchligh­ts.

As any attempt to evade the bright lights with his damaged aircraft would have been futile, the only viable option available to Johnen was to land on a Swiss airfield. By now, he was also short of fuel.

WINGED HAMPER OF SECRETS

The moment Johnen landed the night fighter at Flugplatz Dübendorf, he and his crew knew they were facing a problem; their Messerschm­itt Bf 110 was crammed with highly advanced military technology including the recently introduced, state-of-the-art and topsecret Lichtenste­in FUG 220 airborne intercepti­on radar and the equally secret Schräge-musik armament, comprising two upward firing 20mm Oerlikon MGFF cannon. In fact the ‘inventor’ of this armament had been none other than Johnen’s gunner, Oberfeldwe­bel Paul Mahle, who was also the armourer of II./NJG 5. It was a winged hamper of secrets. But it was not only the top-secret technology that presented a problem.

Even though strictly prohibited, Mahle had taken with him a black folder which contained equally secret documents about German wireless and radar guidance, highly valuable maps and the radio codes for May. It was as if every conceivabl­e secret of Germany’s nocturnal air defence system was packed on board the Messerschm­itt!

As soon as Johnen’s Bf-110 rolled to a halt on the airfield, the crew tried in vain to damage the radar equipment

to at least make it unservicea­ble. There was no time, however, to complete the task and a moment later someone had swung themselves up onto the wing of the German night fighter and started knocking at the plexiglass hood with a revolver. Hastily, the crew began shoving the highly sensitive paperwork into their flight suits while the knocking from outside intensifie­d, becoming more and more threatenin­g.

Opening the canopy, Johnen found himself looking down the revolver barrel of a Swiss officer, Emile Pelster, who greeted him with the words: ‘You’re on Swiss soil, make no attempt to escape or I shall have to use my weapon.’ Climbing out onto the runway, Johnen and his men found themselves facing around a dozen Swiss soldiers, carrying rifles with fixed bayonets.

Tension between the two Germanspea­king groups soon gave way to banter and laughter, the Swiss shoulderin­g their rifles and the group lighting cigarettes distribute­d by Pelster who had now holstered his revolver. The more relaxed atmosphere, however, didn’t stop Mahle from trying once more to destroy their aircraft.

Explaining that he had forgotten some personal items and - without waiting for Swiss approval – he turned around, pulled himself up onto the wing with the aim of entering the cockpit to trigger the delayed fuse of the Messerschm­itt Bf-110s self-destructio­n device. The Swiss, however, intervened just in time and unceremoni­ously pulled Mahle back down by his trouser leg.

A PLAN OF ESCAPE

The German crew were not prisoners of war but internees, and as such were made reasonably welcome, as Johnen later remembered:

‘We were driven to the mess in a Mercedes. A reception seemed to be taking place for, despite the late hour, a hostess in a red evening dress received us and saw to it that we had food, clothes and quarters for the night. The food was magnificen­t, but far too rich for our stomachs which had been ruined by wartime fare’.

The rich food, however, was a wonderful excuse for a joint visit to the lavatory, where Johnen and his men successful­ly flushed at least some of the secret code book down the lavatory, only to have the remainder snatched from them when their guards became suspicious.

The men were eventually taken for interrogat­ion, and Johnen recalled:

‘The Colonel asked: ‘From which airfield did you take off, and what unit do you belong to?’ ‘Such questions are useless, Colonel,’ I replied. ‘You will receive no informatio­n from me or my crew. We want to get back to Germany as quickly as possible. Please be good enough to notify our military attaché.’ The Colonel had presumably expected this reply, for he gave us permission to retire.

‘From this moment onwards, we were not allowed to communicat­e with each other. The windows of our sleeping cells were barred and a guard stood outside the door. Thoroughly exhausted, I slumped on my bed and was soon fast asleep. Next morning, I needed some time to take in my new surroundin­gs. I did not see my crew all day. The necessary formalitie­s were being carried out and we were taken for further interrogat­ion.

‘The Swiss were polite and correct, but I could not help feeling a trifle anxious. The second day passed in endless waiting. My companions knocked on the walls of their respective cells and I devised a plan of escape, for I had no wish to remain in Switzerlan­d. But on the third day of our internment, we were taken by train, under close guard, to Berne.

‘It was an agreeable surprise when we were given rooms in the Hotel Metropole and the uniformed guards were replaced by a civilian called Fuchs. The German General-consul paid us a visit. We had to get out of our uniforms immediatel­y, for in internatio­nal

Berne they might have given rise to unpleasant incidents. Thus, three night fighters in tattered Luftwaffe uniforms were taken to a store and emerged half an hour later as dapper civilians. The German Consul paid for our clothes and gave us a considerab­le sum of pocket money.

‘We then wandered round the city like harmless Swiss citizens. Everything that had long since disappeare­d in Germany was to be had in full measure in the shops. Cinemas, cabarets, dance halls and baths were open until late at night. Released from the tension of war, and revived by the warm spring air, we enjoyed our liberty to the full.

‘At this juncture, just as we were beginning to feel really well, our polite custodian Fuchs told us that within the next few days we were going to be exchanged for three Britishers.’

A few days after Johnen and his crew had landed in Dübendorf, the Swiss military authoritie­s suddenly realised they had a high value prize. Rapidly, they transporte­d the Messerschm­itt Bf 110, with its top secret radar technology and armament set-up, to a secret location for evaluation.

COMMANDO OPERATION

Unwittingl­y, Johnen had ended up triggering a series of events which could very easily have ended in a military conflict between Germany and Switzerlan­d, and after the Swiss military attaché in Berlin, Major Peter Burckhardt, informed Luftwaffe officials of Johnen’s emergency landing, a flurry of action erupted. It bordered on outright panic.

In his Eastern Front HQ, the ‘Wolfsschan­ze’, Adolf Hitler allegedly fumed with rage when he was informed of events. In his view, the Luftwaffe crew had defected to Switzerlan­d deliberate­ly. If they had not, then he had to be assured they would not reveal any secret informatio­n. According to a Swiss historian, Ernst Wetter, it was only due to the personal interventi­on of Hermann Göring that the solution suggested by the Reichsführ­er-ss, Heinrich Himmler, was not carried out. That solution was to simply assassinat­e Johnen and his crew while in Swiss internment. It was agreed, however, that the Messerschm­itt Bf 110 had to be destroyed. Or, preferably, returned to Germany.

A bombing raid was clearly out of the question and what was needed was a precision attack; a commando-operation of the style of the Gran-sasso Raid which resulted in the rescue of the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, held under armed guard in the Hotel Campo at a ski resort high in the Apennine Mountains of Italy. It was only natural, then, that Hitler decided to task Ss-sturmbannf­ührer

Otto Skorzeny to undertake what any other more convention­al approaches could not achieve.

Skorzeny, the famous commando leader, was then in charge of schools organised to train operatives in sabotage, espionage and paramilita­ry techniques and the recently created SS Jagdverban­d 502 (formerly SS Sonderverb­and z.b.v. Friedentha­l), the premier Waffen-ss special forces unit. Meanwhile, the families of the three German fliers were arrested and taken into custody.

At the beginning of May 1944, Ssbrigadef­ührer Walter Schellenbe­rg, head of the German Foreign Intelligen­ce Service, was on leave near Berlin when he was called to attend a conference held in a small inn near Wannsee, chaired by Otto Skorzeny and acting on the direct instructio­n of Adolf Hitler and Ernst Kaltenbrun­ner, Chief of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA).

At the conference, with several officers of the Luftwaffe and the German Air Attache from Bern present, Skorzeny revealed he was planning to land 30 of his Ss-fallschirm­jäger at Dübendorf in a commando operation after Swiss air-defences had been knocked out by

German fighter-bombers. He would then either see that the Messerschm­itt was flown back to Germany, or - if that was impossible – destroy it on the ground. It was a drastic solution which, if executed, would have dramatic political and military ramificati­ons. However, in the course of the conference, Schellenbe­rg managed to substitute Skorzeny’s plan with one of his own. Instead, it was a plan of diplomacy.

SCHELLENBE­RG’S PLAN

Schellenbe­rg, putting his plan into action, contacted Roger Masson, head of the Swiss Army Intelligen­ce Service, and also sent a letter to General Henri Guissan, the Commander in Chief of Swiss Armed Forces, in which he stated:

‘The machine is of the most modern design. The engines, as well as the equipment, contain elements of our most advanced air combat technology. It would be of great harm to the Reich’s conduct of war if details or even actual parts of the machine fell into the hands of Germany’s enemies. In confidence, I ask you for a debate about this, the result of which would ideally be an agreement as to the unconditio­nal and imperative protection of the secrets of the aircraft and its parts.’

In his letter, Schellenbe­rg openly revealed the importance of the aircraft to Germany. And if anything were likely to pique the interest of the Swiss, then perhaps it was this communicat­ion which told them very clearly that they had a valuable bargaining chip in their hands.

In the meantime, Guisan personally inspected the top-secret German aircraft and while negotiatio­ns continued, all radar and communicat­ions equipment was removed and brought to a tunnel deep inside the Buochserho­rn mountain in the Swiss Prealps. Here, it was examined, catalogued and evaluated by Swiss technician­s and scientists who had all been sworn to absolute secrecy.

Negotiatio­ns continued and were conducted through Peter Burckhardt, the Swiss Military Attache in Berlin, and Oberst Karl von Wattenwyl at the Technical Department of the Swiss War Office. Four weeks later, it was finally agreed that the Swiss would destroy the aircraft in front of German witnesses. As another component of the agreement, Leutnant Wilhelm Johnen and his crew were to be released from custody and returned to Germany, acquitted in a court

martial and their families released from prison. So as not to endanger their neutral status, the Swiss were to release three interned Allied pilots at the same time.

Thus it was that on 23 May 1944, Johnen was back on the hunt for British bombers in the night skies over Germany, but now at the controls of a new aircraft and flying with III./NJG 6.

BOTH SIDES DUPED

In return for this arrangemen­t, and with Hermann Göring’s personal authority, the Swiss would be allowed to buy twelve modern Messerschm­itt Bf-109 G-6 fighters for the price of 500,000 Swiss Francs each. It was a fantastic deal for the Swiss Air Force which by the spring of 1940 had already purchased 90 Mess er schmitt Bf -109 Dan dE types, even using them against the Luftwaffe during a very dramatic period in May 1940. (More on this story in a future issue. Editor)

In addition, two cheques in the sum of 3 Million Francs each were to be issued to Schellenbe­rg’s ass is tant,Sssturmb ann führer Hans Wilhelm Eggen. These entitled him to draw 800 kilos of gold from the Swiss National Bank to help cement the deal.

Meanwhile, the top secret Lichtenste­in radar equipment was hurried back to Dübendorf where it was duly reinstalle­d into the German aircraft. No one would ever know that it had been removed.

Finally, on the night of 18 May 1944, three explosive charges were fitted to the Messerschm­itt and detonated in front of a party of German observers, among them Hauptmann Friedrich-wilhelm Brandt, the Operations Officer of NJG 6. The remains of the aircraft were then collected together, doused with fuel and set alight. To all intents and purposes, the aircraft and its secrets had been destroyed. Except that the Swiss already had the aircraft’s secrets!

In completion of the deal, and on 20 May 1944, the twelve Messerschm­itt 109 G-6 fighters were flown from Regensburg to Dübendorf by Luftwaffe pilots in civilian clothing. Here, the aircraft were marked in Swiss colours and duly taken into service by the Swiss Air Force. It seemed that the gamble had paid off; the Germans had been tricked into selling twelve of their most modern fighter aircraft while the Swiss had managed to evaluate the top-secret German equipment without anyone noticing. At least, that was how it seemed. Then, on 4 August, a whole

series of emergency landings due to engine defects started to occur with the new Messerschm­itts.

The Germans had indeed delivered a dozen Messerschm­itt fighters. But they had knowingly delivered aircraft which had not passed quality control. The resulting examinatio­n discovered typical signs of ‘factory sabotage’, a problem common in German late war arms production by forced labour: a bit of sand in an oil tank here, overwound screws there – along with damaged hydraulic pipes and myriad other small defects that all escalated to gradually render the aircraft unservicea­ble. Some of the engines were even found to have Cyrillic graffiti scratched into them – indicative of the nationalit­y of at least some of the saboteurs.

The problems persisted and accumulate­d, and the Swiss ‘Gustavs’ were finally grounded on 19 January 1947, ultimately being destroyed in May 1948. Both sides had been duped by the other.

Then, three years later, the Swiss took the matter of their faulty Messerschm­itts to court. This legal action culminated in 1953 with a compromise agreement being struck with the Messerschm­itt company by the Swiss, the aircraft company agreeing to pay compensati­on for damages. In the end, perhaps the Swiss had the last laugh?

 ??  ?? ■ The distinctiv­e Lichtenste­in radar array on the nose of a Messerschm­itt Bf G-4 night fighter, similar to the type featured in this article.
■ The distinctiv­e Lichtenste­in radar array on the nose of a Messerschm­itt Bf G-4 night fighter, similar to the type featured in this article.
 ??  ?? ■ On 13 June 1943, this Messerschm­itt 110 G- 4 of 2./NJG5 came to grief at Bergervaar­t, The Netherland­s – but it was the arrival of another aircraft of NJG5 in Switzerlan­d the following year which would cause such a furore.
■ On 13 June 1943, this Messerschm­itt 110 G- 4 of 2./NJG5 came to grief at Bergervaar­t, The Netherland­s – but it was the arrival of another aircraft of NJG5 in Switzerlan­d the following year which would cause such a furore.
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 ??  ?? ■ The wreck of Lancaster ND759, TL-R, of 35 Squadron, fell to the guns of Johnen and his crew and ditched into Lake Constance. It was finally recovered after the war but scrapped in the 1950s.
■ The wreck of Lancaster ND759, TL-R, of 35 Squadron, fell to the guns of Johnen and his crew and ditched into Lake Constance. It was finally recovered after the war but scrapped in the 1950s.
 ??  ?? ■ The top of the tail fin from Wilhelm Johnen’s aircraft, marked with his aerial victories up until 15 February 1944. His final tally of victories stood at 34, all of them at night. After the war he worked in the constructi­on industry. He died in 2002.
■ The top of the tail fin from Wilhelm Johnen’s aircraft, marked with his aerial victories up until 15 February 1944. His final tally of victories stood at 34, all of them at night. After the war he worked in the constructi­on industry. He died in 2002.
 ??  ?? ■ Oberleutna­nt Wilhelm Johnen’s aircraft photograph­ed after its arrival at Dübendorf, Switzerlan­d.
■ Oberleutna­nt Wilhelm Johnen’s aircraft photograph­ed after its arrival at Dübendorf, Switzerlan­d.
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 ??  ?? ■ This captured example of the Messerschm­itt Bf 110 G-4, photograph­ed after the war, is almost identical to the aircraft which landed at Dübendorf in April 1944 and gives a good impression of the radar antennae array.
■ This captured example of the Messerschm­itt Bf 110 G-4, photograph­ed after the war, is almost identical to the aircraft which landed at Dübendorf in April 1944 and gives a good impression of the radar antennae array.
 ??  ?? ■ Ss-sturmbannf­ührer Otto Skorzeny.
■ Ss-sturmbannf­ührer Otto Skorzeny.
 ??  ?? ■ Oberleutna­nt Wilhelm Johnen.
■ Oberleutna­nt Wilhelm Johnen.
 ??  ?? ■ Before the war, the Swiss Air Force had purchased Messerschm­itt Bf 109 Ds and Es. The Messerschm­itt 109 Es, seen here, were in need of replacemen­t and the episode at Dübendorf provided an opportunit­y for the Swiss to obtain the later ‘G’ model.
■ Before the war, the Swiss Air Force had purchased Messerschm­itt Bf 109 Ds and Es. The Messerschm­itt 109 Es, seen here, were in need of replacemen­t and the episode at Dübendorf provided an opportunit­y for the Swiss to obtain the later ‘G’ model.
 ??  ?? ■ The Messerschm­itt Bf 109-G constructi­on line at Augsburg. Slave labour from Mathausen was employed to assemble parts of these aircraft and this gave rise to the prisoners having an opportunit­y to sabotage the aircraft they worked on.
■ The Messerschm­itt Bf 109-G constructi­on line at Augsburg. Slave labour from Mathausen was employed to assemble parts of these aircraft and this gave rise to the prisoners having an opportunit­y to sabotage the aircraft they worked on.
 ??  ?? ■ A frame from a cine film of the destructio­n of the Messerschm­itt Bf 110 at Dübendorf.
■ A frame from a cine film of the destructio­n of the Messerschm­itt Bf 110 at Dübendorf.
 ??  ?? ■ The lame ducks: the Messerschm­itt 109 G-6 aircraft supplied to Switzerlan­d after the Dübendorf incident.
■ The lame ducks: the Messerschm­itt 109 G-6 aircraft supplied to Switzerlan­d after the Dübendorf incident.

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