ZERBERUS, DONNERKEIL AND FULLER
On 12 February 1942, the German warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen brazenly sailed from Brest, through the Dover Strait, and back to Germany under very the noses of the British. Chris Goss charts what happened that day.
Eighty years after the famous ‘Channel Dash’, Chris Goss examines the story of this famous event when the Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen and Gneisenau all escaped from Brest and brazenly sailed through the English Channel under the very noses of the British. The background to the ‘dash’ is explored, with the passage of the ships, the efforts to protect them and the somewhat disastrous attempts by the British to thwart the passage all chronicled in detail.
On 29 December 1941, Adolf Hitler had insisted that the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen be brought back to the North Sea to counter any possible invasion of Norway by the Allies, or else to be paid off and their guns used for coastal defences. Vizeadmiral Otto Ciliax, Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe, agreed that the ships could be brought through the English Channel only if they had total air cover, which was agreed with the recently appointed Generalleutnant Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger, who would be personally responsible for the planning and coordination of the air effort.
Operations ZERBERUS (Cerberus) was thus born and feverish preparations for what became known as the ‘Channel Dash’ were put in motion.
Earlier, and following the successful conclusion of Operation BERLIN, the Scharnhorst (under Kapt Kurt-caeser Hoffmann) and Gneisenau (Kapt Otto Fein) arrived at Brest on 23 March 1941 after having sunk or captured no less than 22 ships in just 60 days. Now, urgent repairs to the Scharnhorst’s boilers were need, with Brest being the only port with a dry dock large enough to take a ship of her size. The works were completed by mid-july 1941, and on 24 July 1941 she headed south for La Pallice on sea trials, only to be damaged that same day in a daylight attack by Halifaxes of 35 and 76 Squadrons.
The Gneisenau was then dogged by bad luck-on 4 April 1941, an air raid seeing a bomb landing in the dock where she was lying. As it did not
explode, she was moved out into the harbour and two days later she came under air attack when three Bristol Beauforts of 22 Squadron, two carrying torpedoes and one carrying bombs, were tasked to attack.
Flying Officer Kenneth Campbell was the first to go in, and as it would transpire the only one to attack the Gneisenau, hitting her towards the stern and causing considerable damage. On climbing away, however, Campbell’s aircraft was hit by flak and crashed in flames into the harbour killing all four crew.
The remaining aircraft flown by Flying Officer Jimmy Hyde DFC and Sergeant Alan Camp became lost and failed to attack the primary target, while Sergeant Henry Menary also got lost but managed to bomb a lone ship away from Brest. For his valour in an action which put the Gneisenau out of action for six months with a smashed propeller shaft, Kenneth Campbell received a posthumous Victoria Cross.
The final warship of the trio was the Prinz Eugen (under Kapt Hellmuth Brinkmann) which had arrived at Brest on 1 June 1941 for repairs to her three engines and to a propeller blade.
On 1 July 1941, though, she was hit in an air attack which
killed over 50 of her crew, the necessary repairs taking three months. However, by December 1941, all three warships were ready again to go to sea, albeit that damage to the dock gates caused by yet another air attack on 18 December 1941 meant Scharnhorst could not get out into the harbour until January 1942.
One month later, all three ships set sail for Germany. It was to be an epic voyage.
MISFORTUNES AND ERRORS
Onboard Scharnhorst would be what Galland called his ‘fighter command afloat’, or Jagdfliegerführer Schiff, headed by Oberst Max Ibel, formerly of JG27. Under him was Oberstleutnant Karl Hentschel, the fighter direction officer, who had Oberleutnant Leo Dorando and Leutnant Hugo Stahlberg to assist him. Oberst Joachim Elle oversaw communications, having five Luftwaffe and one Kriegsmarine radio operators.
The Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen would each have fighter liaison officers, Hauptmann Gerhard Rutsch and Oberleutnant Armin Rothenberg respectively, with one radio operator to maintain communications.
The optimum sailing date was decided as being 12 February 1942, with the meteorological forecast showing that a depression would cause weather to deteriorate that morning but would clear up that afternoon. All of this would favour the Germans. Also, high water in the Dover Strait and sunrise/sunset times meant this date was also optimal in these respects. The code name for the surface operation was to be ZERBERUS (Cerberus), while the air operation would be given the name DONNERKEIL (Thunderbolt). It was now a matter of waiting.
Activity in Brest had not escaped the attention of the RAF and Royal Navy, and as a result a breakout from Brest was expected, and probably between 10 and 15 February 1942. As a result, the British began taking precautions under Operation FULLER. In addition to increased minelaying along the expected routes, RAF Coastal Command would fly three specific standing patrol lines to hopefully detect any breakout, while the submarine HMS Sealion, commanded by Lieutenant George Colvin, set sail from Portsmouth on 3 February 1942 to lie off Brest. Unfortunately, when the German ships eventually set sail at 22.45hrs on 11 February 1942, Sealion had gone further out to sea to surface and recharge her batteries. As a result, she missed the departure. This would be the first of many misfortunes and errors that the British experienced over the next 24 hours.
One of the patrolling aircraft was a Hudson of 224 Squadron flown by Flight Lieutenant Chris Wilson which met up with a Junkers 88 at round 19.20hrs. Although there was no engagement between the pair, the Hudson’s Airborne Surface Vessel radar (ASV) was switched off and went unserviceable when it was switched back on. Thus, Chris Wilson returned to RAF St Eval early and was replaced on the patrol by Squadron Leader Geoff Bartlett who flew close to the German ships several times during his patrol but saw or detected nothing.
Further east, Sergeant Smith of 233 Squadron took off from RAF Thorney Island at 00.32hrs and landed four and a half hours later having seen or detected nothing.
Meanwhile, Flying Officer Alexander took off at 03.55hrs and landed at 07.10hrs. He also reporting nothing - even although he must have also flown close to the German ships. By 08.00hrs, the German flotilla was south of the Isle of Wight. So far, the three warships with their massive escort had been undetected. But would their luck continue to hold?
WARSHIPS UNDETECTED
As the formation of three battleships, up to 15 destroyers and myriad smaller warships steamed eastwards, Luftwaffe bombers were carrying out diversionary attacks further west over Devon and Cornwall in the hope of distracting the RAF. Oberleutnant Rudolf Häusner, of the Do 217 equipped 7./KG 2, had moved from Schiphol to Evreux on 7 February 1942 to fly just one mission - a nuisance attack on Exmouth at dawn on 12 February 1942, returning to his Schiphol base the following day.
Taking off at 07.34 hrs, he landed at 10.10 hrs (German time), with British records acknowledging that Exmouth
was attacked just after 08.00 hrs when three bombs were dropped, one of which exploded in Bicton Place killing five and injuring another seven. Another nine aircraft attacked RAF Warmwell and Torquay, the latter attacked by a lone aircraft at 08.10 hrs which dropped four bombs. These landed on Warren Hill and damaged the Majestic and Warren Hotels before the attacker machine gunned the town and harbour but caused no casualties.
At the same time, another Do 217 E-4 of 7./KG 2 flown by Uffz Rolf Güldenpfennig, attacked RAF Exeter at 08.00 hrs. Flying at 100 ft, he approached from the south-west, dropping three bombs on the north of the airfield after which the bomber was hit by light anti-aircraft fire from the ground defences. It then collided with a tree, the port wing tip was ripped off and it hit the ground at a shallow angle, disintegrating over a wide area. Not surprisingly, the crew were all killed. Despite all this activity, the warships were undetected and sailed on.
FIGHTER COVER
At 08.14 hrs German time, the first four Luftwaffe escort aircraft took off, reaching the warships at 08.50 hrs which were by now just east of Cherbourg. These would be followed by another 15 fighters at 09.20 hrs. Unusually, but understandable as it was still getting light and the weather inclement, these aircraft were Messerschmitt Bf 110 night fighters.
At 03.50 hrs that day, both the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine had been warned thus:
‘Friendly fighter aircraft may be encountered after dawn. Aircraft should only be attacked when definitely recognised as enemy.
In Channel area at dawn, type Me 110 with night camouflage and yellow ring on fuselage. Further types: Fw 190 Bf 109 E and F with normal western area markings.’
It is believed that these Messerschmitt Bf
110s were from I./NJG 1 based at Venlo, Holland, and also II./NJG 1 from St Trond, Belgium. The latter having moved to Coxyde in Belgium on 8 February 1942. It is probable that III./NJG 1 was involved later in the day, as they were operating from Schiphol rather than their normal base of Twente in Holland. It would appear these aircraft were not black but had been repainted with a temporary sea-green colour.
Pilots who are known to have flown this day included Oberleutnant Wilhelm Herget, Leutnant Georg Greiner and Oberfeldwebel Johann Schönherr of 4./NJG 1, Oberleutnant Heinz Gresens, Leutnant Heinz Schnaufer and Leutnant Ludwig Meister of 5./NJG 1 and Leutnant Hans Autenrieth of 6./NJG 1.
Another unit getting airborne at the same time as the second wave of Messerschmitt Bf 110s were 11 Messerschmitt Bf 109 Es of Hauptmann Fulbert Zink’s 4. (Einsatz)/jagdfliegerschule 5. They were based at Le Havreocteville, and by this time the ships were off Le Havre.
However, both ships and aircraft were, as yet, undetected by the British and it would remain that way for another hour and a half. By this time, the air and sea armada, the former now being made up of Messerschmitt Bf 109s and Focke-wulf 190s of JG 2 and JG 26, was approaching the Dover Strait.
JAMMING AND STEALTH
From the outset of the operation, the Luftwaffe had been jamming or at least interfering electronically with British radar. Just before dawn, two Heinkel 111s from the Funk-technisches Untersuchungskommando LC 4 had got airborne from Evreux with each aircraft fitted with a Garmisch Partenkirchen transmitter intended to produce false echoes on British radar screens. At the same time, ground-based Breslau transmitters were doing the same thing. Nevertheless, at 10 00 hrs British time, the radar station at Swingate Downs, near Dover, detected three large contacts 60 miles away and sailing east at 25 knots. As a result, HQ 11 Group RAF Fighter Command sent out aircraft to find out what was going on.
At RAF Hawkinge in Kent, Pilot Officer Ken Charney and Flying Officer Jim Brady of 91 Squadron had already taken off at 08 30 hrs to carry out a patrol and weather check, returning at 09 30 hrs having seen nothing. Shortly afterwards, Australians Sergeants Bruce ‘Buster’ Brown and Tom Omdahl got airborne, the former heading to Dieppe but reporting very little, the latter heading to Boulogne.
Tom Omdahl did spot six minesweepers off Zeebrugge, and then another 11 some 15 miles north of Dunkirk, one of which he strafed before heading for home. He then spotted a Junkers 88 some 40 miles east of Dover which he chased down to sea-level and fired all his remaining ammunition from 500 yds but did not see strikes and so did not submit a claim. However, first blood of the day did indeed go to him as this reconnaissance Junkers 88 D-1 of 3 Staffel(fern)./aufklärungsgruppe 122 was reported damaged by a fighter and crash-landed at Haamstede, Holland, with its pilot, Unteroffizier Heinz Klaus, wounded.
Meanwhile, the Germans were confident their attempts to jam British radar and radio were effective, and their aim of flying low and observing strict radio silence was working. But their luck was about to change - albeit very slowly.
FATAL DELAYS
At 10 00 hrs, Squadron Leader ‘Bobby’ Oxspring of 91 Squadron received a phone call from the 11 Group Sector Controller that there was unusual activity off the Somme Estuary. This was especially unusual as the aircraft appeared to be staying in roughly the same area and there were no RAF aircraft around.
At 10.20 hrs, Oxspring and Sergeant Tom Beaumont got airborne, while around the same time, Group Captain Victor Beamish and Wing Commander Findlay Boyd got airborne from RAF Kenley. In his book, Spitfire Command, ‘Bobby’ Oxspring relates what happened:
“We flew along the cloud base which varied between 1,200 and 1,800 ft. This gave us the opportunity to nip into cloud if we encountered too many German fighters. Following the coast past Le Touquet towards the Somme Estuary, we suddenly ran into some bursts of heavy Flak. Banking into a turn we peered down through the rain and sighted a large oval of destroyers and smaller escorts in the middle of which were three much larger ships in line astern; all were leaving creamy wakes indicating that the force was moving fast.” Thinking the ships were British, the Spitfires came under heavier antiaircraft fire so popped back into cloud - but not before they saw the Spitfires of Beamish and Boyd boldly dive down to attack the outer escort vessels with cannon fire.
The two 91 Squadron aircraft then headed back for RAF Hawkinge and landed at 10 45 hrs, but not before Oxspring, unaware of Operation FULLER, had radioed the Sector Controller what he had seen.
According to Adolf Galland, who was sitting in his operations room at Audembert, this had been heard by the German listening service at 10.35 hrs British time, but he refused to give the call ‘Open Visor’ which meant that Luftwaffe radio silence could be broken as he thought that it would take time for the RAF to react. It soon transpired Galland was correct in his assumption.
Meanwhile, Oxspring had landed and phoned 11 Group stating that Sergeant Tom Beaumont thought that one of the ships was the Scharnhorst. Then, 30 minutes later, Victor Beamish and Findlay Boyd landed at RAF Kenley and phoned in what they had seen. However, it would be another hour since first being spotted that the RAF was first brought to readiness. These were the first of potentially fatal delays for the British. However, 25 minutes later, the ships with their fighter escort were off Cap Gris Nez. And it would still be another half an hour before the first British aircraft got airborne.
FIRST ACTION
At around 12 15 hrs British time, two Do 217 E-4s of 9./KG 2 accidentally collided mid-channel north-east of Cherbourg after one suffered an engine failure. They would have been behind the warships and it is assumed they were still trying to draw away British fighters and distract attention. There were no survivors from either Oberleutnant Hermann
Ruess or Unteroffizier Helmuth Meier’s crews.
The first action, however, occurred on the sea. And yet again it was another failure.
A group of 32 Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBS) should have been available at Dover, but there were just five and these were on training when the call for action came. They had to return quickly to port, remove dummy warheads from their torpedoes and fit live ones. Then, during their attack, S-boots damaged the British leader’s MTB which suffered engine failure while a second also suffered mechanical failure. Meanwhile, any torpedoes fired by the remaining MTBS went wide of their intended target. This failed attack was followed at 12.19 hrs by shelling from the guns around Dover. Immediately afterwards, the first air attack took place.
Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde DSO was the Commanding Officer of 825 Squadron. Equipped with Fairey Swordfish, they had moved from Lee-on-solent in Hampshire to RAF Manston in Kent in preparation for Operation FULLER. Esmonde had joined the RAF in December 1928 on a Short Service Commission but transferred to the Fleet Air Arm before leaving in 1934 to fly for Imperial Airways. Re-joining the FAA at the outbreak of war, he was awarded the DSO for his part in the attack on Bismarck on 24 May 1941 which damaged the battleship allowing it to be caught and sunk three days later. He and his Squadron were now after more German battleships.
Now another misfortune befell the British. The six Swordfish were meant to be escorted by three Spitfire squadrons, but only 72 Squadron managed to meet up with the slow torpedo bombers. To make matters worse, the Luftwaffe now had the most fighters available as this was close to their bases in the Pas de Calais.
It was going to be a slaughter. And 72 Squadron could do little to intervene.
SUICIDAL ATTACK
The order ‘Open Visor’ was finally given by Adolf Galland at 13.50 hrs and so German radio silence could now be broken as the Swordfish flew into a withering Flak barrier and defending German fighters.
All six Swordfish were shot down, with Esmonde being the first to be lost. Section 1 suffered four killed (including Esmonde) and five rescued, but all of Section 2, led by Lieutenant John Thompson, were killed.
The II./JG 2, led by Hauptmann Karl-heinz Greisert, claimed eight Swordfish between 13.45 and 13.50 hrs German time, while four Focke-wulf 190s of 8./JG 26, led by Leutnant Paul Galland (brother of Adolf), and four from 9./JG 26, led by Oberleutnant Johannes Naumann, claimed another seven between 13.45 and 13.50 hrs. The Prinz Eugen herself claimed Swordfish at 13.34, 13.35 and 13.38 hrs, the Scharnhorst one and Gneisenau two at 13.45 hrs. Massive over-claiming perhaps, but the battle was confused and frantic.
Unteroffizier Willi Morzinek of 4./JG 2 noted in his logbook that they had taken off from Calais Marck at 13.25hrs, landing at 14.36 hrs, during which time they met up with Swordfish.
Meanwhile, 72 Squadron engaged the German fighters with Pilot Officer Eric Bocock claiming a Focke-wulf 190 destroyed and two damaged east of Manston, Flying Officer Francis De Naeyer a Focke-wulf 190 destroyed off Boulogne, Sergeant James Garden a Focke-wulf 190 damaged, Flying Officer John Rutherford a Focke-wulf 190 damaged and Pilot Officer Bernard Ingham a Focke-wulf 190 destroyed.
Ingham’s combat report gives a good idea of what happened:
“I was flying as Blue Leader on the left-hand side of the Squadron and weaving over Swordfish when I saw some MTBS coming towards us, and then immediately a few Fw 190s flew underneath us on our port side. The Squadron then immediately broke up and I turned to port with my section. I then saw a Fw 190 firing at my No.4 and I attacked him at about 200 yds from the front quarter with cannon and machine gun with no apparent results; he continued firing. I then saw two Fw 190s attacking a Swordfish. The first one broke away and just as I closed on the second one the Swordfish’s petrol tank exploded. I then gave the Fw 190 a 2-3 second burst with cannon and machine gun and black smoke came from the right-hand side of the engine as I broke away. My No.3 saw it hit the sea. I then climbed away and attacked another Fw 190 which tried to climb away from me and fired a short burst at it without any apparent result and broke away to evade another Fw 190 attacking my No.4. He also broke away. I then looked round for the rest of the Swordfish but could see only two Fw 190s below which I immediately dived on but I did not catch them, so I broke away. I then circled for a little while and saw two Fw 190s attacking a Swordfish which I immediately dived on, firing a 5 second burst at about 250 yds at the second one.
The leader then turned on my section, so I broke away and returned to base with my section and landed at Gravesend at 13 10 hrs.”
72 Squadron all got back safely, but it would appear they accounted for Oberfeldwebel Henri Starke of 8./JG 26 and Unteroffizier Günter Stavenhagen and Oberfeldwebel Eduard Koslowski of 9./JG 26. Starke was probably Eric Bocock’s victim as his body was later washed ashore at Herne Bay, Kent.
The crews of 825 Squadron were highly decorated for this suicidal yet failed attack, with Esmonde being awarded the VC. Four DSOS, a CGM and 12 posthumous Mentioned in Despatches were also awarded.
ERROR STREWN
While all this had been going on, the other two squadrons which should have been escorting the Swordfish were engaged by German fighters with 124 Squadron claiming to have damaged a Focke-wulf 190 and two Messerschmitt Bf 109s off Boulogne with no losses, while 401 Squadron claimed to have destroyed two Messerschmitt Bf 109s and damaged another two, but Pilot Officer Omer Levesque failed to return, although he was picked out of the Channel by the Germans and spent the remainder of the war as a POW.
The next attack was carried out shortly afterwards by Hurricanes of 607 Squadron, and yet again failed to achieve its aim as the following report shows:
“Aircraft piloted by Fg Off Lare, Plt Off Gibbs, Flt Sgt Walker and Sgt Paul took off at 12 30 hrs to attack escort ships to the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen. The ships were reported to be off Le Touquet, but aircraft were vectored too far south, and only small Flak ships were seen. One was damaged and left on fire. Flt Sgt Walker suffered a direct hit and was lost.”
Flight Sergeant Edward Walker is still recorded as
missing with no known grave. However, 607 Squadron would be back in action two hours later with worse to report.
The next action occurred 40 minutes later, and yet again was error strewn from an RAF perspective. At 13.10 hrs, four Whirlwinds of 137 Squadron got airborne from RAF Matlaske, Norfolk, to patrol a convoy of five destroyers. After flying for 35 minutes, they had seen nothing so turned back and then spotted a convoy of two battleships off the Belgian coast. Thinking them to be friendly, they dived to investigate and were immediately bounced by III./JG 2.
Pilot Officer Ralph Haggberg and WO Basil Robertson failed to return, claims for their destruction being filed by Oberleutnant Egon Mayer of 7./JG 2 at 14.58 hrs (German time) and by Flak. Then, 30 minutes later, Pilot Officer George Martin and Sergeant John Sandy of 137 Squadron got airborne. Both failed to return and were shot down by Feldwebel Johannes Stolz of 9./JG 2 at 15.12 hrs and Unteroffizier Willi Reuschling of 7./JG 2 at 15.24 hrs, German time. All of this was witnessed by the battleships:
“1455hrs:dogfight between German fighters and five Whirlwinds which were attacking the Gneisenau.
1520hrs: Two Whirlwinds attacking Gneisenau approaching from port quarter, one shot down by German fighters.
1524hrs: Near Scharnhorst one Whirlwind shot down by one of our fighters. A dogfight with another one, chased by several fighters. Thick smoke poured from one of the engines of the Whirlwind.”
The German ships sailed on, waiting for the next chapter.
SCHARNHORST HITS MINE
Meanwhile, HQ RAF Bomber Command was not informed as to what was going on until 11.27 hrs, the first main wave of 73 aircraft not getting airborne until 14.20hrs and was followed by a second wave of 130 aircraft between 14.37 and 16.00hrs, and a third wave of 41 aircraft between 16.15 and 17.05hrs, a force numbering 244 aircraft, of which in the region of 39 carried out attacks. It was later reported that:
“In the adverse weather, few of them found the main target. One possible hit on one of the battle cruisers and near misses on various of the main units and escorting vessels are claimed...”
The panic to throw bombers against the ships is shown by the Operations Records Book of 420 Squadron, flying Hampdens from RAF Waddington. Warned at 12.30 hrs for immediate take off, it launched six aircraft: two at 13.37 hrs and four at 14.45 hrs. It was hardly a coordinated attack.
The earliest take off was by Plt Off John Topping DFM who failed to return, while Squadron Leader George Harris failed to return from the second wave. It appears he first Hampden was claimed by Oberleutnant Bruno Stolle of 8./ JG 2 at 15.50 hrs German time.
However, the British now had their first stroke of luck when, at 15.30 hrs German time, Scharnhorst hit a mine as she passed the mouth of the River Scheldt. It had been laid some days previously by the RAF. Immediately, the lights went out on Scharnhorst, and its engines stopped. Despite this, the RAF remained unable to take advantage of this sitting duck and within 30 minutes of frantic repairs, the lights came back on and she set sail again. Oberstleutnant Hentschel was slightly injured in the explosion and 15 minutes later, as a precaution, Oberst Ibel and Oberleutnant Dorando were moved to the destroyer Z29.
YET ANOTHER FARCE
Meanwhile, on the surface, the Royal Navy tried to slow down Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen with a mixed force of destroyers. The German ships opened fire first, and despite the Navy claiming to have hit her, the opposite was true, and when the last RN warship, HMS Worcester (an aged ‘W’ Class destroyer launched in 1919), commanded by Lt Cdr Ernest Coats, was in range to open fire, she was herself hit accurately by shells from Gneisenau.
The first salvo removed half of the bridge; the second salvo exploded in the boiler rooms. After this, she swung about and presented her side to the Gneisenau’s gunners who hit her another four times. On fire, and listing dangerously, the Germans thought the destroyer would sink shortly, stopped firing, and continued onwards. With 23 killed, and at least 70 of her 130-man crew wounded, Worcester limped back to Harwich the next morning.
Coastal Command reported attacking the ships between 15.35 and 18 00 hrs with 16 aircraft from 42 and 22/217 Squadrons (Beauforts) and 407 Squadron (Hudsons) claiming to have attacked the German ships but losing three Beauforts and two Hudsons. Before this attack, it was yet another farce.
Eight aircraft from 217 Squadron, together with three from 22 Squadron, had flown from RAF Thorney Island, West Sussex, to meet up with their escort over RAF Manston only to find the escort had already gone. Then, the aircraft were unable to communicate with RAF Manston so headed off unescorted. Even then, they failed to hit anything. A good account of one attack is given by the pilot of Beaufort AW275/L, 217 Squadron, flown by Pilot Officer James Stewart:
“At 15.35 hrs sighted force of two destroyers, Prinz Eugen, one capital ship and many other craft not identified. Attacking Prinz Eugen releasing one torpedo from 80100ft at a range of 2-3,000 yds. No results were observed but torpedo was seen running strongly approximately correct direction for Prinz Eugen. Aircraft was immediately afterwards attacked by two Me 109s the first of which was given two bursts of 40 rounds at 300-400 yds and dived vertically towards the sea with smoke coming from its engine. Two bursts were fired at the second aircraft from 500-600 yds, and although no results were seen, enemy aircraft banked steeply and disappeared. Aircraft sustained some damage but no casualties.”
The 217 Squadron Operations Record Book writer gave his view, writing:
“Terrific flap today. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen are out of Brest and heading up towards the North Sea. How they managed to get as far as this without detection is one more mystery of the war. Late that afternoon we were still in a muddle, but finally sorted things out.”
It was all becoming an unmitigated disaster for the British.
MURDERED BY GESTAPO
A similar farce was experienced by 86 Squadron. Six aircraft led by Wing Commander Charles Flood flew from RAF St Eval, Cornwall, to RAF Thorney Island and after refuelling was told to proceed to RAF Coltishall, Norfolk, to meet up with their escort. It was a rendezvous which never occurred, and they headed to the German fleet unescorted.
Finally, 42 Squadron had flown from RAF Leuchars, Scotland, to RAF Coltishall that morning where they would pick up their torpedoes. On arrival, they were told that the torpedoes had not yet arrived. Finally, they got airborne for RAF Manston where they too had to circle waiting for the escort and although eight aircraft reported to have launched torpedoes, no damage was inflicted.
Coastal Command’s efforts were set out by its HQ,
stating at the end of the day:
“Owing to the poor weather conditions, elaborate nature of the defences and the present paucity of evidence regarding damage sustained by the enemy, no claims are being submitted in the cases of the attacks on the enemy naval force.”
While all of this was going on, however, and at 17.00 hrs German time, a Dornier 217 dropped bombs on the destroyer Hermann Schörmann but missed. At that time, KG 2 was known to be active and a Do 217 E-4 flown by Lt Valentin Wagner of 5./KG 2 was damaged by Flak and he returned with a wounded observer.
Still, however, the RAF tried to throw anything and everything at the ships.
Led by Squadron Leader Noel Mowat, 607 Squadron flew a second sortie taking off from Manston at 14.20 hrs with eight aircraft. They claimed to have destroyed a tanker and damaged another, as well as damaging a Messerschmitt Bf 109 but three of their aircraft failed to return.
This operation had been preceded by a similar attack by six Hurricanes of 1 Squadron, led by Flight Lieutenant Wally Raymond and escorted by Spitfires of 129 Squadron. They made contact off the Belgian coast at 14.30 hrs, opening fire with 20 mm cannon. The starboard pair, White Section, comprising Pilot Officer Romualdas ‘Romas’ Marcinkus and Sergeant Errol Blair, failed to return.
It would appear they attacked Vorpostenboot 1302 and 1303 which then shot them down. Blair was killed, but Marcinkus crash landed near the coast at Knokke, Belgium, and was captured. Of Lithuanian heritage, he was part of the Great Escape and was one of those recaptured and murdered by the Gestapo on 29 March 1944.
Meanwhile, VP1302 was reported sunk northwest of Zeebrugge with 12 crew killed and 35 rescued. While VP1303 was damaged, VP1302 was the only German ship to be sunk during the Channel Dash.
During the same operation, 129 Squadron lost Pilot Officer George Davis, while Sergeant James Wilson had much of his Spitfire’s wing shot away by Flak and he was forced to bale-out over RAF Martlesham Heath and Flight Sergeant Ray Mcphie was attacked by three Messerschmitt Bf 109s which damaged his aircraft and wounded him in the heel.
HIT IN BOMB BAY
With deteriorating weather and poor light, the air battles began to wane and JG 2 and JG 26 had done their part and handed over to JG 1, flying from Dutch airfields. The last claim by French-based fighters being by Feldwebel Adolf Glunz of 4./JG 26 at 17.08 hrs.
Of the Dutch based units, II./JG 1 would claim two Blenheims, three Wellingtons and three Hampdens between 16.43 and 17.39 hrs, while IV./JG 1 would claim two Spitfires at around 17.38 hrs.
It was about now that the day fighters were replaced by the Messerschmitt Bf 110 night fighters, eight of which took off from Coxyde at 17.30 hrs. One from III./NJG 1 was damaged in combat and force landed at Schiphol with minimal damage. There were two reported combats between RAF bombers and the110s.
Squadron Leader Beverly Kerr, Flying Officer Don Allen and Sergeant Bernard Tompkins, flying Stirlings of 218 Squadron took off between 14.30 and 15.15 hrs. Allen sighted two destroyers through a break in the cloud, but it was only after circling for 36 minutes that the cruisers were spotted, and an attack carried out against one of them, the bombs falling harmlessly into the sea. The Stirling was hit in the bomb bay by flak and then attacked by three Messerschmitt Bf 110s, one attacking from dead astern and later from the starboard quarter. The Stirling’s gunners opened fire and one attacker was seen to break away in a vertical dive.
Sergeant Tompkins was also attacked but arrived
home safely with his bombs after being unable to locate the ships. Meanwhile, at 17.46 hrs, a Wellington of 214 Squadron flown by Flying Officer Francis Ruoff was attacked by a single Messerschmitt Bf 110 from the starboard quarter at 400 yds with continuous fire. The Wellington’s rear runner returned fire at 300 yds with three bursts and saw tracers apparently hit the nose and belly of the attacker which broke away to starboard, diving away. The Wellington returned none the worse for wear, albeit still carrying its bombs.
The air battles over the German warships were at last over.
LIMITED REVENGE
The last reported claim, however, was for a Wellington at 19.05 hrs by the destroyer Hermann Schoemann which crashed in the sea in flames, and it was now hoped that the bad weather and darkness would give the German ships some respite.
The day fighters had landed at Belgian and Dutch airfields in atrocious weather conditions, and the battleships steamed on.
Total darkness came at around 19.35 hrs, but now the RAF got limited revenge. At 20.55 hrs German time, Gneisenau was damaged by an air-dropped mine and although damage was not thought to be severe, she reduced speed but sailed on. Then, at 22.37 hrs,
Scharnhorst was further damaged by yet another mine off Terschelling and she too had to reduce speed.
By daybreak, the warships had reached the mouth of the Elbe and at 10.30 hrs on 13 February 1942, having not been further bothered by the British, all three docked at Wilhelmshaven. Even that, though, was not without incident as Gneisenau hit a submerged wreck which caused further damage and necessitated her going into dry dock. It was there, on the night of 26 February 1942, that she was hit by a single bomb during an air raid which caused serious damage and killed over 112 men. She was never fully repaired, being decommissioned in July 1942 and her armament taken off at the end of the year. Her fate was to be scuttled as a block ship at Gotenhafen on 27 March 1945.
Meanwhile, Scharnhorst was repaired in dry dock but was eventually sunk at the Battle of North Cape on 26 December 1943. Out of a crew of almost 2,000, only 36 survived. As for the undamaged Prinz Eugen, she was captured at the end of the war and became a target ship for nuclear tests at Bikini Atol.
Surviving two nuclear blasts in July 1946, she was nevertheless badly damaged and was towed to Kwajalein where, on 22 December 1946, she capsized and sank. It was not until the end of October 2018 that work was finally completed to pump out oil which had been seeping from her tanks. Today, she still lies upside down at Kwajalein - a silent reminder of the ‘Channel Dash’.
The ‘Dash’ had been something which Adolf Galland called the greatest honour of his career. And it had, indeed, been a success for the Luftwaffe. For the Kriegsmarine, it had been a somewhat pyrrhic victory given the fate that ultimately befell all three of these important warships.
For the British, it was a dismal and costly failure.