Stars, Bars and Pulsejets
While intelligence material on V-weapons was gathered by the Allies from a multitude of sources, including the interrogation of prisoners and photographic reconnaissance, technical intelligence obtained from the remains of V1 missiles brought down in Britain was also extremely valuable in terms of understanding the weapons and how they functioned.
While the overwhelming majority of V1s literally blew themselves to pieces, sufficient remnants were often discovered that enabled technical investigators and engineers to deduce a great deal about them. Additionally, one or two came down in Southern England and remained relatively intact when the warheads failed to detonate.
Furthermore, a good many intact examples were discovered in France once the launch sites and storage depots had been overrun after the landings of 6 June 1944.
However, a sufficiency of parts and components had been assembled in Britain by the mid-summer of 1944 to enable these items to be shipped to the United States along with a mass of technical data which had been gathered. Thus, as early as 13 July 1944, enough material had been shipped to the United States to allow a reverseengineered copy of the V1 to be constructed.
Although not an exact copy (the reconstruction varied in some details) the missile was almost identical in many respects. Named the JB-2, the Ford Motor Company built the PJ31, a copy of the V1’s pulsejet motor, and Willys-overland Motors duplicated the airframe.
Initial production began in late 1944, with the Pentagon quickly ordering mass production of the JB-2 for use against both Germany and Japan. The missile was expected to reach full production by April 1945, and in January an order was placed for a staggering 75,000
JB-2S intended for strikes on Germany. Ultimately, the end of both the war against Germany and Japan resulted in the JB-2 project being abandoned - although it is bizarre to consider that the ‘V1’ came close to being turned against its originators.
The V1 was the first-generation cruise missile, and it is interesting to note that the United States went on to become a leading proponent of that weapon in its late 20th and early 21st Century wars. Indeed, such was the importance of the cruise missile that by the early 21st Century it was used to good effect in the opening salvo of the 2003 Gulf War.
Then, in stark contrast to the abject failure of the V1 salvo planned for 12/13 June 1944, it truly was a ‘shock and awe’ strike by a salvo of around 1,000 of the V1’s successors.