Boris goes nuclear on energy strategy
The UK’s energy plans are full of big ideas. Small ones would have been better. Stuart Watkins reports
Prime minister Boris Johnson unveiled his long-awaited energy security policy last week, which put offshore wind and nuclear power at the centre of a plan to produce 95% of electricity from low-carbon sources by 2030 and reduce reliance on volatile global commodity markets. The aim is to deliver up to eight new nuclear reactors before 2030, generate 50GW of energy from offshore wind and double hydrogen production by 2030, boost solar fivefold by 2035, exploit North Sea oil and gas with new developments in the interim, and explore the potential of fracking through a new independent inquiry.
Industry groups and academics say the policy represents a “missed opportunity” that will not reduce the UK’s reliance on expensive imports in the short term nor alleviate the pressure on households from soaring fuel bills, report Nathalie Thomas and Sebastian Payne in the Financial Times. New nuclear and offshore wind infrastructure both come with long lead times; cheaper technologies, such as landbased turbines, which are quicker to install, were soft-pedalled as a result of pressure from Tory backbenchers.
The target for offshore wind is “genuinely ambitious” yet achievable and the boost to solar welcome given that it is the “quiet success story of the renewable revolution”, says Nils Pratley in The Guardian. Still, the “tiptoeing” around onshore wind looks like a clear case of “political cowardice” – it is “perverse” to back off on one of the cheapest forms of renewable power, given that public opinion is broadly supportive – and the big bet on nuclear “is, to put it mildly, hopeful”. Indeed it is, says Peter Franklin on UnHerd. The prime minister favours “big, bold, willy-waving policies”, and that’s why he chose to go big on nuclear. But “he’s forgotten that the story of British nuclear power is not a happy one”. Early attempts were plagued with technical problems; Margaret Thatcher’s pledge to give it another go resulted in only one new plant out of a planned ten due to escalating costs; Tony Blair’s bold plans met a similar fate. Boris, “hilariously”, thinks he can do ten times better than this 40-year record.
Loft insulation trumps nuclear reactors
The most glaring omission in the plans, though, says an editorial in the Financial Times, is the lack of initiatives to cut energy use. Beyond removing VAT on household energy-saving measures as already announced, there is no big programme to help insulate Britain’s “notoriously draughty homes” or any inducement for people to swap their gas boilers for heat pumps. The Treasury is “understandably resistant to new spending”, yet such investment would have “huge long-term benefits”. An insulation effort starting with the neediest households could reduce energy costs long term and help with bills. A “roll of loft insulation may not make for the most exciting of photo opportunities”, as Franklin puts it, “but right now that might make all the difference” in a way big promises won’t.
Indeed, extra nuclear power isn’t even needed, says Simon Nixon in The Times. The National Grid’s “Future Energy Scenarios” paper, published last year, laid out three pathways to net zero by 2050, none of which required new plants. What is key is reducing demand. The billions of pounds going on nuclear would be better invested in a national effort to decarbonise and improve energy efficiency in the residential sector. Investment in smart networks to allow differential pricing to maximise efficiency and enable households to sell back surplus energy is also needed. This is the “quickest and cheapest” way to meet net-zero targets, reduce the need for imported fossil fuels and bring down bills.
The idea of Finland joining Nato would have seemed “farfetched” earlier this year, but Russia’s “brutal invasion of Ukraine”, and mounting evidence of Russian war crimes, have now made it seem “all but inevitable” that the country will soon apply to join the Western alliance, says Richard Milne in the Financial Times. Polls show a majority of Finns supporting Nato membership for the first time and Finland’s government is preparing a white paper on the country’s security and potential Nato membership, which is due to be released later this month. A parliamentary debate is expected to follow. Some MPs are pushing for a decision to be taken before a Nato summit in Madrid at the end of June.
“Additional measures”
Finland is not alone in wanting to join Nato – the mood is also shifting in Sweden, says Jon Henley in The Guardian. Swedish prime minister Magdalena Andersson has been notably cautious about the idea, but her party has begun debating Nato membership, with a policy expected to be agreed by the summer. Nato membership is expected to be a key issue in parliamentary elections due on 11 September, with the centre-right opposition already saying they would back a Nato application, a position supported by around 50% of Swedes. Both countries have received public assurances from the Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, that their applications would be welcome.
The move is unlikely to be welcomed in Moscow, says Samantha Berkhead in The Times. It risks “chilling” Finland’s ties with Moscow, which have evolved from the 1939 Winter War into what many saw as a “partnership based on pragmatism and realism”. Moscow has made it clear that any further expansion towards its borders is a “red line”. Putin’s spokesman has said that Russia would consider such a move “a threat for the whole architecture of security” that would force it to take “additional measures”.
Closer than ever
Russia might talk about serious military and political consequences, but this is probably just impotent “fury”, say Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon in Foreign Policy. The Finnish government expects some form of retaliation, but believes this would be in the form of “information influencing” rather than anything more direct. Russia lacks the resources for concrete action, especially given its actions in Ukraine, and those countries thinking of membership are not viewed by the Kremlin in the same light as other prospective members that used to be in the Soviet Union.
Integrating Sweden or Finland into Nato “would not be hard”, says The Economist. Any application process could be “quick” and “interim security guarantees” could cut the period in which both countries were vulnerable to Russian “ire” but not yet covered by Nato’s mutual-defence clause. Decades of cooperation mean that both countries “are as close to Nato as it is possible for a nonmember to be”; indeed, some experts say Finland is in fact more “Nato interoperable than some actual members”. It looks like “a war launched by Vladimir Putin ostensibly to keep Nato at bay looks set to bring the alliance closer than ever before”.