Danger signals?

Further to G Pengelly’s letter regarding bland resignalling ( Open

Access, RAIL 863), I believe he is right to highlight an important issue.

People who refer to mechanical signalling as outdated/Victorian should think again, and perhaps buy a crystal ball.

Years ago, I had the pleasure of assisting a system engineer who used to say that electronics should be thought of in terms of dog years. He had a point - an operational life of 30 or so years is a long time in electronics. The digital world does not remain static - it dates almost as fast as paper burns.

I understand reasons for ‘state-of-the-art’ signalling and a desire to create 12 inter-connected Rail Operating Centres, but it’s difficult anticipating the future.

Rail businesses may believe they operate a hack-proof system, but security always overlooks something. When the decision to go digital was made, I wonder if Network Rail’s executives had ever heard of digital remapping- the ability to re-program silicon chips.

Chips are everywhere, from computers to engine management systems, and rail networks have millions of them. Without, I suggest, a strategic number of mechanical analogue signal boxes, you are unlikely to contain an incident - with the potential to spread across the network.

There is then the headache of replacing (wholly or in part) old-fashioned integrated circuits quickly, which diagnostic programs are not designed to fix.

Nefarious programming for silicon chips is out there. Future handheld wireless communication devices designed for industry could find another use - take laser light pens, for example, or even electronic warfare. So far, to my knowledge, this has not been deployed in this way. But we must ask ourselves, especially in the world in which we live today, will Network Rail stay lucky? R. Harriss, Essex