NO RELEASED CAPACITY
One of the main benefits of new high-speed rail lines is that they can free up capacity on existing lines which no longer have to accommodate longer-distance non-stopping trains.
The DfT’s June 2022 paper ponders whether (for example) once the CreweManchester HS2 line is in place, the planned hourly HS2 service from London to Stoke and Macclesfield might be
restructuring on existing lines (which might in turn entail some infrastructure changes), it’s no wonder that the benefit calculation (which takes into account all effects positive and negative) is so dismal.
THE MAIN LINE AND ITS SPUR
It is wrong to think of the route north to Golborne as a ‘spur’ or as a branch off the HS2 main line. Really, the London-Glasgow⁄ Edinburgh route is the main line (comprising HS2 and the northern part of the West Coast Main Line), and Crewe-Manchester is an (important) branch off it.
This isn’t just a question of nomenclature. The benefits of extending northwards towards Scotland (Golborne) are greater than those achieved by creating a new high-speed CreweManchester line - much of which, by the way, would necessarily be speed-restricted through its lengthy tunnelled approach into central Manchester.
CAPITAL COSTS
So, let’s turn to the question of costs. Does removing the Golborne spur allow a significant saving in capital outlay? Surprisingly, it seems not.
The capital costs for HS2 Crewe-Manchester without Golborne are stated as being in the range of £15 billion to £22bn.
With the Golborne link taken off the table, a study is promised to consider other options for the Anglo-Scottish route northwards. This work is to be taken forward by DfT⁄HS2 Ltd and Network Rail, who will ‘engage with the Scottish Government’.
A budget allocation has been identified for the options for this work on ‘alternatives to Golborne’. Interestingly, this expenditure would apparently need to cover not just the costs of the replacement of (or modification to) the Golborne spur, but also the works required over the West Coast Main Line to support the operation of the planned Anglo-Scottish HS2 services. These include:
■ Significant works at each of Preston and Carlisle stations, where 400-metre-long platforms will be needed.
■ A depot at Annandale for HS2 trains. ■ Other unspecified changes along the length of the Crewe-Glasgow⁄ Edinburgh existing line.
But what the DfT’s June 2022 report makes clear is that the budget for the Golborne spur replacement (and, it would seem, at least some of these other WCML costs) is very modest.
It says that capital expenditure should not exceed £2bn-£3bn in total, in order to comply with the £96bn Integrated Rail Plan budget ceiling. But since the discounted capital cost of the Golborne spur is stated in the June report to be £4bn, clearly the undiscounted costs of the (removed) Golborne spur alone must be at least £4bn (say around £5bn-£6bn).
An accountancy explanation might be that in removing the Golborne spur, some of its costs have been ‘transferred’ to the estimate for the surviving Crewe-Manchester line.
Any substitute for the Golborne spur that might be examined as a suitable replacement (such as a line of route upgrade) has a budget allocation capped at below the expected cost of the original spur.
So, it would not be possible, for instance, to conclude in due course that the best approach would be simply to reinstate the Golborne spur as designed, because to do so would be inconsistent with the allocated budget. Any substitute, far from being a lengthier scheme as the Union Connectivity Review envisaged, would need to be shorter.
There is no mention of separate funding to be made available to implement the Union Connectivity Review’s conclusions, which featured rail investment north of Crewe towards Scotland as the first of its several key recommendations across the transport modes.
If this does emerge later, it will no doubt be welcome. And let’s hope that by then the need to respect the Integrated Rail Plan’s £96bn budget will be quietly forgotten.
SERVING CREWE AND MANCHESTER
There is no mention of a north-side connection at Crewe to allow trains from the Phase 2b route from Manchester (or indeed from other north of Crewe locations if a suitable variant of the Golborne link can be found) to call at Crewe station.
But it appears that “the Northern Connection (at Crewe) is part of the Northern Powerhouse Rail programme rather than HS2, although it is included in the HS2 Hybrid Bill”, according to papers presented to the Transport for the North Board on June 30.
In other words, powers to construct the connection will be sought in the HS2 Bill, but the question of how such a scheme would be funded is for another day.
In its absence, Crewe will be restricted to the two trains per hour HS2 service plan that it will receive on HS2 service commencement.
Regarding Manchester, Transport for the North and the Manchester authorities have contended that Piccadilly HS2 station should be built below ground level and designed as a through station.
The Phase 2b plans provide for a lower-cost, terminating, above-ground-level station at Piccadilly.
This HS2 part of the station is not going to be connected to existing Network Rail lines. Trains can only return back to Crewe over the HS2 Phase 2b upon arrival.
True, a further and largely tunnelled line could be added later (Northern Powerhouse Rail, pointing north-east towards
Huddersfield). But this would have to await its turn for legislation and funding, and the 2050s would seem to be its earliest possible opening decade.
Greengauge 21 pointed to the merits of a through (underground) station design at Piccadilly four years ago. It would also have lent itself to creating a new crossManchester route for NPR services, as well as accommodating HS2 services.
The current Phase 2b HS2 plans for Manchester bring no solution to the current problems and limitations of the rail network in central Manchester. Nor do they provide a basis for speeding up NPR journeys from Liverpool to Manchester at a later stage.
But the contention here isn’t about the fact that local stakeholders at either end of this section of the planned HS2 route would have liked to see a commitment to more expensive transformations of Crewe and Manchester Piccadilly stations respectively.
Such propositions may bring greater benefits, of course, but the DfT and ministers have judged that such gains would be outweighed by significantly greater capital
The decision to progress with a Crewe-Manchester HS2 Bill shorn of its facility to connect northwards towards Scotland makes no sense. Having created a London-Crewe high-speed line (HS2 Phases 1 and 2a), the policy priority is surely to ensure that HS2 can support better and expanded cross-border rail services.
costs and lengthier build programmes. In the absence of a wider plan, the opportunity to evidence such gains is lost.
IMPLICATIONS
On current plans, the next stage of HS2 will cost £15bn-£22bn and bring a much lower rate of measurable benefit in both economic and greenhouse gas reduction terms than HS2 Phases 1 and 2a provide.
The Golborne link from the Phase 2b scheme has been dropped for political reasons, leaving the problem of promoting a scheme where the value of it is (at best) questionable.
Of all the possible uses of £15bn-£22bn in taking forward projects considered in the Integrated Rail Plan, this diminished CreweManchester project would not be an obviously high priority.
The funds left to contemplate what is to be done in the absence of the Golborne link fall hopelessly short of what is needed to improve infrastructure northwards from Crewe to Scotland (the ‘main line’ that should be the focus of attention). This is because:
■ It is here where there is the scope to create faster rail times that can bring about significant carbon reduction, building on the committed investment in HS2 phases 1 and 2a with less need for both air travel and car travel over the generally longer distances involved in cross-border Anglo-Scottish travel.
■ It is also here where more rail capacity is needed most, including for the longer-distance freight flows in the corridor.
These are the underlying most important strategic objectives for the next stage of HS2 development on the western side of the country. Shaving just a few further minutes off the Phase 1⁄2a HS2 London-Manchester rail journey time cannot be the number one priority.
The decision to progress with a CreweManchester HS2 Bill shorn of its facility to connect northwards towards Scotland makes no sense. Having created a London-Crewe high-speed line (HS2 Phases 1 and 2a), the policy priority is surely to ensure that HS2 can support better and expanded cross-border rail services.
High-speed services for passengers can reduce the need for domestic air travel. And the capacity freed up by HS2 for more rail freight south of Crewe needs to be made available northwards, to accommodate the switch of 350-mile+ HGV movements from the national motorway network to electrified rail - a switch essential for net zero.
Regional rail strategies are needed to frame rail investment projects.
Of course, HS2 services will still need to reach Manchester, and the existing CreweManchester railway will be used for this purpose from the early 2030s onwards. It is level and largely straight, and capable of accommodating the necessary train paths. With some relatively modest investment, it can provide line speeds in excess of 200kph (125mph).
Some junction improvements would no doubt be desirable in the Stockport area. And it would make sense to provide the long platforms that HS2 trains need at Piccadilly (and at Stockport).
All this should be planned not as a standalone HS2 project, but as a Manchester area rail strategy, designed to get the best value from whatever investment is needed for the range of rail services in the area.
This common-sense approach has been sadly absent in HS2 (and Northern Powerhouse Rail) planning. There has been no regional⁄sub-regional strategic planning, only a project-level attempt to marry Northern Powerhouse Rail aspirations with HS2 alignment plans. As a result, the current Phase 2b station plan at Piccadilly, for example, makes no contribution to tackling the limitations of the rail network in central Manchester.
A needs-must approach which looks to upgrade the existing Crewe-Manchester route for a sensible price, instead of building HS2 Phase 2b, could bring a very wide set of benefits to the city region, not just a new facility for HS2 trains.
And it would leave some spare capital investment budget to make real progress northwards from Crewe to Preston and Scotland.
CONCLUSIONS
The decision to drop the Golborne spur leaves us riding the wrong horse - off to Manchester Piccadilly instead of onwards to Preston, Carlisle and Scotland.
Some might hope that the decision taken about the Golborne link could be revisited in due course. But lead times are long, and anyway there seems to be an inadequate capital budget to examine the alternatives.
The damage to the Anglo-Scottish component of HS2 (which is really where it delivers for the nation) could take decades to put right.
Phase 2b into Manchester has a delivery decade of the 2040s. England-Scotland has been relegated to the 2050s or beyond. It’s a long time to be riding the wrong horse - and in the meantime it’s a waste of scarce capital budget. R