Jutland battleship that made Turkey our Great War foe
ReCenT descriptions of the Battle of Jutland have failed to convey the chaos that characterised the conflict. after 100 years, it’s time for an objective analysis. Both the British and German fleets had much the same strategy: a scouting force trying to lure their opponents on to a much stronger fleet. But woeful communications between the British ships (and the admiralty) and innumerable tactical errors led to a confused melee, with ships steaming in all directions, unaware of each other’s positions and intentions, much less those of their foes. admiral Beatty’s battlecruisers outran his four supporting battleships, dangerously dividing his fleet when, at about 16:30, to his complete surprise he was led on to admiral scheer’s oncoming High seas fleet of 16 dreadnought battleships — which the admiralty had advised were still in port! He immediately turned back to try to lure the Germans on to admiral Jellicoe’s Grand fleet to the north, but an improper signal meant the four battleships continued their southerly course, and two elements of the British fleet suddenly found themselves passing each other in opposite directions. a lack of initiative meant that, in darkening, smoky conditions, British battleships held their fire for fear of betraying their positions, even when German ships blundered almost under their guns. In the highly confused night action, HMs Black prince mistakenly formed up with the German fleet, was recognised and sunk with all hands. The German High seas fleet was shocked to be suddenly confronted by Jellicoe’s Grand fleet, but only ten of the 24 British battleships opened fire and scheer was able to escape. Jellicoe declined to pursue directly for fear of torpedoes, but scheer realised his reprieve was temporary and boldly turned back towards the British fleet, which he correctly calculated was the last thing they expected. Jellicoe managed to inflict much damage but no sinkings on the Germans. scheer escaped again, and by nightfall the biggest battleship fleet encounter in history was over. The battle ended with the British much the worse off, with 6,000 dead and twice the tonnage sunk. It’s a myth that Britain ‘won’ because the Germans ‘never put to sea again’: they made several more sorties, the first as early as august, only three months later
when most of their ships had already been repaired. Neither the British Press nor the public regarded the battle as a victory at the time, but more a disgrace. But the angst was forgotten a month later when the nation suffered ten times those casualties on just the first day of the ill-fated Somme campaign. A fascinating footnote concerns the presence in the British fleet of the world’s most powerful battleship, the Agincourt. originally ordered by the Brazilians to intimidate their South American neighbours, she was sold on to Turkey when Brazil went bankrupt. The Turks bought her by public subscription and patriotically named her Sultan osman I, and she was ready for delivery on the eve of World War I. Unwilling to give up such a powerful asset, Churchill confiscated her for the British fleet, and she was renamed Agincourt. The Turks were outraged, and the Germans exploited the situation by presenting them with the powerful cruiser Goeben. Turkey was neutral at the time, but this was enough to tip Turkey into declaring for the Central powers. As a result, the Dardanelles were closed to Russian shipping, blocking 90 per cent of her trade, and in another ill-fated Churchillian plan the far-flung Australians and New Zealanders, among others, were called on to remedy the situation and died in their thousands in the futile Gallipoli campaign. The consequences of the Agincourt’s seizure might have hastened the collapse of Tsarist Russia, facilitated the rise of the Soviet Union and prolonged the war on the Western Front when thousands of German troops were transferred there from the East. overall, the Battle of Jutland was a very costly, but ultimately irrelevant, debacle of woeful communications, gross tactical errors and missed opportunities. Its unintended consequence was to have hastened the German U-boat campaign, but had it never happened the strategic situation in the North Sea would have been just the same.
dAvId H. lEWIS, Nelson, Caerphilly.