‘Two-inch rail spread’ in charter derailment

An official investigation into a charter train derailment at Southampton Docks in November has identified a series of track maintenance failures by Network Rail, and a serious breakdown in routine track safety monitoring - because of staff shortages. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) found that the 13-coach UK Railtours special, carrying more than 500 enthusiasts from Waterloo to Fawley, derailed on the single-line section between Northam Junction and Southampton Eastern Docks - because the rails had spread by two inches (51mm), to a gauge of 4ft 10½in. The line is regularly used by freight, boat trains and charters, including the Belmond Pullman, and although the November 5 charter was being ‘topped and tailed’ by a pair of Class 66 diesels, steam railtours have also used the route. There were no injuries, because the train, comprising Riviera Trains’ chocolate and cream Mk 1 set, was on a sharp curve and travelling at only 10mph - but three axles of the leading coach (BFK generator car No. 35469) and the leading axle of the second vehicle (FO No. 3098) were derailed. As the gauge narrowed again, the right-hand wheels were pressed hard up against the inside of the rails, causing gouging and bruising of their outer faces. The damaged wheels of the two coaches were repaired at Eastleigh, and the coaches were out of traffic for three weeks. The RAIB report states that as an NR ‘maintenance category 5’ line, a visual track inspection (or ‘patrol’) is required every two weeks. Additionally, a section manager is supposed to conduct a supervisory walk of the line every 13 weeks, and a track maintenance engineer is mandated to inspect it every two years. RAIB found, however, that the fortnightly ‘patrols’ were only conducted once a month - and nobody had conducted the 13-week supervisory walk of the line for more than three years, because the requirement to do so had not been listed in ‘Ellipse’, the railway’s civil engineering work management handbook. RAIB further discovered that the Eastleigh track maintenance area had been without a track section manager for two years. His duties were in part covered by assistant section managers but, says the RAIB: “Witness evidence indicates that the workload involved in doing this led to increased sickness, and a refusal to cover ‘higher grade roles’. The renewal of track in the area, scheduled for August 2015, had been ‘deferred’, the RAIB found, and two ‘work orders’ to replace decayed wooden sleepers, written in February 2012 and May 2016, were also deferred, or ‘re-prioritised’ to May 2017. Track patrols of the line on August 9, September 6 and October 4 2016 all highlighted that there were defective sleepers in the area of the derailment. But, says the RAIB: “These reports were logged and the information entered into Ellipse. Defects recorded in this manner require rectifying within four weeks, but no remedial work was recorded as having been undertaken, and at the time of the accident, no evidence of any works could be seen. “In the last few years, some partial re-sleepering had been done, but by replacing individual sleepers without any attempt to correct the wide gauge. Only some of the re-sleepering work required in the area had been carried out. Due to incomplete records it is not possible to establish when this work was done, or by whom.” As a result of the accident, and a related incident at Shawford, Hants, the RAIB is now in discussion with NR on the subject of staffing levels, as they affect the network owner’s commitment to track safety.