The Battle of Anzio
Gerald Prenderghast describes the Allied attempts to outwit the German defenders in Italy on the way to Rome
Gerald Prenderghast describes the Allied attempts to outwit the German defenders in Italy on the way to Rome by landing at Anzio and then breaking out. However, it didn’t quite work out that way.
On 3 September 1943, Harold Alexander's 15 Army group invaded Italy at Salerno, Calabria and Taranto. Their main objectives were the roads leading to Rome, in particular route 6, which went to the capital through the spine of the Appenine mountains via the Liri valley at Monte Cassino, which overlooked and controlled this main road. However, in the opposing camp, German commanders had problems far more consuming than the Allied march on Rome. Losing northern Italy would leave the way clear to the vital Balkan oil fields, which were by then fuelling almost all the German army groups. Their loss would probably see the beginning of the end for Hitler and the Reich.
Opposing Alexander was General Albert Kesselring, C-in-C South in Italy under Rommel, who had previously organised German bomber raids against London during the Blitz and later shown his strategic skill by abstracting 60,000 troops from Sicily. Although beaten at Salerno by stubborn Allied resistance and their overwhelming naval gunfire, he subsequently began a slow retreat to a series of defensive lines erected across the Appenines from east to west, which took maximum advantage of the difficult terrain and its awful roads. The Gustav line was the third of these barriers and Germany's main defensive fortification in northern Italy, running from just north of the mouth of the Garigliano River in the west, through the Apennine
mountains to the mouth of the Sangro River on the Adriatic coast.
In November 1943, Rommel was sent to France and Kesselring took command of all German troops in Italy, having assured Hitler that he could keep the Allied armies away from the Balkan oil fields for at least six months. However, despite Kesselring's meticulous planning, stubborn German resistance and the mud and snow of an Italian winter, by November 1943 Allied forces had reached the Gustav Line, which effectively barred any further progress by Montgomery's Eighth army advancing in the east and General Mark Clark's Fifth army to the west. Clark was held up in front of
Monte Cassino, just 80 miles from Rome through country with two good roads, populated by Italian civilians who were sick of the war and ready to welcome the Alexander's men with open arms.
With the joint Allied armies so close to their final objective and tired of waiting for something to happen, Churchill came up with a plan to break the stalemate. He proposed landing two divisions behind the Gustav line at Anzio, then moving on Rome, having first cut Routes 6 and 7, XIV Corp's main supply routes. General Alexander had already considered this plan, using five divisions instead of two, but abandoned the idea because Clark's Fifth army had neither the men nor enough transport to move that many troops to Anzio. Operation Overlord was
in the offing and transport ships for amphibious operations were in short supply, especially tank landing ships (LSTs). Clark however, proposed a smaller landing, Operation Shingle, intended to divert German reserves from the Gustav Line and hold Anzio until Clark broke through at Monte Cassino, relieving the men on the beachhead before marching on Rome.
Lucien Truscott’s 3 Division was selected initially for this landing, but Truscott was pessimistic about his chances, correctly regarding the beach and its surrounding high lands as a lethal combination, and finally Clark agreed and cancelled the operation. Churchill insisted, however, and eventually a modified plan was agreed, which had Major General John Lucas leading VI Corps on to the beach at Anzio, advancing into the surrounding hills, disrupting the German XIV Army communications and threatening their rear. The planners hoped this would draw von Kesselring's forces away from Monte Cassino and allow the Fifth Army to break through and march on Rome, accompanied by VI Corps.
On paper this looked like a win-win situation. If Kesselring pulled troops out of the Gustav line to contain the Anzio beachhead, then Allied forces could break through his weakened defences to relieve Lucas and move on Rome. If he ignored Anzio, VI Corps would be able to threaten Rome and Kesselring's communications. Alexander was clear about the limits of the operation, ordering Clark to ‘… carry out an assault landing on the beaches in the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German XIV Corps (on the Gustav Line).’
Anzio was at the north-western end of the Pontine Marshes, a tract of marshland which had been reclaimed and turned into farmland during one of El Duce’s initiatives in the 1930s. This former marsh was bounded on one side by the sea and on the other by a range of mountains collectively referred to as Monte Laziali, which included the Alban Hills north west of the town. Clark's initial orders to Lucas instructed him to seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio, then advance and secure the Alban Hills which dominated Routes 6 and 7, after which he was to be prepared to advance on Rome. However, Clark and Lucas had both seen their men receive a considerable mauling at Salerno, which perhaps dampened their enthusiasm for Shingle, and Clark
sent Lucas a second set of orders which omitted the attack on Rome and gave him wide latitude for the timing of his attack on the Alban Hills. Lucas may have assumed Clark meant that his primary concern was consolidation and unfortunately, this ambiguity laid the foundations for the problems at Anzio.
Despite what his critics have said, Lucas was not wholly to blame. The operation was flawed from the start because the two groups of senior figures, British and American had never been absolutely clear about the objectives and scope of Shingle, nor were enough men or armour allocated to the operation. Churchill, in particular, insisted that it was to be a joint attack on Rome and the rear of Kesselring’s forces, while Alexander, Clark and their subordinates saw it as a less far reaching operation, intended to draw German forces away from Cassino, allowing Clark to break through and advance on Rome, with his Fifth army reinforced by VI Corps. Whatever Clark and Lucas may have thought, however, no-one ever intended that the invading force at Anzio should remain on the beaches.
Lucas was probably entirely wrong for a job like this, which needed the drive of a Montgomery or Patton. He had served in Mexico against Pancho Villa and was in France briefly during 1918, but afterwards spent most of his career in staff and technical appointments. A good technical soldier and noted academic, he was 53 when appointed to IV Corps, his first combat command since Amiens in 1918, and his last. He was replaced at Anzio by Lucien Truscott and finished the war as a staff officer.
The Operation begins
On 22 January 1944, four days after the US Fifth Army attacked German positions on the Garigliano and Rapido rivers near Cassino, Shingle was launched, transportation being carried out by the Royal Navy and Rear Admiral Frank Lowry's Task Force 81. Britain's 1st Infantry Division landed on Peter beach six miles north of Anzio with support from 2nd Special Service Brigade and the 46th Royal Tank Regiment. In the south, Truscott's 3rd Infantry Division landed on X-Ray beach east of Nettuno and six miles from Anzio, supported by 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment. Three battalions of Rangers who had landed with them attacked the port itself, capturing it without difficulty, the other landings also being virtually unopposed. Although ships of the landing forces were strafed by a handful of Luftwaffe aircraft who penetrated the Allied
CAP (Combat Air Patrol), damage was minimal. Allied losses were only 13 men killed and 97 wounded, German units which might have opposed the landings had been deployed further south to counter the US Fifth Army’s earlier attack on the Garigliano. The town's civilian population was also gone and the Allied deployment progressed swiftly, so that by the end of Day 1, 36,000 troops and 3,200 vehicles were ashore, with the way clear to leave the beach, cut routes 6 and 7 and strand the Germans without petrol, food or ordnance. During this period a US reconnaissance patrol had also found the way to Rome open, so that a bolder commander might have at least moved his men forward, thus denying the German artillery their advantageous positions in the hills. Lucas threw away this opportunity, tasking his troops with extending the narrow Anzio bridgehead.
Eight days later, on 30 January, Lucas finally ordered his men forward but by now it was too late. Acting on orders from the Führer, Kesselring had rapidly moved troops from outside Italy to the hills overlooking Anzio and by the time VI Corps began to move, Lucas found the 69,000 men of his two augmented divisions facing eight partial divisions of over 71,000 Germans. Even worse, Kesselring's eight divisions, which included five divisions of LXXVI Panzer Corps, were comfortably entrenched in a perfect position to shell the Allied landing force out of existence. Casualties during the resulting bombardment reflect this, the Guards Brigade alone losing 2,000 men out of a total of 2,500, while one of the battalions of 167 London Brigade was reduced from 1,000 men to just 60.
Lucas' attack on 30 January began as a two pronged assault against Campoleone
and Cisterna and it turned into a disaster, with little progress being made and 761 men of the I and 3 Ranger Battalions cut off and killed at Cisterna, only six men from both battalions being able to return to the beachhead. On 3 February, von Mackensen, who had assumed control of the Anzio defences on 25 January and commanded the 100,000 men of XIV Corps, launched a counter-attack against the Allies, who were now augmented by the British 56 Infantry Division and numbering 76,000 troops. Within hours the Allied gains of 30 January had been lost, British 1 Division taking heavy casualties and fighting to hold its original defensive line. This set the pattern for the following day but, by 5 February, the situation had stabilised and both sides began employing heavy artillery and bombers to soften up their opponents. On 7 February, German attacks resumed and by 18 February, VI Corps had been pushed back to their prepared defences on the line of the original beachhead. Here both sides halted, each having sustained about 20,000 killed and wounded since the initial landings and exhausted all the reserves of their troops, both mental and physical. Unconvinced by reports on the condition of his men, Hitler ordered another counter attack on 29 February, its only result being the slaughter of 2,500 men of the XIV Army.
After a brief period as Lucas’ deputy, Lucien Truscott replaced him on 22 February and immediately began planning a decisive attack from Anzio as part of a general offensive to begin in May, which included Operation Diadem, a major attack on the Gustav line. The main objective of this plan was to keep Kesselring's armies occupied and prevent the Wehrmacht withdrawing forces from Italy to re-deploy elsewhere, like the beaches of Normandy. As an added bonus, most of the German X Army would also be caught between Clark's V Army advancing through the Gustav Line and VI Corps moving inland from Anzio.
Truscott was a better man for this post than his predecessor, Lucas. Only 48 at the time of his promotion, in 1942 he had helped develop the first US Ranger battalion, remaining to command it under General William Darby. He had been at Dieppe as an observer and led the 60 Infantry and 66 Armoured Regiments ashore during Operation Torch, before landing with 3 Infantry in Sicily.
Not unexpectedly, Kesselring had also been busy, building the Caesar line south of Rome, pulling his weary troops out of the line to rest and refit as well as turning off the drainage pumps which kept the Pontine marshes dry, hoping disease and wet feet would do part of his work for him. During March and April, military activity on the Anzio lines was at a low level, consisting of local skirmishes, mortar and artillery duels, and night-time patrolling in no-man’s land reminiscent of trench warfare in WWI, although Allied casualties from trench foot, malaria and related causes still totalled over 37,000. While the troops were suffering, the
Allied commanders were planning VI Corp's breakout. Two plans were being considered: Operation Turtle, an assault up the Via Anziate, through Aprilia to Route 7 and on to Rome. This was the shortest but also the most heavily defended route to the capital and it was finally decided to go further south via Cisterna, across the Alban Hills to Route 6 at Valmontone and cutting off the retreating German X Army in an operation designated Buffalo.
Breaking out
Diadem began well, British, Indian and Canadian forces opening the attack across the Garigliano and Rapido rivers on 11 May and by 23 May, Allied troops had broken through the Gustav Line, forcing the Germans to send their men encircling Anzio south. Kesselring guessed Truscott would take the shortest route to Rome and deployed his troops across the Via Anziatato accordingly, but Buffalo began on 23 May instead. Cisterna fell on 25 May and by the end of May, VI
Corps was in the Alban Hills, threatening Valmontone and Highway 6. Now unfortunately, ego supplanted military sense. Clark changed the direction of VI Corp's advance towards Route 7, effectively returning to Operation Turtle so that US 5 Army would be first into Rome, not the British. Unfortunately, this sent the US 45 Infantry and 1 Armoured Divisions against the strongest section of the Caesar Line, holding up the advance until the US 36 Division found a gap in the defences, allowing it to threaten Velletri and force the Germans to withdraw. By 2 June the Caesar Line had collapsed and US forces entered Rome two days later, on 4 June 1944. Clark held an impromptu press conference on the steps of the Town Hall that morning, ensuring the event was a strictly American affair by stationing military police at road junctions to refuse British military personnel entry to the city.
Condemnation for the struggle at Anzio has been reserved for John Lucas and although his lengthy consolidation was certainly responsible for the delay, his contemporaries were less ready to assign him all the blame. Alexander wrote: ‘The actual course of events was probably the most advantageous in the end.’ For the
Germans, Kesselring explained: ‘It would have been the Anglo-American doom to over-extend themselves. The landing force was initially weak, only a division or so of infantry, and without armour. It was a halfway measure of an offensive; that was your basic error.’
While Anzio was a lost opportunity to break out swiftly, Clark's conduct afterwards must rank as one of the war's most colossal pieces of egotism. Lucien Truscott wrote later on the decision to implement Operation Turtle: ‘I was dumbfounded. This was no time to drive to the north-west where the enemy was still strong; we should pour our maximum power into the Valmontone Gap to insure the destruction of the retreating German Army. I would not comply with the order without first talking to General Clark in person. There has never been any doubt in my mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to the north-west on May 26, the strategic objectives of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was a poor compensation for this lost opportunity.’
The last word can be safely left to Alan Whicker, who was a correspondent with the British Army's Film and Photo Unit who said: ‘ General Mark Clark was so eager that the world should see pictures showing him as the liberator of Rome, that he allowed the armies of a delighted Kesselring to escape. He had ignored the orders of Field Marshall Alexander in a decision as militarily stupid as it was insubordinate. This vain-glorious blunder, the worst of the entire war, lost us a stunning victory, lengthened the war by many months and earned Mark Clark the contempt of other American and British generals. If General Mark Clark had been in the German Army, Hitler would have had him shot.’