Crisis in the Red Sea must make Britain re-examine its strategy in the region

Dominic Nicholls ASSOCIATE EDITOR (DEFENCE)

Nearly two hundred years ago the Royal Marines landed in Aden as part of an operation to protect shipping off the coast of Yemen from pirate raids.

If the Navy means to perform the same role today, and protecting global shipping routes is a fundamental duty of Western armed forces, its strategy may need a fundamental rethink.

In terms of purpose and a plan to serve that end, Britain’s senior service is in better shape than either the RAF or the Army. Sure, the RAF has a plan and the funding to field 48 F-35 Lightning II strike fighters, with the aspiration to put a further 90 into the air. Maritime patrol aircraft, logistic and intelligence planes and drones are all in the mix too.

Much, however, is not in service, and the money to close that gap is under increasing pressure as questions are asked about the future viability of crewed aircraft, now we have all seen the versatility and lethality of drones.

Even so, the flyboys still fare better than those in green.

The counter-insurgency years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan still cast a long shadow in terms of equipment in British Army service, and a clearly defined role to go along with it.

The mess that has been made of the £5.5 billion Ajax procurement highlights many of the deep-rooted problems facing the Army today. Will future security challenges require military forces (predominantly the land-based army) to be light, cyberenabled groupings that can deploy globally at a moment’s notice? Or will massed armoured engagements, with the attrition rates and casualty levels expressed in the war in Ukraine, still be in vogue in, say, 30 years – the realistic time frame for a major procurement project such as a new tank?

You can’t have both.

In contrast, the long-term decisions taken by the Navy do – in some ways – appear to be bearing fruit today.

Choosing 20 years ago to get Britain back into the aircraft carrier game is one good investment. It took a while (and £6 billion) but the result was two state-of-the art aircraft carriers, plus air defence destroyers, submarine-hunting frigates and friendly submarines.

Add to that the next-generation of Britain’s nuclear armed deterrent submarines and what the package may lack in quantity, it certainly makes up for in quality. But the service is probably not sufficient to maintain a constant presence around the Red Sea.

With the Houthis unlikely to be wiped out by the limited strikes we saw on Thursday night, their attacks on shipping may well continue – perhaps going quiet for a year or two before a dramatic re-emergence. Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said: “How long such a mission can be sustained will depend on how many other governments and navies are also ready to take a meaningful share of the burden. There is a debate over what impact a prolonged disruption will have on the global economy, and the extent to which the shipping community will adapt. That could include returning to using the Red Sea if the threat can be returned to acceptable levels. In the end, this is a major shipping route, and there are stakes involved beyond the region.”

All of which means the way the Royal Navy is organised – prioritising the North Atlantic area and operation of Britain’s nuclear deterrent – could come into conflict with that timeless requirement of navies throughout history: to keep trade flowing and defeat anyone - pirates, rebels, privateers - who try to disrupt it.

In terms of purpose, Britain’s senior service is in better shape than either the RAF or the Army

The longterm decisions taken by the Navy do – in some ways – appear to be bearing fruit today