How Balfour’s great purpose led to conflict

A century after Britain supported a Jewish state, the legacy of its bungled implementation remains

Almost 100 years ago, the British government officially converted to Zionism. On November 2 1917, a 67-word letter travelled 1,500 yards from the foreign secretary, Lord Balfour, in Whitehall to Lord Rothschild in Piccadilly. By “expressing sympathy” for Jewish Zionist endeavours and viewing “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”, the communication transformed the course of Jewish history. It provided a stepping stone to the establishment of the state of Israel. It was a bold and visionary statement. But after the war, Britain lacked the resources and ingenuity to implement it.

The roots of the extraordinary declaration have been debated for decades. The prime minister, David Lloyd George, and Arthur Balfour were inspired by their Christianity to enable the return of the Jewish people to the land of Israel – a goal given greater urgency by anti-semitism in Europe and the humanitarian crisis of Russian Jewry, where tens of thousands were killed in pogroms.

But they were also driven by the immediate mission to win the First World War, and in that context gaining favour with Jewish communities across the world was considered a distinct advantage if they could influence decision-making in America and Russia. Above all, Britain was acknowledging the reality on the ground: Jews had already established thriving towns and successful farms in their historical homeland. Moroever, Zionist leaders were skilled diplomats and their requests for support were met favourably in Germany, Italy, France and the United States.

If Britain didn’t declare their support, another country would. But the Empire had an edge: they were the only European power fighting in the Middle East and the eventual defeat of the Ottomans chimed well with British plans for a post-war settlement, including British control of vital shipping routes to India from Suez and a network of permanent bases in the region.

At the end of the war, Britain was granted a mandate from the League of Nations in the newly created territory of Palestine. Hugely in debt, overstretched and unable to commit fresh forces abroad, Britain was now in control of vast territories, including Egypt, Palestine and another new creation – Iraq. In addition, Britain offered the Arabs independence in return for fighting the Ottomans, but they also promised the Zionists a Jewish home in Palestine.

British rule in Palestine was hampered by these competing pressures, and the government never developed a coherent strategy to implement the Balfour Declaration. Winston Churchill, the colonial secretary, told Arab leaders the declaration was “manifestly right”, while assuring them the Jewish national home wouldn’t be created in all of Palestine, but without suggesting where it would be.

Both Zionists and Arabs were bitterly disappointed. Unable to work together in a shared national endeavour, they functioned autonomously and this incubated their conflict with increasingly tragic consequences. The Arabs interpreted the British lack of clarity as an opportunity. If they stood firm against Jewish immigration they hoped the proposed homeland would be abandoned. In the Palestinian narrative, Balfour is the start of a national disaster. But it was a disaster of their own design. They refused to accept Jewish autonomy, however small; they never compromised and rejected every subsequent plan to share the land.

The Zionists learnt to adapt to each twist and turn in British policy. They built strong institutions and prepared for conflict. They compromised on almost every issue to achieve the goal of Jewish self-determination, accepting severe limits on immigration, even when open borders could have saved millions of Jewish lives. They agreed a two-state solution in 1937 and accepted the UN partition plan in 1947 that laid the foundation for the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

Balfour’s declaration had great moral purpose, but was implemented without clarity, vision or the necessary resources. The sad truth is that British rule amounted to conflict management, when its focus should have been to design a two-state solution from the beginning.

James Sorene is CEO at the Britain Israel Communications & Research Centre (Bicom)