Nebulous is now the norm with Mrs May

Theresa May yesterday accused Jean-claude Juncker of calling her “nebulous” – and of course she would be upset. Nebulous is an antonym of clear, and Mrs May claims to be clear about everything, even as her audiences, including the EU, complain they don’t understand what she’s saying. When she met with the EU27 on Thursday and asked them for help to sell the Withdrawal Agreement to her own MPS, it is reported that the Europeans repeatedly interrupted her to ask exactly what she wants.

A truly clear answer would be “the impossible”. The Withdrawal Agreement is totally unacceptable to a majority of MPS because it contains a backstop arrangement that they believe would turn Britain into a rule-taker. The obvious solution is renegotiation, but the EU has ruled that out. All that is left is to seek from the EU27 a set of reassurances that the backstop won’t be all that bad – and the Europeans haven’t even delivered that. One could ask, why should they? They refuse to change the substance of the agreement, so any reassurances would be a fudge; they know it, the Prime Minister knows it and Britain’s MPS know it.

The problem is that “nebulous” is exactly how Mrs May does business. She seems to believe in the power of rhetorical formulas to paper over policy differences, or provide policy where none exists. Remember “strong and stable”? That was in lieu of a proper manifesto. “Nothing has changed” is often wheeled out at moments when everything has fallen apart. The latest fudge was a withdrawal that was agreed, perfect and about to be put to the Commons, until Mrs May suddenly deemed that it lacked clarity and was clearly unready for a parliamentary vote.

This volte face – like the decision to call a general election that Mrs May insisted the country didn’t need – has come to define her premiership, and one consequence is the death of trust. Yes, the EU27 treated Mrs May abominably this week (again). Apparently, they wanted Parliament “to feel the bleak midwinter”. That attitude is one of the reasons why Britain voted Leave and it is exactly why Brexiteers don’t trust Brussels not to exploit the backstop. Once we’re outside the EU, it’s in the EU’S interest to treat us even worse and keep us locked within their regulatory orbit. But the EU27 are also probably asking themselves how much they can trust Britain’s representatives not to return in a month or two to ask them for yet more reassurances. The UK is supposed to be out the door on March 29 and doesn’t seem very confident about it.

One major problem is the lack of an alternative to scrabbling around for an Eu-approved deal: that’s why the Prime Minister has to beg Brussels for help rather than tell them plainly what the UK wants. The Tory manifesto pledge that “no deal is better than a bad deal” turned out to be untrue. The Government has obviously concluded that almost any deal would be better than no deal, and thus has turned the threat to “walk away” from negotiations into a plea not to let us “crash out”, putting Britain into the position of supplicant.

This is not to say that we should be anything other than courteous and constructive: leaving the EU under any circumstances will be difficult and can only be achieved with cooperation. But the Prime Minister was wrong to allow Remain to define what a no-deal scenario would look like – ie the Apocalypse – when in reality it will consist of many little deals designed to cushion the blow. If there are economic consequences, it is the job of the British government to fashion policies that can compensate. Alas, the Government is no clearer about its economic strategy than anything else.

The picture is one of stalemate. The Prime Minister tells the country that the Europeans will offer assurances in the next few days, but you could forgive the voters for being sceptical. Until substantive changes are made to the Withdrawal Agreement, or a new deal is put on the table, we are stuck in the same nebulous state that we have existed in for over two years.

The Prime Minister seems to believe in the power of rhetorical formulas to paper over policy differences