Britain has a duty to end Libya’s bitter civil war

Having helped to create the conflict, we should not allow Moscow, Ankara and Berlin to make the running

For a country that was one of the chief cheerleaders for regime change in Libya, Britain’s voice has been strangely mute in the global effort to resolve the bitter civil war that has engulfed the country since the overthrow of its dictator, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Boris Johnson, it is true, was present at last weekend’s Berlin summit aimed at ending the fighting. But in terms of exerting influence on how to end the conflict, it is other powers, such as Russia, Turkey and Germany, that are calling all the shots.

Moscow has emerged as a key player in Libya after its decision to back the rebel leader, General Khalifa Haftar, in his attempts to overthrow the Unbacked Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-sarraj. This, in turn, has prompted Turkey to come to the aid of the GNA, hoping this will lead to the creation of a pro-ankara Islamist government similar to the disastrous Muslim

Brotherhood regime that briefly held power in neighbouring Egypt.

Meanwhile, Germany, which strongly opposed the 2011 military campaign led by David Cameron and then French president Nicolas Sarkozy to remove Gaddafi, is hoping its neutrality on the Libyan issue, as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cordial relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, will help to bring hostilities to an end.

The irony that Germany, which actively sought to undermine the Anglo-french military campaign by refusing to provide much-needed air refuelling tankers, now finds itself the key play maker in Libya will not be lost on Mr Cameron. In common with the rest of Whitehall, the former prime minister believed Gaddafi’s removal would lead to a new era of democratic and stable rule in Tripoli.

Instead, the country’s calamitous descent into unending conflict has led successive British governments to wash their hands of this benighted land. The result has been that the likes of Russia and Turkey have filled the void in this key region of the southern Mediterranean, with all the implications that will have for future European security.

Russia’s motivation in siding with General Haftar, who is benefiting from the support of an estimated 1,500 Russian mercenaries from the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group, is not hard to fathom.

Hot on the heels of his success in Syria, Mr Putin believes he can establish another vital foothold in the Arab world, with the added benefit of having access to Libya’s vast oil riches. Moreover, by siding with Egypt in the fight against Libya’s Islamist heartland around Tripoli, Mr Putin hopes the Russian intervention results in closer ties with Cairo, another key North African state that feels it is being neglected by its erstwhile British ally.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to come to the aid of the beleaguered GNA is also, in part, motivated by energy concerns, with Ankara having recently signed a cooperation pact with the GNA to protect Turkey’s new gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, the deployment of Turkish forces to Tripoli allows Mr Erdogan to maintain his support for the numerous Islamist militias operating in the area that already enjoy the benefits of Ankara’s largesse.

The immensely complex landscape of the Libyan conflict is made even more challenging by the deep divisions that have arisen among key European players. Italy, the former colonial power which has significant oil interests to protect in Libya, has thrown its lot in with the GNA, while France, whose priority is to prevent Tripoli-based Islamist groups from plotting further terrorist attacks on the French mainland, contends that only a military strongman like General Haftar can keep the Islamists at bay.

In such circumstances, Mr Johnson might be forgiven for believing Britain’s interests are best served by steering well clear of the Libyan morass. The problem with this approach, though, is that, unless urgent action is taken to arrest the recent alarming escalation in the Libyan crisis, the Prime Minister could see Libya, not Iran, emerge as the first major foreign policy test of his premiership.

So, rather than allowing Moscow, Ankara and Berlin to make all the running on resolving the Libyan conflict, Britain should be working with Washington to put pressure on the warring parties to agree a ceasefire, as well as taking measures to implement the UN’S arms embargo, which should put an end to the gun-running antics of Moscow and Ankara.

This, after all, is the type of bold and assertive policy-making that should define Mr Johnson’s post-brexit vision of Global Britain, one where Britain’s ability to act independently from the rest of Europe provides it with a distinctive voice on vital global issues.

Nor can the Government ignore the deep moral obligation it has towards bringing some semblance of stability to Libya after all the turmoil of the past decade.

Having helped to create this mess in the first place with the Cameron government’s ill-considered decision to remove Gaddafi, the very least we can do is to try to clear it up.