GREECE’S WAR

“STRATEGIC RETIREMENT.”

AFIUM EVACUATED.

FROM A BEAUMONT. ATHENS, WEDNESDAY (7.40 P.M.).

The operations of the Greek army in Asia Minor are apparently entering on a new phase, which may be only transitory. Since last night it had been rumoured that a decision had been reached to retreat from Afium-karahissar and other advanced posts along the Konia railway, which were too exposed. The newspapers have not yet announced this decision, but hints have appeared, and at the present moment it is not yet clear whether the operation has been carried out. It would mean probably that the Greek army was falling back on its original positions near Oushak, and would wait there until new plans were matured and an offensive begun with stronger forces and greater chances of success.

The mere suggestion that the southern army might abandon Afium-karahissar has caused great excitement in certain circles in Athena, where every movement of the Greek troops is watched with jealous sensitiveness and pride. I have had a long conversation with a very high military authority, and it was explained to me that the voluntary falling back of an army must not be taken as an indication of failure. It might only be a preparation for future success. The occupation of Afium-karahissar would have produced its full effect had the northern army been able at the same time to occupy Eskishehr. But since the latter had failed there was a danger of frittering away the forces of the southern army in sterile advances towards Konia, and of exposing it to being cut off by a big surprise attack from the Kemalist northern army. This surprise was actually attempted by the Kemalists, and a three days’ engagement followed at Touloubouna with a strong force brought by Mustapha Kemal from Eskishehr. This was too clear a hint of the danger to which these distant divisions were exposed, and the Greek command was faced with the alternative of either sending reinforcements to hold those positions or of withdrawing the exposed divisions. The first alternative was not advisable, because it would mean drawing away from Smyrna valuable contingents which were intended for other sectors, where a decisive movement was being prepared. It would have meant weakening the main army, wherever that was being concentrated, for the mere satisfaction of reinforcing that part of the army which held only a secondary position in the general plan. An intelligent strategy, therefore, dictated the necessity of adopting the second alternative, and of withdrawing the southern army to safer positions. It entailed the painful step of abandoning Afiumkararhissar, but military necessity required it.

It does not mean that the Greek army is thereby in any way weakened; on the contrary, my informant told me, this movement positively strengthens its position and enables it to prepare calmly for future successful movements.