Trump’s Doha agreement was a retreat dressed as peace deal, and it means the Taliban will be celebrating on the 20th anniversary of 9/11
It seems likely that the 20th anniversary of al-qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the US – the event that brought the American military to Afghanistan – will be remembered for the start of the second Taliban emirate.
Just how fundamentally flawed US Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad’s strategy for negotiating with the insurgents was is now laid bare. It was driven by the US desire to withdraw its troops, meaning the US had given away its bargaining chip before it came to the table. More dangerously, it gambled on the Taliban wanting to negotiate an end to the war rather than try for military victory.
Stemming from that came Khalilzad’s caving in to Taliban demands to exclude the Afghan government from negotiations. From those talks emerged the bilateral Us-taliban deal signed in February 2020 in Doha, a Trump-era agreement that Biden inherited.
To get that deal, Khalilzad prised vague promises from the Taliban – on their dealings with al-qaeda and other international jihadist groups, to begin talking to the government – and just one strong commitment: that they would not attack the US and “its allies”.
In return, the US conceded a swift timetable for the withdrawal of international troops, that the Afghan government would release 5,000 Taliban prisoners, and that it would cease attacks on the Taliban. The US also agreed to work for United Nations sanctions to be lifted.
The Doha agreement bound the US and the Taliban not to attack each other while international troops withdrew. There was to be no ceasefire. Rather, the US had extracted just a 10-day period when violence generally was reduced in the run-up to the deal being signed. The Taliban were then free to attack fellow Afghans again from March 1 2020 onwards.
Khalilzad’s strategy boosted Taliban morale. It gave them legitimacy on the international stage, leant not only by the US but all the other countries whose diplomats flocked to Doha.
US planning appeared not to have allowed even for the possibility that the Taliban might be playing a double game – going along with the negotiations, while actually intent on a military solution, or that they might redouble their efforts to capture Afghanistan by force once the inter national forces left.
After Doha, for example, the US pressured the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take an “active defence” stance, i.e. the ANSF would take, at most, pre-emptive action. The ANSF was forced to wait passively for the Taliban to attack them and could only watch as the Taliban consolidated territory and spoke of the coming victory. Along with the withdrawal of US air support, the active defence stance was a disaster for ANSF morale and further encouraged the Taliban. One of many soldiers and police interviewed by Andrew Quilty in summer 2020 gave a typical account: “The Taliban aren’t stressed about air strikes anymore,” said the deputy commander of an ANP check post on the highway south of Maidanshahr. “They walk around in the open with their weapons… They’re very relaxed, checking everyone slowly and carefully.”
That last quarter of 2020, just after “intra-afghan talks” had finally begun in Doha, was the most violent of any last quarter that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan had monitored. Over the winter, there was also a campaign of unclaimed – but it seemed clear, largely Taliban perpetrated – targeted killings of off-duty ANSF, judges and lawyers, government officials, journalists and activists, in Kabul and other cities. It appeared to be a systematic exercise to dishearten the ANSF, a demonstration that, even in the capital, there was no place of safety. Killing journalists and activists seemed aimed at silencing voices and removing civic opposition ahead of any attempted takeover.
All through this time, Khalilzad’s assumption that the Taliban were pursuing a negotiated peace informed not only US policy but also that of its allies. Internationally, many institutions were commissioned to look into “post-peace” scenarios – studies looked at how a future constitution might work, at “disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration”, women’s rights, the economy and development.
But the Taliban’s attitude to the intra-afghan talks showed every sign of their “running down the clock”, of avoiding any discussion of substantive issues and wasting time until foreign forces left. Despite warm words from the Taliban in Doha, on the ground, there were no signs that the Taliban were preparing for compromise. The leadership did not embark on the sort of work it would have to have done if it had wanted to prepare for an end to the “armed struggle” – quite the opposite: behind the scenes, they were rallying fighters to re-take and establish a new emirate in Afghanistan.
When President Biden announced on April 14 2021 the full, rapid and unconditional withdrawal of US forces, he tied it to a US domestic political event – the 20th anniversary of al-qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. As so often, America’s Afghan policy was pegged to what might sound good to a domestic US audience rather than its consequences for Afghanistan. That gave the Taliban a timetable for action. It means that on September 11 2021, not only the Taliban but also the various violent jihadist groups in the world will be celebrating the 20th anniversary of al-qaeda’s attacks and rejoicing in the second defeat of a superpower by Afghan “mujahideen”.