The full Falklands Exocet story deserves to be told
Forty years ago tomorrow, HMS Sheffield was hit by an Exocet missile in the South Atlantic. Twenty men died. She was the first Royal Navy ship lost since 1945. These were the first British losses in the Falklands war, coming hard on the heels of the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, the Belgrano. I was working in this paper’s offices when the news came through. I remember the shock, and the utter seriousness: emotions rare in a newsroom.
The French-made Exocets were Argentina’s deadliest weapon. Fired from Super Étendard strike fighters, they would drop to the lowest possible level and skim the sea to avoid detection. It was within their power to cripple the British Task Force before it had reached the Falklands.
Sadly, official secrecy has so far prevented the story of Britain’s response to the Exocet threat being told in full, though bits have come out. I have seen no more official documentation than anyone else, but there is clearly a good tale here. A couple of elements of the story follow.
One is British work with Chile. Margaret Thatcher, prime minister at the time, was much criticised for her lifelong loyalty to General Augusto Pinochet, the country’s dictator. But there was a reason for it: through MI6 and others, Britain established a high level of trust with the Pinochet regime, which was hostile to Argentina. Chile possessed Exocets from the same stable as those sold to Argentina. It handed us the secrets about them that it found.
We also obtained information about Argentina’s desperate attempts to buy more of the missiles. This allowed us to block the trade.
Another aspect was our own expert work on the Exocets. Before hostilities, Britain, too, possessed some. Given President Francois Mitterrand’s declared support for Britain in the conflict, the British authorities asked the French about devices, colloquially known as “kill switches”, customarily inserted in the missiles’ seeker-heads. These are placed by manufacturers so that if the weapons, once sold, are ever used against the seller, they can be disabled. The French indicated that they did not include kill switches in their sales lest their presence deter customers.
At least one official, however, doubted the French account and wanted to inspect the seeker-heads of the British Exocets. Because normal defence contracts with foreign powers forbid such investigations, approval had to be sought from No10.
It was, I understand, forthcoming. A seeker-head was taken apart. The official’s anxieties were confirmed. From what was found, it was possible to work out electronic counter measures (ECMS) that could reprogramme the missile as it approached its target. (In one case, ECMS worked to tragic effect. The measures successfully distracted an Exocet attacking HMS Ambuscade, but this meant that it flew on beyond the target and locked on to the Atlantic Conveyor which, being a merchant navy ship, lacked protection. She was hit, with 12 men killed and the helicopters intended to carry troops across the islands destroyed.)
In addition, experts at the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment (ASWE) worked out how to put up “chaff ” to confuse the missile, including a decoy in the shape of a perfect “box” that could fool the Exocet that it, and not a British ship, was the right target. This was attached to the helicopters. One of the helicopter pilots volunteering was the nowadays much-derided Prince Andrew. The Sheffield had carried no active decoys. This lack was remedied for other ships.
As a result of the ASWE’S work, the Task Force gained much greater security than before. It also benefited from key information about how to face an imminent Exocet attack. In the few minutes’ notice before the missile hit, it was necessary to “roll” the ship so that it did not present itself broadside. In the case of HMS Glamorgan, hit by the only land-based Exocet fired, quick thinking by the navigator to execute such a roll prevented the destruction of the entire ship. Fourteen men died, which was bad enough, but a small proportion of the total crew of over 300.
The courage of sailors, soldiers and airmen in the Falklands is rightly celebrated. But it would be good if comparable accolades could be given to the ingenious scientists who worked so resourcefully to outwit the enemy and counteract our own lack of preparedness. Please, tell us more.
Talking to naval Falklands
veterans, I find their view of the war in Ukraine interesting. To them, the successful Ukrainian attack on the heavily armoured Russian flagship Moskva is remarkable.
First, they admire the skills of the Ukrainian navy, which used targeting provided by satellite to hit the Moskva within 16 minutes of receipt. They distracted the Russians’ attention by flying a drone near the ship. Then, they hit it with two Neptune sea-skimming missiles, not unlike the Exocet.
Second, the veterans cannot believe the complacency of the Russians, who ignored the danger of land-based attack (like that on the Glamorgan) and failed to “close down” their ship, the system by which each part of the vessel is sealed from the other to limit fire and explosion. As a result, it seems likely that only 50 men got off the Moskva, of perhaps 500 who had been on board.
I can readily believe that Neil
Parish MP accidentally discovered online pornography while searching for tractors. A shooting friend of mine once googled “English game birds” when looking for pheasant poults to buy, and found something completely different on offer.