The hard truth: Ukraine has left everyone reeling
IWith the conflict entering a stalemate, we are fast approaching the point where negotiations will be the only answer
It must be Zelensky himself who decides to negotiate and not because of Western pressure to do so
n the sixth month of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, it is timely to conduct an interim audit into the progress of the war. The question is often asked as to who is winning and who is losing, but such binary questions are confounded by the complexity of the situation. Indeed, one wonders whether winning or losing is a meaningful concept at all.
The 19th century military theoretician, Karl von Clausewitz, in pronouncing that war was a continuation of politics by other means implied that the active warfighting phase of a conflict was merely a period of violent activity that changed the situation on the ground prior to the resumption of negotiations. With the obvious exception of the Second World War, most modern conflicts have ended in negotiation not outright victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will almost certainly follow this pattern.
Any hope that Vladimir Putin had of a swift outright victory collapsed amidst the extraordinary ineptitude of his military’s failed attack on Kyiv in the early days of the war. Prior to February 24, while gathering his intimidatory and threatening forces on the Ukrainian border, Putin was the world leader to whose door other leaders in the West wanted to beat a path. While threatening, he was in an enormously powerful position, but having launched his totally incompetent “special military operation” he became a pariah with credible accusations of genocide staining his hands.
If Putin’s aggressive posturing before 24th February was designed to split the West, he has failed in that strategic objective, just as the early operational failure by his armed forces has handed initial on-theground success to Ukraine.
Still, in his determination to redraw the boundaries of Eastern Europe, the Russian president has ensured that the second stage of his campaign switched to more achievable operational objectives – namely, securing a land corridor between Crimea and Russia itself and the capture of the two Donbas provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. On the battlefield, the Russian army has switched to tactics more redolent of the Soviet-era Red Army: massive and sustained artillery and cruise missile strikes at close targets to reduce Ukrainian defensive positions and at deep targets to undermine civilian morale. These have had mixed results.
Exerting relentless pressure, the Russians have grinded their bloody way into the majority of the two Donbas provinces and secured the land corridor from Crimea. But this has come at a huge human cost. Reliable sources suggest that the Russian army may have lost around 40,000 in action and multiples of that figure wounded, missing or taken prisoner. Such losses are unsustainable by armed forces, especially those not fully mobilised on to a war footing (Putin remains reluctant to admit that he is actually fighting a war).
At home, pressure from soldiers’ mothers is mounting, reminiscent of the Afghanistan conflict between 1979 and 1989. And in Ukraine, the supply of Western arms and ammunition is turning the tide of success towards the defenders, even encouraging limited counter attacks such as recently in the Kherson area.
But back to the interim audit, do these developments suggest that either side is winning? The provisional conclusion has to be negative. The Russians are approaching a culminating point when, if they can complete the capture of Donbas, they will be exhausted and unable to push further west, while the Ukrainians, reinforced by Western arms and training, will be able to hold new defensive lines in the east of their country. As winter approaches, the conflict on the ground looks set to enter a stalemate, akin to a deep freeze.
Away from the battlefield, other strategic influences are at play. The rupture of diplomatic relations with the West, the cautiousness of China and India and the ambivalence of most African states leaves Putin in a very isolated position on the world stage. Yet, simultaneously, the economic picture appears to be moving in Putin’s favour. Sanctions may be having a negative effect on the Russian economy, but the rouble is strong and the revenue from continuing energy supplies to the West is sustaining the Russian war machine.
Moreover, reduced supplies, particularly of oil, to the West, are being eagerly bought up by the East Asia market. And now, as winter approaches, energy hungry countries like Germany, Austria and Italy who are struggling to diversify the supply of their energy needs might start to break ranks with the current cohesion of the West, giving Putin a glimpse of achieving that strategic objective of dividing Nato.
Furthermore, international pressure orchestrated by the United Nations to restart the flow of Ukrainian grain exports to stave off a food crisis in developing countries has brought Russia and Ukraine to a grudging agreement on that issue. The grudge being underlined by this week’s missile strikes on the grain port of Odesa.
Aggregating the military, diplomatic and economic factors leads to the possible conclusion that the Clausewitz moment to resume negotiations might have arrived. The UK is leading the West in agreeing with President Zelensky that the situation on the ground must return to that of February 24 and possibly that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine – but that will not happen. The Russians will not withdraw voluntarily, the Ukrainians are most unlikely to be strong enough to throw them out, and the West will never contemplate an Iraq-style operation to eject them.
Vladimir Putin will continue to sit tight under his nuclear umbrella and Volodymyr Zelensky may have to accept that about 20 per cent of sovereign Ukrainian territory is under Russian occupation.
That is the changed situation in which negotiations are likely to resume but, critically, it must be Zelensky himself who decides to negotiate and not because of Western pressure to do so. The West must continue to support Ukraine and not start to dictate to her, even though certain European countries would like to see this war end sooner rather than later for their own economic and energy reasons.
By now, it should be clear that the interim conclusion to this audit is more akin to a bitterly fought score draw than either side winning or losing. Even if the situation in Ukraine is likely to remain deeply unsatisfactory for that country, Putin’s aggression must not be seen to have been successful. The future stance of Nato must be determined to deter Russian aggression as it was during the Cold War, but to this there is an obvious and unavoidable cost: defence spending will have to rise.
Member states will make their own decisions on this front, and in the UK, it is now a live issue within the context of the Conservative leadership election.
Boris Johnson pledged to increase our defence spending from 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade. Now Liz Truss has pledged to raise it to 3 per cent. It is unsurprising therefore that Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, popular among the party faithful for his handling of the Ukraine crisis, this week declared his support for her campaign.
Ukraine is fighting for our values at huge cost in blood and treasure. The least we can do is dig deeper into our own pockets to honour that commitment and sacrifice.