In ceding power to wiser generals, Putin is learning from his mistakes

Autocrats who come to believe their own mythologies and surround themselves with yes-men often turn out to be appalling military leaders. This is certainly true of Vladimir Putin. Does the apparent decision to withdraw from the embattled city of Kherson show that he has come to realise his limitations and is willing to let his generals run his war?

Putin, after all, has no meaningful military experience. He did a cursory reserve officer training programme at Leningrad State University back in the 1970s, like every student at the time, but as soon as he graduated and joined the KGB, he used that to get out of any refresher training. Thus there is no evidence that the Russian president really understands the complexities of modern war, even if he delights in macho photo opportunities.

Even so, in deciding he knew best, Putin ignored the Russian military’s carefully structured way of waging war – one that tries to take fullest advantage of its strengths and minimise those failings that have been so obvious in Ukraine.

Instead, he deluded himself into believing that the Ukrainians would not and could not fight, and that this would be a simple takeover rather than a hard-fought invasion. He did not assemble the necessary supplies or unleash the kind of massive preliminary air attacks that Russian doctrine would suggest, or even establish a single commander for the invasion.

This was war as imagined by spooks (with Putin’s closest advisers being Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Security Council, and Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service – both also EX-KGB). Critical planning professionals and military voices were pushed out.

Putin became obsessed with micro-management, personally dictating orders down to the level of brigade and regiment commanders in such operations as the disastrous attempt to force the Siverskyi Donets river in May. He ignored the appeals of his generals who, keenly aware that they lacked manpower on the front line, had been appealing for months for the partial mobilisation that Putin grudgingly approved in September, long after it would have been effective.

These generals had also been signalling for weeks that they needed to pull out of Kherson. When the announcement was finally made, it came in a clumsy double act between Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister, and General Sergei Surovikin, the overall field commander. The man behind the war, the president, was conspicuous by his absence.

There is a powerful historical parallel. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Red Army was caught flat-footed because Joseph Stalin had convinced himself that he knew Hitler would not move until the coming year. None the less, Stalin quickly learnt his lesson. He would largely concentrate on managing the country’s resources and setting broad strategy, allowing his generals much greater freedom of manoeuvre. This was a combination that helped turn the tide of war.

What if Putin is belatedly learning that same lesson? There is a risk here for the Ukrainians, for Russia may begin to pose a more professional challenge to their forces. Kyiv still looks set to win – but the road to victory may be that much longer and more bloody.