Ukraine has its tanks – now for the hard part

After realising its dream Kyiv must grapple with using, maintaining and protecting its ‘metal fist’

It looks as if Ukraine’s leaders will finally realise their dream of having Western tanks – but can they use them? Tanks cannot take enemy positions and hold ground on their own, of course. For that, battlefield commanders need other parts of the military orchestra to all be in tune.

First the infantry needs to be able to get the tanks close enough to blast enemy positions as it closes the critical last few hundred yards.

Then, engineers, to breach minefields or get the force across rivers that have had bridges blown.

Next, artillery, to cover the flanks preventing the enemy from counter attacking along with an umbrella of air defence to stop Russian jets and helicopters interfering.

Prior to all this, low-loaders will be required to get the tanks to the front. Tanks rarely travel under their own steam meaning the low-loaders they require need protecting too.

Of course, when offered very capable Western main battle tanks such as Leopard, Abrams and Challenger the correct response is “yes please” even if their logistic tails are largely bespoke and intricate.

So, for Ukraine the (likely) tank decision is just the start of a wider industrial headache, albeit one clearly falling in the bracket of “a nice problem to have”.

Donations of weapons from multiple sources throw up their own set of problems. In the medium-term Ukraine is likely to slim down to an all-leopard fleet (mostly Leopard IIS but also including some Leopard I models still held by German industry).

Kyiv now finds itself in a similar position to Britain circa 2006, when military and political chiefs in London realised the kit they had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan wasn’t up to the job. So started a colossal – and expensive – process of rapidly bringing into service “Urgent Operational Requirements” to plug the immediate gap.

The resulting equipment was generally very good, but hampered by being designed to solve one problem only.

New vehicles could rarely operate together. Existing communication equipment had to be clunkily integrated, sometimes literally bolted on. The logistic tails were the polar opposite of the slick, efficient, fat-free, just-in-time architectures beloved of supply professionals.

After a hesitant start, the Treasury took to fire-hosing cash around to save lives and fend off military defeat.

Wellington said after the Battle of Waterloo: “Napoleon built his campaigns of iron and when one piece broke the whole structure collapsed.

“I made my campaigns using rope, and if a piece broke I tied a knot.”

For the foreseeable future, Ukraine will be tying knots.

For now troops and civilians will have to rely on their ability to be adept at battlefield innovation.

However, they will need to do even more patching up on a systemic industrial scale to meet this challenge.

They may need to shift to something approaching a war economy, at great cost to their domestic industrial output.

They may need a maintenance and production facility to make this work in the long term, perhaps in Poland as Tobias Ellwood, chairman of the Commons defence select committee, suggested on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme.

Time will be an important factor. Getting tanks and other armoured equipment into the country and even to the front line is likely to be measured in weeks for the Leopards and Challengers, perhaps months for the Abrams.

But that’s just the delivery service. Extra time (and locations outside the country) will be needed to train the crews and mechanics.

How does this fit with Ukraine’s operational plans and the anticipated Russian spring offensive? So many logistic, industrial, political, societal and operational hurdles to overcome.

But what if ? If Ukraine can pull it off, can they win?

There are countless reasons why an armoured thrust by Ukraine could be absorbed and even repelled by Russia.

But done correctly, Ukraine could use these tanks to form the core of an armoured division to punch through Russian lines.

Where might this punch be aimed? A drive east through the Donbas would retake territory held by Russia since the 2014 invasion; potentially delivering a shattering political blow to Vladimir Putin.

Alternatively, a push south-east towards the coast could split Russian forces in two – one part in the Donbas, the other in Crimea and the land immediately north of the peninsula.

If Ukraine can hold this ground, losing the land-bridge to Crimea would place Russian forces there under immense pressure – a potentially war-winning move.

Moscow’s exhausted forces have underwhelmed so far in this war. There is every reason to expect Ukraine could make that problem worse for them with the application of a heavy metal fist.