Funding crisis No proof, but the damage is hard to undo
Unsupported Israeli allegations about Unrwa links to terrorism led donors to cut $450m (£365m) in funding to the main humanitarian agency working in Gaza, at a time when its people were dying in droves. Three months later, the situation has only worsened with the onset of a famine on top of the bombing, the collapse of healthcare, the lack of water and the epidemics. And despite a rigorous inquiry by a former French foreign minister, Catherine Colonna, there is still no evidence for the claim that significant numbers of Unrwa employees have ties to Hamas or Islamic Jihad.
There is a separate review under way into specific claims Unrwa employees took part in the 7 October attack, but that investigation is not complete, UN officials say. The last time there was a progress report, Israel was still withholding cooperation.
The Colonna inquiry, a broader assessment of Unrwa neutrality, wrote to the Israeli authorities in March and again in April asking for evidence behind Israeli claims of Hamas and Islamic Jihad ties.
Arguably, Israel did not need to cooperate as Unrwa’s donors proved themselves to be all too eager to cut off funding without seeing any evidence.
Most of the major country donors have since resumed the flow of funds. The UK has held back and Germany is only funding Unrwa operations outside Gaza.
For the US, formerly Unrwa’s biggest funder, it is too late. Congress has insisted US funding of the agency should not resume until March 2025 at the earliest.
There was an element of miscalculation and accident in how this funding crisis unfolded. On 18 January, Unrwa’s commissioner general, Philippe Lazzarini, was summoned to the Israeli foreign
ministry and presented with a list of a dozen Unrwa staff alleged to have taken part in the Hamas attack on 7 October.
Lazzarini found that the 12 named men indeed were or had been employees, though two had died. There was no evidence to prove the other 10 played any role on 7 October, but Lazzarini used his powers to fire them anyway, to protect Unrwa operations in Gaza.
However, the dismissals heightened the misgivings of donor governments, who reasoned that the staff would not have been fired in the absence of a serious problem.
Within a day of Lazzarini’s announcement, the first nine donors had suspended funding.
Those decisions were taken in an environment which Israel had cultivated over the years in which Unrwa was perceived as a captive of Hamas in Gaza.
The Colonna review recognises the challenges that the agency has faced. Almost all Unrwa staff are local in a system in which Hamas is the overwhelming political force.
The Colonna report credits Unrwa with significant efforts to maintain its neutrality. The review also lists various ways in which Unrwa’s procedures could be made even more rigorous.
What emerges vividly from Colonna’s account is Israeli nonengagement both before and after 7 October. It is a political issue. The agency’s full name is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, reflecting the fact that it was founded in the aftermath of the 1948 Israeli war of independence. The Palestinians displaced by that conflict, and by the wars that followed, are still refugees, together with their descendants. That legal status, enshrined in Unrwa’s name, implies a right of return under international law.
Until then, Unrwa is a reminder to Israel of its obligations as an occupying power, and to some Israelis it is therefore an enemy to be eliminated, no matter what the cost in Palestinian lives.
Arguably, Israel did not need to cooperate as donors cut off funds without evidence