Why couldn’t a border work?

ALEXANDER McKay (Letters, October 23) berates the Scottish Government because its “forecasts and plans” fail to take into account “the reaction of the others involved”.

First of all, those reactions are unknown, at least in their specific content. Secondly, Mr McKay may have forgotten but, in 2014, David Cameron steadfastly refused to discuss the possible outcome of any future negotiation on Scottish independence.

However, let’s consider Mr McKay’s typically unconstructive forecasts, including the roads on which there will be a hard border. Sweden (EU member) and Norway (part of EEA but no customs union) have many roads crossing their lengthy border, many in out-of-the-way mountainous regions, yet only a few have border checks. Why is this possible there, but not here?

He considers free movement in the UK would be at best under threat, if not ended, yet there is free movement between Ireland (EU member) and the UK (no longer an EU member). Why possible with Ireland but not Scotland?

But, more importantly, a clear opening position is necessary to negotiate seriously. The lack of this was a major weakness for the UK in its Brexit negotiations, as Michel Barnier points out endlessly in his “Secret Brexit Diary”.

Mr McKay goes on to point out that “the rest of the UK is a very much larger entity”, as is the EU. The EU is often described as a “rules-based organisation”. Does Mr McKay believe that it will abandon this in the case of Scotland? If so, why? Even if good neighbourliness is beyond the UK, will it obey at least international law and its commitments? Or does Mr McKay expect the UK will simply throw its weight about to achieve whatever its ends are? Does he consider this a “good thing”? But, more importantly, how many of the Scottish electorate would want to remain in a state that would do this? How much better than Russia would it be, if it did?

Alasdair Galloway, Dumbarton.