Has the forward march of Corbynism been halted?
Jeremy Corbyn succeeded because he defined himself as against the system: but with his party split and his message fading, the strategy has come unstuck, says John Rentoul
It is odd that the two main parties should be splintering now. It looks as if the imminent crunch of leaving the EU has finally forced party loyalties to break. But the paradox is that, as Anna Soubry admitted, none of this week’s defections changes the parliamentary arithmetic on Brexit. What is more, “the last thing this country needs is a general election” to change that arithmetic, Soubry added.
But the causes of the defections from both main parties go beyond Brexit, and the implications of the launch of the Independent Group of MPs are more for Jeremy Corbyn than for the prime minister.
After all, the Conservative Party doesn’t intend to fight the next election under Theresa May’s leadership, whereas Labour Party members are eager and hopeful to see Corbyn try to repeat the trick of exceeding expectations that he pulled off last time.
The true significance of the Independent Group could be that it marks the point at which the forward march of Corbynism was halted. For three and a half years Corbyn has defied all challenges and overcome them. Three times he seemed to be becalmed, facing defeat and yet he surprised everyone – including himself.
In the election campaign Corbyn and Seumas Milne promised change versus more of the same, the oldest dividing line in democratic history, and their anti-establishment pitch succeeded beyond their wildest dreams
When he agreed, with the mock reluctance that is still required in old-fashioned socialist circles, to allow his name to be put forward for the party leadership, he did not expect to attract enough nominations to be a candidate, let alone to win. But he was the authentic outsider against the system. That was a message whose time had come.
The membership surge he attracted produced more revenue for the party than it known for many years – never mind the myth of £3 registered supporters, most of the new recruits paid full fare – which meant he took over a party that was suddenly solvent.
However, the rise in membership numbers stalled, and Corbyn faced a revolt of Labour MPs after he appeared to welcome the result of the 2016 EU referendum. He brushed off a vote of no confidence by his parliamentary party and the mass resignations of shadow ministers. But then, faced with a challenge from Owen Smith, he fought a second leadership election, attracting a second surge of new members, taking the party over the half-million mark.
The respite was short. His standing, and that of his party, in opinion polls drifted as Theresa May continued to enjoy a halo effect as a new prime minister. Twenty points ahead, she went to the country to ask for a mandate of her own to negotiate our departure from the EU. Corbyn held his nerve and Seumas Milne, the executive director of strategy and communications for the
Labour Party, stuck to his strategy. The strategy that Milne directs, as his grandiose job title has it, and which he helps the leader to communicate, is simple: to keep Corbyn Labour on brand, the brand being “against the system”.
In the election campaign Corbyn and Milne simply ignored Brexit and focused on the accumulated discontents of seven years of fiscal stringency: policing, housing, schools and the NHS. They promised change versus more of the same, the oldest dividing line in democratic history, and their antiestablishment pitch succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.
Everything that was thrown at the Labour leader was turned into a strength. His anti-Americanism was turned into an argument that a US-led foreign policy had made Britain a target for terrorism. His hostility to private enterprise was turned into a plan to nationalise resented utility companies. And his interest in Latin American Marxism and the history of Irish republicanism were just badges of his authenticity.
On election night, before the exit poll was announced, Corbyn asked his inner team to predict the result. Milne was among those who predicted a large Conservative majority, with only Karie Murphy, Corbyn’s chief of staff, expecting to accompany the leader to Buckingham Palace the next day.
As it was, Corbyn and Murphy didn’t go to the palace, but Labour gained seats rather than losing them, and although it fell just short of preventing a Tory-DUP majority defeat seemed like a victory. Milne’s presentation of Corbyn as the authentic outsider enjoyed its finest hour.
It was surprising that Corbyn and his inner circle did so little to avert the split
For all his time as leader, the strategy of being “against the system” has worked a treat. Sticking to the brand helped him hold together the Remain-heavy Labour coalition of Remainers and Leavers. The most vociferous Remainers were identified with the Blairite elite, so Corbyn kept his distance while favouring a softer Brexit than the government’s. That allowed Remainers to vote for him in 2017 while allowing the main campaign to focus on other things.
It was only this year that the Milne strategy came unstuck. Corbyn’s aides could see May’s offer of crossparty talks on Brexit coming a mile off. They knew she would have to put her deal to parliament and that it would be defeated by a large margin. As the moment approached, was put off and then approached again, they expected the prime minister – the moment the result of the vote was announced – to invite opposition MPs, including the leaders, to talk to her about the way forward.
As they discussed how Corbyn should respond, they stuck to the strategy that had served them so well. Corbyn should refuse to talk to the prime minister, the personification of the establishment, unless she agreed to his demand for a permanent customs union. They knew she would refuse, not least because her party would become unmanageable if she agreed, so they believed Corbyn would appear reasonable and yet keep his hands clean by not fraternising with the enemy.
It was a mistake. Public opinion was strongly in favour of cross-party talks and even Corbyn-supporting Labour members were confused and uncertain.